Citizenship,Indigeneity,and the Experiences of 1.5- and Second-Generation Fulani Herders in Ghana

Abstract

Issues of indigeneity and citizenship rights for second-generation pastoralist migrants across the West African States have received little to no attention in migration and pastoralist studies. This article explores this under-researched area in the field of migration studies and revisits the highly contested migration–citizenship nexus among Fulani herders in the Shai-Osu-Doku and Agogo traditional areas of Ghana. The article captures the crises of citizenship facing descendants of Fulani herders and families, particularly in relation to their integration into local host communities. I argue that second-generation migrants remain at the margins, spatially and socio-politically defined, of both development and society. While they do not have any ties with their ancestral “home countries,” they are also considered non-citizens and face growing hostility in the places they call home. Being a citizen is not simply a static legal position, but a status developed through routine practices, building relations, and shared experiences.

Introduction

This article explores an under-researched area in migration studies and revisits the contested migration–citizenship nexus using the Fulani herders in the Shai-Osu-Doku and Agogo traditional area of Ghana as a case in point. The Fulani herders who are described as a non-indigenous ethnic group are in conflict with indigenous farmers in these areas. Factors that cause farmer–herder conflict include insecurity in land tenure systems, increasing numbers of livestock and human population, increasing migration of herders in search of natural resources, and the unfriendly struggle for scarce resources, among others (Al Okoli and Atelhe, 2014; Tonah, 2006). As Odoh et al. (2012) and Turner et al. (2011) show, climate change exacerbates many of these factors. Other scholars point to the construction of citizenship status of pastoralists as the reason behind the incessant farmer–herder conflict in some parts of Africa (e.g. Afolabi, 2014; Keller, 2014; Setrana, 2018a, 2018b). Brosché and Sundberg’s (2018) work on Darfur in Sudan illustrate a case in which the state fuels conflict by favouring the “sons of the soil” (the indigenes) over the so-called “outsiders.” Adesoji and Alao (2009) argue that the rigid definition of citizenship is a major cause of conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria. The Mahamid Arabs, who are nomads in Niger and are said to have Chadian origin, were threatened to be expelled because they are perceived as outsiders by the communities of residence (Manby, 2015). Other cases of citizenship questions also exist among other ethnic groups who are not necessarily pastoralists. In Liberia, the Mandingo ethnic group who are of Guinean origin, are threatened to be expelled by the indigenes, even though they are long-term settlers (Maze, 2015). Similarly, the Fula Muslim traders in Sierra Leone are constantly challenged as they access property and land because they are described as foreigners. Meanwhile, they are one of the six dominant ethnic groups in the country (Maze, 2015).

The case of Ghana is no exception. A litany of laws and decrees have attempted but failed to find an answer to the “indigenous–foreigner” question among farmers and herders. These include the Aliens Compliance Order in 1969, the expulsions of 1988/89 and 1999/2000, and the recent expulsions of 2012 (Olaniyan et al., 2015). During these expulsions, the military and police have been ordered not only to expel Fulani pastoralists from Ghana, particularly from the Northern, Brong-Ahafo, and Ashanti regions, but also to seize their cattle. In most cases, the perceived lack of interest by the state in protecting the rights of pastoralists has forced them to resist government authority by acquiring weapons to defend themselves (Soeters et al., 2017). These struggles have led to the destruction of crops, killing of cattle, and harassment or social vices in the communities of residence.

Although these issues of citizenship exist among indigenes and non-indigenes, they have received little to no attention in migration and pastoralists studies. Schlee (2010: 9) observes that patterns of conflict in pastoralist areas are increasingly influenced by national debates, where the notion has gained ground that “every group has a homeland and that indigenes have the right to expel minorities by force.” In the countries of residence, legal systems pose challenges to the citizenship status of pastoralists (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2014). These legal complexities undermine pastoralists’ access to land and prevent them from enjoying the rights and responsibilities because they are perceived as aliens (Atuguba et al., 2020; Oppong, 2017), even though they may have permanent residence status.

Even more complicated is the fact that while citizenship is important, it does not necessarily provide some individuals such as herders entitlement to resources in the country of their citizenship. Citizenship allows them to be part of the struggle for resources (Mamdani, 2005); however, the actual access depends on how citizenship is defined. I argue that 1.5- and second-generation ¹ herders remain vulnerable and are socio-politically distanced from both development and society. While they do not have any ties with their ancestral “home countries,” they are also considered non-citizens and face growing hostility in the places they call home. This article thus seeks to explore citizenship as one of the causes of the farmer–herder conflict and its implications on livelihoods. The article further examines the extent to which 1.5- and second-generation Fulani herders conceptualise their citizenship through everyday practices in their local communities, despite the contradictions and tensions in the legal requirements of Ghana’s citizenship.

