GagnonM.-A.LexchinJ., “The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States,”PLoS Medicine5, no. 1 (2008): 0029–0033.
2.
MontalbanM.SakinçM. E., “How Financialization Shapes Productive Models in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Domination and Contradictions of the Blockbuster Productive Model,” GREThA Working Paper, Université of Bordeaux (2011); GagnonM.-A., The Nature of Capital in the Knowledge-Based Economy; The Case of the Global Pharmaceutical Industry, Ph.D. Dissertation, York University (2009).
A blockbuster drug is normally defined as a drug with sales of more than $1 billion per year.
5.
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6.
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7.
GoldacreB., Bad Pharma: How Drug Companies Mislead Doctors and Harm Patients (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2012); MintzesB., “Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives and Patient Safety: A Comparative Prospective Study of Information Quality in Canada, France and the United States,”Journal of General Internal Medicine28, no. 4 (April 2013): 1–8.
8.
See GagnonLexchin, supra note 1.
9.
SismondoS., “Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?”PLoS Med4, no. 9 (2007): 1429–1433; MathesonA., “Corporate Science and the Husbandry of Scientific and Medical Knowledge by the Pharmaceutical Industry,”BioSocieties3, no. 4 (2008): 355–385; SpielmansG. I.ParryP., “From Evidence-Based Medicine to Marketing-Based Medicine: Evidence from Internal Industry Documents,”Bioethical Inquiry7, no. 1 (2010): 13–29; SismondoS., “Linking Research and Marketing: A Pharmaceutical Innovation,” in QuirkeV.SlinnJ., eds., Perspectives on 20th Century Pharmaceuticals (New York: Peter Lang, 2010): At 241–256.
10.
SismondoS., “Ghosts in the Machine: Publication Planning in the Medical Sciences,”Social Studies of Science39, no. 2 (2009): 171–198; LacasseJ. R.LeoJ., “Ghostwriting at Elite Academic Medical Centers in the United States,”PLoS Med7, no. 2 (2010): 1–4; U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Ghostwriting in Medical Literature,111th Cong., June 24, 2010; SismondoS.DoucetM., “Publication Ethics and the Ghost Management of Medical Research,”Bioethics24, no. 6 (2010): 273–283.
11.
CosgroveL., “Financial Ties between DSM-IV Panel Member and the Pharmaceutical Industry,”Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics75, no. 3 (2006): 154–160; AngellM., “Drug Companies & Doctors: A Story of Corruption,”NY Review of Books56, no. 1 (2009); see Institute of Medicine, supra note 6.
12.
KesslerD. A., “Therapeutic-class Wars: Drug Promotion in a Competitive Marketplace,”New England Journal of Medicine331, no. 20 (1994): 1350–1353; La PumaJ.SeltzerJ., “Phase IV Market Steams Ahead,”CenterWatch9, no. 10 (2002): 1–13; AndersenM.KragstrupJ.SondergaardJ., “How Conducting a Clinical Trial Affects Physicians' Guidelines Adherence and Drug Preferences,”JAMA295, no. 23 (2006): 2759–2764.
13.
HealyD., Let Them Eat Prozac (New York: New York University Press, 2004); TurnerE. H., “Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy,”New England Journal of Medicine358, no. 3 (2008): 252–260; HartB.LundhA.BeroL., “Effect of Reporting Bias on Meta-Analyses of Drug Trials: Reanalysis of Meta-Analyses,”BMJ344, no. 7838 (2012).
14.
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Staff Report on GlaxoSmithKline and the Diabetes drug Avandia, 111th Cong., 2nd Session, January, 2010; EgilmanD.ArdolinoE., “The Pharmaceutical Industry, Disease Industry,” in WiistW. H., ed., The Bottom Line or Public Health (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): At 193–224; FavereauE.PhilippinY., “Servier: La technique de l'intimidation,”Libération, December 23, 2010; Prescrire, “Des firmes s'attaquent à des chercheurs,”Prescrire31, no. 328 (2011).
15.
MillerS., “Corruption,” in ZaltaE. N., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (spring 2011 ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/corruption/> (last visited June 17, 2013); LessigL., Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress – and a Plan to Stop It (New York: Twelve, 2011): At 226–248.
16.
See EgilmanArdolino, supra note 14; GagnonM.-A., “Corporate Influence over Clinical Research: Considering the Alternatives,”Prescrire International21, no. 129 (2012): 191–194.
17.
See Gagnon, supra note 2.
18.
OECD, Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies in a Global Market (Paris: OECD, 2008); MorganS. J., The Public Provision of Pharmaceuticals: A Synthesis of Policies in Ten Developed Countries, Pharmaceutical Policy Research Collaboration, December 2012.
19.
