When corruption spreads, it tends to block collective action, consequently, institutional reforms to combat it are not adequately defined or implemented. What variables can contribute to the success of reforms in high-corruption environments? To answer this question, we have used complexity theory, particularly the need to identify leverage points that allow, in each system, positive and verifiable progress. We have built a model that would identify which could be the most useful leverage points in the design and implementation phase of corruption prevention policies. This model was tested in case studies from local and regional governments in Brazil and Spain, finding successful outcomes in one case from each country, using for Spain regionally representative surveys and a system of structural equations to test the assumed causal relationships. The joint results show that, unlike other cases where no substantial progress has been made, in the two cases studied, it has been possible to find leverage points for the initiation of positive changes in the short, medium, and long term. These lessons can be useful for other municipalities and regions in other democratic countries, being aware that each system, in its context, should find its own leverage points to be successful.
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