Fulani pastoralist migrants settled in the eastern parts of West Africa after migrating from Futa Jalon in Guinea in the eleventh century. The Fulani pastoralists are part of the dominant ethnic groups, spreading from the Atlantic Coast to the Red Sea (Tonah, 2005). Large numbers of Fulani pastoralists have settled in Northern Nigeria due to their ability to create space among the indigenous population (Tonah, 2005). In other parts of West Africa such as Ghana, the numbers were few and so they could not create their own settlement. As such, they have been considered migrants.

Fulani pastoralist migrants have lived in Ghana for many years. While the 1948 census indicated that there were approximately 20,000 Fulani pastoralists in Ghana, the 1960 census suggested that this number had risen to approximately 25,050 (in Oppong, 2017: 51–52). The majority lived in the Northern, Ashanti, Greater Accra, and Eastern regions. The data also showed that the majority (86.2 per cent) were non-Ghanaians, having migrated from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. Per the 1960 census, 91 per cent of the Fulani were Muslims, 7.3 per cent were traditionalist, 0.5 per cent were Christians, and 0.5 per cent had no religion (in Oppong, 2017: 51–52). According to the 2000 census, which is the most recent estimate, there were a total of 300,000 Fulani including pastoralists in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2002). Unfortunately, the breakdown is unknown. For this reason, this study relied on primary sources of data collected through life history interviews with herders and some leaders of the farmers’ associations. The article addresses its objective by, reviewing the literature on the “everyday conceptualisation of citizenship.” The next section discusses the legal requirements of Ghanaian citizenship; this is followed by a description of the study areas and methods used in collecting and analysing the data. The penultimate section narrates how citizenship is conceptualised in the everyday life of Fulani herders’ households, and ends with a discussion and concluding section on the construction of citizenship by Fulani herders.

Conceptualising Citizenship in Everyday Life Experiences

Beyond legal debates on Fulani herders’ citizenship, citizenship from a sociological point of view is based on how individuals define their identity and belongingness to the state, as well as their experiences and practices (Pailey, 2016). In clarifying such sociological standpoints, Glenn (2011: 10) defines citizenship as “fundamentally a matter of belonging, including recognition by other members of the community and not simply a fixed legal status, but a fluid status that is produced through everyday practices and struggles.” Isin (2000: 5) also conceptualises citizenship as “norms, practices, meanings, and identities which are constantly negotiated by individuals and social groups, placing less of an emphasis on the formal legal status with attendant rights and privileges in a territorial boundary.” The relevance of defining citizenship beyond the legal status is critical to the survival of Fulani herders in their communities of residence. Such definitions give meanings and identities to their everyday lives as they consistently negotiate for their place in society. These social processes are connected with the concept of social citizenship. Glick Schiller (2005: 31) describes social citizenship as “claiming rights to citizenship through social practice rather than through the law.” Expanding on social processes, Glick Schiller (2005) introduces the concept of social citizenship, which is inclusive, but broader than the definition of cultural citizenship. Glick Schiller’s explanation is, however, limited to trans-border citizens; yet it is also relevant in other contexts where long-term migrants and their households might have lost contact with their home country. Such migrants tend to be a minority group, living at the margins of communities in destination countries.

Citizenship among long-term residence raises concerns about who indigenous versus non-indigenous are, as well as first arrivals versus new arrivals (Berry, 2009; Maze, 2015). These concerns could further be deepened through people’s ethnicity, religion, and occupation (Lund, 2011). The Fulani herders who have lived for a very long time in their communities but facing some of these citizenship problems find ways of negotiating their identity and belongingness through lived experiences. Maze (2015: 19) gives the following examples of first-comers and later arrivals to depict its widespread in West Africa:

In Liberia, the Mandingos are [a] Muslim group widely regarded to be of Guinean origin. They are commonly referred to as newcomers or foreigners, even though they may have been living in Liberia since the 18th century. Members of ethnic groups claiming first- comer or indigenous status have attempted to expel members of the “foreigners” or migrant ethnic groups from their land, and in particular members of the Mandingo.

Sierra Leone is home to about sixteen ethnic groups, the largest being the Temne, Mende, Limba, and Fula. The Fula, Muslim traders, are often portrayed as “foreigners” by other Sierra Leoneans, which results in frequent struggles over property and land access. However, the application of “foreigner” and “outsider” exists to different degrees in every country throughout the [West African] region, especially among the transhumance pastoralists.