GorryP.MontalbanM.SmithA., “When Medical Science Meets Economics & Politics: The Institutionalization of Health Technology Assessment within the European Government of Pharmaceuticals,” GEDI working paper, 2011.
20.
SchoonveldE., The Price of Global Health (Farnham: Gower Publishing Limited, 2011).
21.
DrahosP.BraithwaiteJ., Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy (London: Earthscan, 2002).
22.
EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures (EFPIA-Various years), available at <http://www.efpia.eu/documents/80/61/The-Pharmaceutical-Industry-in-figures-Edition-2013> (last visited June 26, 2013); DavidE.TramontinT.ZemmelR., “Pharmaceutical R&D: The Road to Positive Returns,”Nature Reviews Drug Discovery8, no. 8 (2009): 609–610. For a discussion of the misalignment of incentives for research and development, see RodwinM. A., “Five UnEasy Pieces to Pharmaceutical Policy Reform,”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics41, no. 3 (2013): 581–589.
23.
Patented Medicines Price Review Board, Annual Report 2011 (Ottawa: PMPRB, 2012); Prescrire, “L'année 2012 du medicament; Progrès en berne, mesures timides pour la protection des patients,”Prescrire33, no. 352 (February 2013): 134–137; LightD.LexchinJ., “Pharmaceutical Research and Development: What Do We Get for All That Money,”BMJ345, no. e4348 (August 2012): 22–28. Note that Light and Lexchin contend that there is no innovation crisis in terms of the number of new drugs arriving on the market, but that there is a real innovation crisis in terms of the therapeutic innovation that these new drugs represent. See also, LightD. W.LexchinJ.DarrowJ., “Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs,”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics41, no. 3 (2013): 590–600.
24.
HarrisG., “Federal Research Center to Help Develop Medicines,”New York Times, January 22, 2011.
25.
For more information on methods, see Gagnon, supra note 2.
26.
FretheimA., “Back to Thiazide-Diuretics for Hypertension: Reflections after a Decade of Irrational Prescribing,”BMC Family Practice4, no. 19 (2003): 1–4; PollackA., “The Minimal Impact of a Big Hypertension Study,”New York Times, November 27, 2008.
27.
JonesP. B., “Randomized Controlled Trial Effect on Quality of Life of Second- vs. First-Generation Antipsychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia: Cost Utility of the Latest Antipsychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia Study (CUtLASS 1),”Archives of General Psychiatry63, no. 10 (2006): 1079–1087; GirgisR. R., “Clozapine v. Chlorpromazine in Treatment-Naïve, First-Episode Schizophrenia: 9-Year Outcomes of Randomised Clinical Trial,”British Journal of Psychiatry199, no. 4 (2011): 281–288.
28.
FournierJ., “Antidepressant Drug Effects and Depression Severity: A Patient-Level Meta-analysis,”JAMA303, no. 1 (2010): 47–53; KirschI., The Emperor's New Drugs: Exploding the Antidepressant Myth (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
29.
Fugh-BermanA., “The Haunting of Medical Journals: How Ghostwriting Sold ‘HRT,’”PLoS Medicine7, no. 9 (2010): 1–11.
30.
See Sismondo, supra note 9.
31.
See SpielmansParry, supra note 9.
32.
NorrisS., “Characteristics of Physicians Receiving Large Payments from Pharmaceutical Companies and the Accuracy of Their Disclosures in Publications: An Observational Study,”BMC Medical Ethics13, no. 24 (September 2012): 1–7; PearR., “U.S. to Force Drug Firms to Report Money Paid to Doctors,”New York Times, January 16, 2012. For discussions of the limitations of transparency, and its potential benefits, see in this issue of JLME41, no. 3 (2013): SismondoS., “Key Opinion Leaders and the Corruption of Medical Knowledge: What the Sunshine Act Will and Won't Cast Light On,”635–643; FeldmanY.GauthierR.SchullerT., “Curbing Misconduct in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Insights from Behavioral Ethics and the Behavioral Approach to Law,” at 620–628; BrownA., “Understanding Pharmaceutical Research Manipulation in the Context of Accounting Manipulation,” at 611–619; CosgroveL.WheerlerE. E., “Drug Firms, Codification of Diagnostic Categories & Bias in Clinical Guidelines,” at 644–653.
33.
AlmashatS.WolfeS., Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and Civil Penalties: An Update, Report for Public Citizen, September 27, 2012.
The Economist, “An Unhealthy Burden,” June 30, 2007.
38.
