In this study, we develop a novel theoretical model of how the relationship between the buyer's use of power and the service provider's opportunism is moderated by the provider's perceptions of dependence advantage. Analyzing a dyadic dataset of 109 professional service relationships, we find that the extent to which the buyer's use of mediated and non‐mediated power aligns with the service provider's perceptions of relative dependence is germane to the power–opportunism relationship. The notion that firm A's opportunism, in response to firm B's use of power, is in part influenced by firm A's perceptions of the relative dependence in the relationship, constitutes a significant theoretical contribution to the power‐dependence literature. Our findings underline the importance of (i) understanding the relative dependence in an inter‐organizational relationship, (ii) managing the other firm's perception of this dependence, and (iii) ensuring that the use of power is aligned with the other firm's perception of the relative dependence in the relationship.
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