These experiences are not different from the experiences of herders in Ghana over the years. As indicated earlier, Fulani herders have been expelled severally from Ghana by different successive governments because they clashed with indigenous farmers. These expulsions have by no means achieved the intended purposes. The perceived lack of interest by the state in protecting the rights of pastoralists has marginalised them and compelled them to challenge government authority by defending themselves through the use of weapons (Soeters et al., 2017). Similarly, Mkutu (2008) records how pastoralists in Karamoja, Northern Uganda, armed themselves for protection against external aggression because the government failed to offer them the necessary security. Because pastoralists are also not regarded as citizens of Ghana and often remain unprotected by the state (Bukari and Schareika, 2015), the assumption of government bias by pastoralists has been a critical factor for the outbreak of violent conflict (Brosché and Sundberg, 2018).

Despite these consistent questions of citizenship and indigeneity across the West African States, there is still a knowledge gap capturing the crises of citizenship facing Fulani herders, particularly to their integration into local host communities. The article focuses on how tensions with their “hosts” undermine community development and social cohesion and fuel violence.

Ghanaian Citizenship

The Citizenship Act 2000 (ACT 591) of Ghana recognises four routes by which one can be considered a citizen of Ghana: (1) by birth, (2) through adoption, (3) by marriage, or (4) by naturalisation (Government of Ghana, 2000). However, among these four modes of acquiring citizenship in Ghana, the most debatable has been citizenship by birth (Agbemava, 2015). Ghana’s citizenship by birth is by blood – that is, jus sanguinis. The jus sanguinis formally excludes herders’ households and their descendants from taking part in the decision-making of the country. The following sections discuss the citizenship requirements of Ghana in detail:

Part one, sections two to seven of the Citizenship Act 2000 (591) determine one’s citizenship by birth. However, the Act further states that a person is a citizen of Ghana by birth within certain periods if at the date of his or her birth either one of his or her parents or one grandparent was a citizen of Ghana. The Act is not strict on the place of birth so long as the latter criterion, which is about ancestral blood, is fulfilled. The Act requires that citizenship of Ghana be traced to a parent or grandparent, even when the person has been born in Ghana, and lived in the country before independence in 1957 and the promulgation of the 1992 constitution. The challenge faced by the second-generation Fulani herders is tracing their ancestry or grandparents. In most cases, they are not aware of these constitutional requirements to even pursue them because of their low education as well as their inability to write and read.

The other option for these Fulani migrants is through the Citizenship Act 2000 (Act 591) and the citizenship regulations 2001 (LI 1690), which makes room for citizenship by naturalisation and registration (Government of Ghana, 2000, 2001). The constitution of Ghana requires that for one to naturalise, the following requirements must be met: (1) speak at least one local language fluently; (2) must have lived in Ghana for 5 years; and (3) must be of good character. In addition, the naturalisation demands that the herder should have a residence permit, as well as pay a fee of 6,000 Ghanian cedis (GHC) or 1,225 US dollars (USD). Unfortunately, the cost is so high, especially for the herders living in remote parts of Ghana (Ministry of Interior, 2020). The third option is that, through marriage, the second-generation herders’ households automatically become Ghanaians.

Although the legal frameworks provide these requirements, it is worth noting that the process of acquiring citizenship through these requirements can be very challenging, while others may not even have any knowledge about them. Comparing all the other options, citizenship through marriage seems to be the most open criterion for the herders. This ethnographic study gives insights into how these legal means of citizenship juxtapose with the everyday experiences of the Fulani herders.

Study Areas, Research Methods, and Profile of Participants

The article examines how citizenship is conceptualised in everyday life of 1.5- and second-generation herders’ households as a means of resolving the tensions existing between them and the farmers. To make this argument, this article relies on interviews conducted in Jorpanya, Kodiabe, and Doryumu in the Shai Osudoku District and Agogo in the Agogo traditional area in Akim North District of the Ashanti region. The Agogo traditional area is somewhat independent or quasi-autonomous, with the paramount chief and the traditional council controlling the affairs of the district and wielding power over traditional lands, but still coming under the sovereign power of the nation-state. This setup is distinctive of the people of Agogo traditional area compared to the Shai Osudoku District. However, Fulani herders have lived for a very long time in these areas, and hence these areas are worth choosing for the focus of this article. The major occupation in these studied communities is farming.