For example, in his testimony for the US Senate Finance Committee, GrahamDavid J., Associate Director for Science and Medicine in FDA's Office of Drug Safety, estimated that the drug Vioxx caused between 88,000 and 137,000 excess cases of heart attacks in the United States. Of these between 30% and 40% died. The drug was marketed by Merck between May 1999 and June 2004 in the United States. To promote the drug Merck organized a ghostwriting campaign involving around 96 scientific articles. Key ones omit mentioning the death of some patients during clinical trials. During a class action lawsuit against Vioxx in Australia in 2009, it was discovered that the company had created a fake medical journal for Merck – the Australasian Journal of Joint and Bone Medicine, published by Elsevier. Merck's internal e-mails, revealed during the class lawsuit, exposed that the company drew up a hit list of “rogue” researchers who needed to be “discredited” or “neutralized.” Eight researchers at Stanford complained that they received threats from Merck after publishing unfavorable results. In the United States, the only charges against the company have been charges of unlawful promotion, for which the company agreed to pay $950 M in an out-of-court settlement. Between 1999 and 2004, sales amounted to $11 billion in the United States. See GagnonM.-A.SismondoS., “The Ghosts of Medical Research,”Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology News30, no. 10 (May 15, 2010); LoftusP.KendallB., “Merck to Pay $950 Million in Vioxx Settlement,”Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2011.
39.
BraithwaiteJ., Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (London: Routledge, 1984): At 308.
40.
PigouA., The Economics of Welfare (New York: Macmillan, 1920). The clearest example of a negative externality is environmental pollution: A manufacturer can sell his product according to his private cost of production, but if the production process generates pollution (for example by spilling mercury in drinking water), this social cost is not included in the private cost that the manufacturer has to pay. This external social cost, which is not included in the cost of production of the manufacturer, is a negative externality.
41.
BaumolW. J., “On Taxation and the Control of Externalities,”American Economic Review62, no. 3 (1972): 307–322.
42.
AIFA Research and Development Working Group, “Feasibility and Challenges of Independent Research on Drugs: The Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA) Experience,”European Journal of Clinical Investigations40, no. 1 (2010): 69–86.
43.
MojaL., “Using Clinical Evidence in a National Continuing Medical Education Program in Italy,”PLoS Medicine4, no. 5 (2007): 799–802.
44.
See AIFA Research and Development Working Group, supra note 42.
45.
LexchinJ., “Models for Financing the Regulation of Drug Promotion,”Globalization and Health8, no. 24 (July 2012): 1–7.
46.
SpurlingG. K., “Information from Pharmaceutical Companies and the Quality, Quantity, and Cost of Physicians' Prescribing: A Systematic Review,”PLoS Medicine7, no. 10 (2010).
47.
Current pricing incentives also encourage promotion of off-label prescribing. For a discussion of how to change reimbursement for drugs prescribed off label, see RodwinM. A., “Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate Off-Label Drug Use,”Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics41, no. 3 (2013): 654–664.
48.
DrummondM.JonssonB.RuttenF.StargardtT., “Reimbursement of Pharmaceuticals: Reference Pricing Versus Health Technology Assessment,”European Journal of Health Economics12, no. 3 (2011): 263–271.
49.
LeeJ. L.-Y., “A Systematic Review of Reference Pricing: Implications for US Prescription Drug Spending,”American Journal of Managed Care18, no. 11 (November 2012): E429-e437.
50.
MabasaV. H., “Effect of a Therapeutic Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) Program on the Cost and Utilization of Proton Pump Inhibitors in an Employer-Sponsored Drug Plan in Canada,”Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy12, no. 5 (2006): 371–376.
51.
See Lee, supra note 49.
52.
MorganS.HanleyG.GreysonD., “Comparison of Tiered Formularies and Reference Pricing Policies: A Systematic Review,”Open Medicine3, no. 3 (2009): 131–139.
53.
HusereauD.CameronC. G., Value-Based Pricing of Pharmaceuticals in Canada: Opportunities to Expand the Role of Health Technology Assessment?, CHSRF Series of Reports on Cost Drivers and Health System Efficiency: Paper 5 (December 2011); ClaxtonK., “Value Based Pricing for NHS Drugs: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed?”BMJ336, no. 7638 (February 2008): 251–254.
54.
See GorryMontalbanSmith, supra note 19.
55.
WieselerB.McGauranN.KerekesM. F.KaiserT., “Access to Regulatory Data from the European Medicines Agency: The Times They Are A-Changing,”Systematic Reviews1, no. 50 (October 2012): 1–4.
56.
SmithM. D.DrummondM.BrixnerD., “Moving the QALY Forward: Rationale for Change,”Value in Health12, Supp. 1 (March 2009): S1–S4; NeumannP. J., “What's Next for QALYs?”JAMA305, no. 17 (May 4, 2011): 1806–1807.
57.
SorensonC., “Use of Comparative Effectiveness Research in Drug Coverage and Pricing Decisions: A Six Country Comparison,”Commonwealth Fund Publications 1420, vol. 91 (July 2010); see HusereauCameron, supra note 53.
58.
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