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42 C.F.R. pt. 493 (2013).
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45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2013).
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13.
EvansJ. P., When Is a Medical Finding ‘Incidental'? Genetics in Medicine15, no. 7 (2013): 515–516, at 515.
14.
MilesJ. J., Health Care and Antitrust Law (Eagan, MN: Thompson-Reuters, 2014): at § 5.02.
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Id.
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17.
Id.
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23.
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34.
Id.
35.
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36.
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37.
Id.
38.
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39.
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40.
See Evans, supra note 20.
41.
Id.
42.
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43.
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45.
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46.
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47.
SpenceD. B. and PrenticeR., The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, Boston College Law Review53, no. 1 (2012): 131–202, at 146–147.
48.
Id., at 147.
49.
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50.
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51.
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52.
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53.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, U.S. Department of Energy, Promoting Wholesale Competition through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Federal Register 61 (May 10, 1996): 21,540-21,716, at 21,560-61; see Spence & Prentiss, supra note 47, at 147–148.
54.
Pub. L. 104–104,110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 47 U.S.C.)
55.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402–03 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko]; RobinsonG. O., On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, Cornell Law Review87, no. 5 (2002): 1177–1232, at 1217–1223.
56.
45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2013).
57.
See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 3.
58.
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Pub. L. 111–5, Div. A, Title XIII, Div. B, Title IV, 123 Stat. 226, 467 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
61.
42 U.S.C. § 17935(d)(1) (Supp. V 2012).
62.
Id. § 17935(d)(2).
63.
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2013).
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See Shirts, supra note 31.
65.
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67.
Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)
68.
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–620).
69.
Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.)
70.
Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w).
71.
FrischmannB. and WallerS. W., Revitalizing Essential Facilities, Antitrust Law Journal75 (2008): 1–65, at 4.
72.
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73.
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74.
See Evans, supra note 19, at 508; Evans, supra note 65, at 26–27.
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91.
Seee.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 (1992) (noting that monopoly power under § 2 of the Sherman Act demands something greater than the market power required for purposes of § 1); Safeway Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 761 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating monopoly power is best understood to be the substantial degree of market power).
92.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571(1966); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447–48 (2009) (Simply possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (The mere possession of monopoly power … is not … unlawful).
93.
United States. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71.
94.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
95.
See Miles, supra note 14, at § 5:7.
96.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. at 448.
97.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d. 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
98.
See Evans, supra note 65, at 30–32.
99.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945).
100.
See Evans, supra note 19, at 508.
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SpulberD. F. and YooC. S., Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, Columbia Law Review107, no. 8 (2007): 1822–1907, at 1841–42; JoskowP. L. and NollR. G., The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, Stanford Law Review51, no. 5 (1999): 1249–1315, at 1250–1251.
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105.
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 (1992) (quoting Times–Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953).
106.
Ill. ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826, 883 (C.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991).
107.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985)).
108.
Id., at 408, 414.
109.
410 U.S. 366 (1973).
110.
Id., at 377.
111.
Id., at 368–69.
112.
Id., at 377 (citing Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951).
113.
Id., at 381–82.
114.
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
115.
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
116.
Id., at 409.
117.
Id., at 409–10.
118.
Id., at 402–404.
119.
Id., at 404.
120.
Pub. L. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 47 U.S.C.)
121.
Trinko, 540 U.S.at 401.
122.
Id., at 409.
123.
ScaliaA. and GarnerB. A., Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul, MN: ThomsonWest, 2012): at 174 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
124.
See Evans, supra note 19, at 506–506.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Trinko, 540 U.S at 409.
128.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 381–82 (1973).
129.
Trinko, 540 U.S at 411.
130.
Id., at 412.
131.
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
132.
See Mills, supra note 14, at § 5:8, n. 10 (noting that it is an unanswered question whether a reasonable price may need to include some measure of monopoly rent in situations where the facility in question is truly irreproducible and unique).
133.
708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983).
134.
See e.g., Loren Data Corp. v. GXS, Inc., 501 F. App'x 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2835 (2013).
135.
MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d at 1132–33.
136.
WallerS. W. and TaschW., Harmonizing Essential Facilities, Antitrust Law Journal76 (2010): 741–767, at 741; CotterT. L., The Essential Facilities Doctrine (University of Minnesota Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-18, 2008): 6–11, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125368> (last visited April 29, 2014).
137.
Seee.g., AreedaP., Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, Antitrust Law Journal58, no. 4 (1989): 841– 853; Cotter, supra note 136, at 11.
138.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
139.
PitofskyR.PattersonD. and HooksJ., The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Journal70, no. 2 (2002): 443–462, at 443–444.
140.
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
141.
See Cotter, supra note 136, at 11.
142.
Id.
143.
See Cotter, supra note 136, at 14–15.
144.
Id.
145.
See Miles, supra note 14, at § 5:7.
146.
Id. at § 5:8.
147.
See Evans, supra note 19, at 508.
148.
Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988)
149.
See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note 53, at 21560–61.
150.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402–03; Robinson, supra note 55, at 1217–23.
151.
See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d at 998.