The empirical evidence is based on a triangulation of qualitative methods for an in-depth understanding of the opportunities and challenges Fulani herders face, as they conceptualise and experience citizenship in the two study locations. The study was conducted from July to December 2017. Ten Fulani herders and their households were observed and interviewed using a life-history approach in each of the communities. There were four focus group discussions (FGDs), two in each of the communities. The FGDs involved community leaders of the farmers’ association and community leaders of the herder’s association. The qualitative questions focused on the migration history of pastoralists, farmer–herder relationship, and citizenship challenges and opportunities (e.g. access to land, issues of language, etc.). I sought permission from the traditional leaders before entering into the community to begin the study. I was led by a key informant into the community of the herders, which was on the outskirts of the main township in both cases. Due to different times of herding and other activities of the communities, I was able to interview herders who were available to take part in the study. It was mostly impossible for me to have interviews alone with other household members, such as wives and children, in the absence of the (male) herder. Because of this, I organised each household interview with the entire household, where the herdsmen answered the questions and the wife/wives and children provided any additional information that was left out by the herdsmen. The average number of persons in the households was four. Pseudonyms have been adopted for the narratives to protect the identity of respondents. I moved from one community to another once I reached saturation point. I minimised the biases associated with snowballing by identifying different contact persons in the various communities who assisted me to recruit cattle owners and Fulani pastoralists. The interviews were mostly conducted in Twi and Dangme, ² which are the native language of the study areas. The English language is rarely used in these regions. The interviews were coded and later translated and transcribed into English. The thematic data analysis was done by identifying themes and sub-themes on the construction of citizenship, challenges, and peacebuilding measures. Based on the analysis of the interviews, four themes emerged: conceptualisation of Fulani citizenship and language acquisition; citizenship – access to land and other resources; citizenship and livelihood strategies; citizenship, education, and marriage.

The University of Ghana Ethics Committee for Humanities granted a national ethical clearance before the start of the data collection. I also obtained permission from traditional leaders before entering the community. The consent of individual participants were sought before the interviews.

The wives of the herders’ households were mainly involved in milking the animals for sale. The lowest age of the herdsmen was thirty-two while the oldest was fifty-eight years old. The youngest wife from the various households was twenty-two years old while the eldest was forty-five years. While some of the children had had formal education and were employed in the formal sector as nurses and teachers, others were learning to take over their parents’ herding business. Some of the younger male children of school-going age were school dropouts who were assisting their fathers in herding animals. Almost all the herdsmen and their wives had not had any form of formal education.

The herders indicated that they migrated into the studied communities in search of greener pastures for their animals as well as find cattle owners who needed herders for their animals. Cattle rearing has been the main occupation of these herdsmen households for generations. The main reason why the wives also migrated was to join their husbands. Since their migration into these communities, they had lived in the communities for a minimum of four years and a maximum of thirty years.

Narratives: Construction of Citizenship among 1.5- and Second-Generation Fulani Herders

Conceptualisation of Citizenship of Fulani Herders and Language Acquisition

All the participants traced their roots to other West African countries such as Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mali. They all said their grandparents and parents migrated to Ghana as herders looking for pasture for their animals. They eventually settled in the northern part of Ghana where their extended families have lived till now, although they had been living in other parts of the country. The narratives below throw light on the countries of origin of these households and how they relate to citizenship.

In herder household 1, Oko and his household live in a small community of herders located at the outskirt of Osudoku. Oko is a 1.5-generation Fulani herder who accompanied his parents to a small town in the upper-west region at a very tender age – his parents told him that they migrated from Burkina Faso. His wife, Sala, is a Fulbe who was also born in a town located in the upper-west region and identifies herself as a Ghanaian but belongs to the Fulbe ethnic group. ³ She believes that her grandparents, as she was told by her mother, hailed from Mali.

In herder household 2, the herder is thirty-two years of age. He was born in Mali and brought to Bawku at a tender age. He first migrated from Bawku to Tamale and later to Winneba. He is married to Amina, who is twenty-five years old, and was born in Bawku in the northern region of Ghana. Amina’s parents were originally from Niger. She has no formal education. The husband who is the herder lived in Tamale, in the northern region of Ghana for twenty years and later moved to live in Winneba for seven years with his wife and children before settling in Agogo, where he is currently employed as a herder. He has been in this community for the past four years. There are three children in this household, a boy and two girls. They came into this community because their brother was already living in the community. His eldest son is fourteen years old and a class five school dropout who is learning the herding business.

The herdsmen and their wives were either 1.5- or second-generation Fulani herders who migrated to Ghana with their parents or were born in Ghana more than twenty years ago. With regard to their current place of residence, they have lived in the studied communities for at least four years but not more than twenty years. The herders regard Ghana as their home and do not belong to any other country. These decisions were also confirmed by the farmers FDG 1; they said:

where will the Fulani herders go to if they are evacuated, they have lived with us all their lives. […] And the real complex issue is that they have come to live here up to this time. They have brought forth children; if you were born in 1997 in Ghana, I don’t know which country you will go back to you are a Ghanaian, and that is the reality. (interviewed in Agogo)

The narratives from the participants equate permanent residency to citizenship and belongingness. By living in Ghana and participating in the activities of Agogo and Osudoku for this number of years, the herders and their households have developed binding ties to Ghana. They negotiate their identities and practices within their communities of residence, rendering the legal status of belonging less valuable (Isin, 2000). On the contrary, the 1992 constitution contradicts such definitions of citizenship. The 1992 constitution and the Citizenship Act 2000 (ACT 591) and regulation 2001 of Ghana state that by law, one can be a citizen of Ghana by birth, through adoption, marriage, or naturalisation.

Restricting Ghana’s citizenship to birth right – jus sanguinis – excludes herder households 1 and 2 from enjoying citizenship rights such as voting during an election or even acquiring a Ghanaian passport. The 1992 constitution also disqualifies such Fulani herders based on the “primordial attachment Act.” The Act requires that citizenship of Ghana be traced to a parent or grandparent, and being born in Ghana. Being a second-generation migrant (i.e. born in Ghana) still does not qualify one as a Ghanaian. The challenge these herders’ households face is the lack of official birth records for themselves, and even worst for their parents or grandparents who would have had citizenship of Ghana. Generally, official birth records are a challenge in many remote areas where these herders live. Women gave birth at home rather than in a health clinic, for various reasons such as distance to a health care facility and lack of money. It is only recently that the government of Ghana has made available birth attendants in some of these remote communities without hospitals or clinics.

In many African countries, the codification of citizenship by birth is interpreted as a place of origin of one’s ancestors (Keller, 2014). Following these debates by Mamdani (2005) and Kabeer (2005), such definitions of citizenship are western oriented. They exclude and create inequalities that have generated conflicts in some West African countries. Similarly, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2014) explains that it makes no sense to deny people a right to the [land] resources they have lived on for centuries. As will be explained later, although there is a consensus among participants that the herders are Ghanaians based on the explanations offered, it does not necessarily give them access to resources as indigenes. This is emanating from the fact that these rights are linked to citizenship and indigeneity (explained under “Access to Land”).

Following these challenges of citizenship by birth, other ways by which herders may want to acquire citizenship is through the Citizenship Act 2000 (Act 591) and the Citizenship Regulations 2001 (LI 1690). They provide for the major means by which a person may become a citizen of Ghana other than by birth. These laws provide for citizenship by naturalisation and registration. The Fulani herders have accommodation and livelihoods, speak the language, and have access to healthcare although they are located geographically far from where they live. Yet these pathways to citizenship are seldom known by herders and their households. The story of Idrisu illustrates the option of citizenship by naturalisation and registration much more clearly.

Idrisu is a second-generation Fulani herder in herder household 3, who took after his father’s cattle after his father’s demise in Osudoku. He learnt cattle herding from his father as a young boy. He has never had any formal education. He is forty years old and claims Ghana to be his home, although he knows his roots are from Nigeria. He was born in Ghana and has lived in Ghana all his life. However, he is not aware of the requirements for naturalisation. Idrisu challenges the fact that they have to naturalise in order to “become” Ghanaians. He says he and his family are already Ghanaians by birth, they are fluent in local languages, and take part in social activities in Ghana and their communities.

One of the key informants during the farmer’s FGD had this to say about the herders and their households about speaking the local language of the community: “the Fulani herdsmen in this community speak Twi, even better than us, we the indigenes. We are able to communicate very well with them. They also speak Hausa; they speak both Twi and Hausa” (Osudoku, key informant, FGD).

Sociologically, Glenn (2011) defines citizenship as fundamentally a matter of belonging and not simply a fixed legal status, but a fluid status that is produced through everyday practices and struggles. The 1.5- and second-generation Fulani herders who were born or had lived in the studied communities over the years behave as “Ghanaians” and exhibit Ghanaian traits. These second-generation herders and their families are fluent in the local languages spoken in their communities of residence. The 1.5- and second-generation Fulani herders, even without any knowledge of the legal demands of citizenship, adapt to their communities through the acquisition of language, which emanates from their everyday practices and interaction with community members. As indicated earlier, the naturalisation requirements require that to naturalise as a Ghanaian citizen one needs to show evidence of integration by speaking at least one of the Ghanaian languages. Indeed, according to the data, the Fulani herders and their households are more than qualified by this stipulation. They have become integrated into Ghanaian communities by speaking several of the local languages such as Twi, Ga, and Dangme. Nonetheless, these accomplishments are not enough to warrant their legal citizenship so long as they do not follow the legal procedure of becoming naturalised. I argue that these formalities may not apply to certain groups of migrants such as the 1.5–2nd-generation herders due to the historical ties they have had with Ghana. The point is that, whether or not they are legally recognised, they still have a sense of belongingness to their communities.

The second-generation herders’ households married to Ghanaians can acquire citizenship through jus matrimony. Any offspring of the marriage automatically becomes Ghanaian. Among households studied, there were rare cases of women who belonged to Fulani herders’ households marrying Ghanaian men. Although, the opposite, Fulani herdsmen married to Ghanaian women, was quite common in Osudoku. In an FDG, key informants explained the marriage situation between the Fulani herdsmen and the indigenous Ghanaian women:

Honestly, I don’t know what is wrong with our women in this community, they allow the Fulani herders to marry them. Meanwhile we the male farmers cannot marry the Fulani woman. The herders are so protective of their women. The male farmers in this community are worried about this. Because the herders know that when we the male farmers marry their women, they will become ours. just as when they [the herders] marry our women, the women belong to them. They even convert our women from traditional religion and Christianity to Islamic religion.

The male farmers described their women as being “snatched” from them by the herdsmen. In Agogo, where the farmers practised the matrilineal ⁴ system because it is an Akan community, farmers who practise this system expressed worry that they lose the children born out of these intermarriages if the mother is a Ghanaian. The Fulani practise a patrilineal ⁵ system that automatically gives the Fulani man ownership of the children.

Although the legal definition of citizenship poses a challenge to the herdsmen, at the community level, strategies such as speaking the local language, being able to marry from the community, and having long-term residency were the means by which herders and their families adjusted to their local communities, and described these as evidence of being Ghanaian citizens.

Citizenship: Access to Land and Other Resources

Social citizenship may not entitle Fulani herders to land because the local structures have their own way of deciding who is included and excluded or who is indigenous and non-indigenous (Mamdani, 2005). The herders have had their own means of dealing with this local belongingness, although they are not without problems. The Fulani had access to land for both housing and grazing through traditional chiefs. The herdsmen were asked to settle on the outskirts of the communities where they could easily herd their animals. In return, they present an initial bottle of “Schnapp” (a common brand of liquor) as well as an annual royalty with cattle so long as they remain occupants of the land in the host community. Once these conditions are fulfilled, the Fulani herdsman and his household are accepted to live in the communities.

Both Osudoku and Agogo practice the hybrid system of the land tenure system. This land tenure system allows the combination of the customary and statutory land tenure systems (Ubink and Quan, 2008). About 70 per cent of the land is under the customary land tenure system, which functions based on the existing traditions and practices of these communities, while 30 per cent are entrusted lands owned under customary tenure but managed by the state or owned by the state for the benefit of the public. The lands are utilised in various ways depending on the interests, namely allodial title, freehold title, leasehold, and sharecropping (Government of Ghana, 1999). The chiefs, clans, sub-stools, and families hold the highest land title, which is called the allodial title. The native farmers also hold usufructuary or possessory titles on the stool land (Fieldwork data, 2017). However, the second-generation Fulani herders acquired their lands through leasehold agreements with the chiefs or the families who hold the allodial title. The Fulani herders in Agogo shared with me their written agreement dated 25 June 1997. Here is an excerpt of the agreement:

On this day,cattle herdsmen with their cattle be allowed to occupy a parcel of land on temporary basis on Agogo Traditional Area stool land under the following terms and conditions; payment of a tenant toll in the form of one live cattle at the end of every year starting from the end of 1997; good care of the animals be taken by the herdsmen to prevent the animals from destroying farms and food items of farmers at the area of occupation since damage caused by the animals would be borne by the herdsmen; that any behaviour which would lead to fighting, chaos, and disturbances at the area would not be tolerated and would lead to the nullification of this grant occupation and lastly if the need arises for the change of site [to] occur, the herdsmen would contact the council for a new site. (Fieldwork data, agreement letter by Agogo traditional council, 2017)

The agreement explains the conditions for acquiring land in the community, yet these conditions are disregarded although the herders continue to live in the community. After several years of living in these communities, the second generation of Fulani herders describes themselves as rightful owners of land leased to them or their parents by the host communities, while the community members see Fulani herders as strangers when it comes to land. Community members see the Fulani as occupying the land of indigenes. The herders, who have known no other home outside of those communities of residence, reject the label of “strangers” and see themselves as Ghanaians belonging to their communities of residence. The experience of Razak (herder household 4) illustrates the situation.

Razak is a herdsman who inherited a parcel of land from his father, the father purchased the land from the traditional council. Razak continue to use the inherited land without any negotiations from the traditional council. He claims ownership of the land because he inherited it from his father after his demise. He pays royalty every year to the chiefs just as his father used to do.

The rigid positions, with one side insisting on claiming land, and the other rejecting such claims and insisting on expelling “settlers,” continue to fuel the conflict and pose serious challenges to peacebuilding. It is not surprising that both farmers and herders describe themselves as victims of the intermittent farmer–herder conflict (Setrana, 2018a, 2018b).

Citizenship and Livelihood Strategies

Herders and their households have progressive relations with their communities of residence and these have influenced their continuing belongingness. These relations are mainly due to the fact that the herders are employed by cattle owners who are indigenes of Osudoku and Agogo. The cattle owners or employers of these herdsmen are usually influential community members who were engaged in other economic activities such as commercial farming, white-collar jobs, and sometimes even politics (Fieldwork data, 2017). This narrative is supported by the following statement by a cattle owner:

what I can say is that there are no cattle in these areas being catered for by a Ghanaian. With the leaders and politicians, for instance, the cattle they have are not catered for by Ghanaians. The Fulani herders are the ones who keep these animals for the ‘big’ people. The Fulani herders are the best cattle keepers, so, they have their support.

The average monthly amount paid to the herders was between 150 and 250 GHC (USD26–USD43 ⁶ ). Sometimes, the employment came with benefits such as accommodation or annual entitlement to a calf once the animals were well taken care of. The herders were also allowed to farm around their houses while some were also sharecropping, as well as receiving support in times of job-related health hazards Herders FGD, Osudoku, and Agogo, 2017. In addition to the activities of the herders, their wives were allowed to milk the cow to make a living. A wife of one of the herders shared this: “I milk the cow for sale. The selling of it is to help me have some income to buy a few household needs. We do consume some of the milk at home too.” Through cattle-owners, the herders have access to land and other resources to facilitate their existence in and sense of belonging to the communities of residence. All these provisions were incentives to motivate the herdsmen to do their job well. The experience of Adam explains the kind of relationship existing between him and the cattle owner.

Adam is a forty-five-year-old herdsman who has been hired by a member of the Ghanaian elite (popularly known by the host community as “big men”) to herd his cattle. His master is a “big man” living in the city, while he lives on the outskirts of a small town of the studied community. He was recruited from a town in the upper west region of Ghana. He was previously herding his family cattle with his siblings but realised that he could earn more by rendering services as a herdsman in the southern part of Ghana. When he was approached by a friend about his current job, he accepted the offer. He migrated from the small town in the upper west region to Osudoku with his wife and children. Adam has a two-bedroom apartment near the kraals [a fenced open space for cattle or sheep].

The long-term relationship originating from their engagement with indigenous cattle owners gives them a sense of belonging in the studied communities. Other scholars (e.g. Olaniyan et al., 2015; Soeters et al., 2017; Yembilah and Grant, 2014) have also highlighted the fact that there is the involvement of some Ghanaian elites in the cattle business, and a sizeable proportion of livestock under Fulani herders’ care belong to Ghanaians, including chiefs, who continue to employ Fulani to manage their animals. This also gives the Fulani herders some type of political connections to both local and national politicians who help them to penetrate farming communities. These influential personalities ensure the security of their settlements and give them opportunities to access landed resources (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). Chiefs and community leaders who have lost out on the rent of herders’ settlements instigate negative sentiments that lead to calling for their expulsion, while farmers use overt aggression to maximise farming opportunities (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). Tonah (2006) similarly notes that in farmer–herder conflicts in Ghana’s Volta Basin, chiefs, landowners, cattle owners, and livestock traders have formed strong networks with herders, while farmers, youth, community members, and government officials are networked in opposition to them, hence escalating violent conflicts. The story of Adam illustrates this point well.

Citizenship and Education

For fear of expulsion, 1.5- and second-generation Fulani herders are educating their children instead of allowing them to inherit their mode of occupation. Education is one of the key determinants of immigrants’ successful integration into the host country’s labour market. Some 1.5- and second-generation Fulani herdsmen have educated their children into professions such as nursing, teaching, and accountancy, among others. This marks a changing trend in the future of the herding business in Osudoku and Agogo, and the so-called traditional occupation of the Fulani ethnic group. Traditionally, the Fulani male learnt his father’s trade, but there is a gradual shift away from this practice. The story of Ibrahim explains these changing occupational trends.

Ibrahim is a second-generation sedentary Fulani herdsman. He is forty-one years old with two wives and six children (three boys and three girls). He is a herdsman and a cattle owner who employs three young herdsmen. He has five different kraals and four of the kraals belong to Ghanaian elites. He moved into his current residence in Osudoku with his parents who later passed on, leaving him with one kraal. Ibrahim’s father was originally from Niger and his mother was a Ghanaian. Unlike his father, he purchased a parcel of land from the chiefs to permanently build a structure for his wives and children. His main reason for doing this was to make sure his children had a better education. Three of his children have tertiary education; they are in the nursing and teaching professions. One of them is still pursuing her tertiary education while the other two younger children are in senior high schools. Two of his daughters are married to Ghanaians and this helps, as indicated earlier, citizenship can be acquired through marriage. Ibrahim does not want any of his children to become herders or to marry herders because of the challenges they face in the communities of residence. He does not have any formal education, but all his efforts are geared towards his children acquiring better standards of living through education and perhaps negotiating better citizenship through marriage. Ibrahim has given his children higher education that allows them access to the labour market. In effect, the constant struggle between farmers and herders may come to an end through these actions.

Discussion and Conclusions

This article has sought to explore citizenship as one of the causes of the farmer–herder conflict and its implications on livelihoods by examining the extent to which 1.5- and second-generation Fulani herders conceptualise their citizenship through everyday practices in their local communities, despite the contradictions and tensions in the legal requirements of Ghana’s citizenship.

The article finds that despite the complexities in the Ghanaian citizenship laws, 1.5- and second-generation Fulani herders construct their own citizenship through language, land access, education, marriage, and livelihood. However, in their attempt to do this, tensions are generated between them and indigenous Ghanaian farmers.

Furthermore, long-term settlement or being born in Ghana and raised in Ghana was a means by which herders entrenched their position as Ghanaians. Their ability to speak the local languages and also marry within their communities of residence were among the strategies. They negotiate their identities and practices within their communities of residence (Isin, 2000). While such socially constructed citizenship seems to be gaining grounds, the citizenship laws are hardly known by the herders. The simple ones they could negotiate (e.g. citizenship by marriage) are hardly known by them, while some of the requirements are also difficult to come by.

Additionally, the creation of Fulani herders’ citizenship does not necessarily provide entitlement to resources such as land, because the local structures had their own way of deciding who is included and excluded or who is indigenous and non-indigenous. Despite the strategies adopted by the Fulani herders, the community members still see them as settlers, especially when it comes to acquiring resources. On the other hand, the Ghanaian legal definitions hinder Fulani herders as they are seen as migrants and not citizens. Atuguba et al. (2020) finds also that people are vulnerable because the legal definitions of citizenship in Ghana prevent them from enjoying the rights and responsibilities, which include owning land.

Finally, education is one of the key determinants of immigrants’ successful integration into the host country’s labour market. The Fulani herders are investing in their younger generations’ education to make sure they find better positions in the labour market, where they can negotiate for their own rights rather than their parents’.

These negotiations among the Fulani herders are necessary because there is no Ghanaian ethnic group known as Fulbe. However, the so-called strangers have a sense of belonging to the communities, they call Ghana their home and may not have any connection whatsoever with their parents’ countries of origin. Citizenship must move beyond the rigid western definition to include the negotiation of norms, practices, and values through everyday experiences (Glenn, 2011; Isin, 2000; Mamdani, 2005). Recognising these challenges, the National Migration Policy, which was launched in 2016, also calls for a revision of Ghana’s citizenship laws to make it more inclusive.

More inclusive citizenship requires not only a review of the legal requirements but it also needs recognition from the (1) legal requirement; (2) how the Fulani see themselves; and (3) how the local people see the Fulani. When all these three dimensions are not in sync, as in the case under study, then there is a problem. In this particular case, the disjuncture and tensions are partly attributable to an underlying ethno-racial difference between the Fulani and the local people. While the Fulani are West Africans, they have physical attributes that are quite different from the typical Black African – they tend to be taller, fairer, with lighter skin colour and finer and longer hair. Thus, they do not “pass” or blend in easily among the local people, and their conspicuous physical difference feeds into some of the problems they are having with citizenship. Arguably, if they were like a typical Nigerian (for instance) in Ghana, they (especially the second generation) could have blended in quite easily without facing some of these problems.

In practice, being a citizen is not simply a static legal position, but a status developed through routine practices, building relations, and shared experiences. Ghana is gradually progressing towards this, but greater dialogue across communities is required to bridge divides if inclusive citizenship is to become an experienced reality (Setrana, 2018a, 2018b). The intervention of the state through National Civic Education and the media is important. Redefining of citizenship in Ghana requires an inter-agency collaborative effort across all arms of government, social partners, the indigenes, and the Fulani herders.