Chimeras,Moral Status,and Public Policy: Implications of the Abortion Debate for Public Policy on Human/Nonhuman Chimera Research

For brevity, I omit “nonhuman” from “nonhuman animals.”

For a full discussion of all of the extant ethical arguments regarding chimeras, see Streiffer R. , s.v. “Human/Nonhuman Chimeras,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/chimeras/> (last visited March 24, 2010).

I say “novel” to set aside traditional animal ethics issues arising from straightforward harms to the interests of animals.

Streiffer R. , “At the Edge of Humanity: Human Stem Cells, Chimeras, and Moral Status,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 15, no. 4 (2005): 347–370, at 354 [hereinafter cited as At the Edge of Humanity].

It is often claimed that those opposing hESC research adopt a potentiality view of moral status, according to which being an organism with the potential to develop into a person is sufficient for full moral status. Undoubtedly some opponents do hold such a view, but it has also become clear from the pro-life community's rejection of altered nuclear transfer and somatic cell nuclear transfer that potentiality views strike many of them as unacceptably inegalitarian, failing to secure basic rights for all human beings regardless of their developmental potential. For further discussion see Streiffer R. , “An Ethical Evaluation of Altered Nuclear Transfer-Cdx2,” World Stem Cell Report (2008): 115–118 and Hyun I. Kung K. , “Human Research Cloning, Embryos, and Embryo-Like Artifacts,” Hastings Center Report 36, no. 5 (2006): 34–41.

Because we are assuming that animals have a lower degree of moral status than normal adult humans, it follows that animals do not currently posses those capacities, for if they did, they would already have full moral status.

National Research Council and Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005) at 33 [hereinafter cited as the National Academies' Guidelines]; see At the Edge of Humanity, supra note 4, at 356.

For a full defense of this principle, see At the Edge of Humanity, supra note 4, at 358–361.

Robert J. S. , “The Science and Ethics of Making Part-Human Animals in Stem Cell Biology,” The FASEB Journal 20, no. 7 (2006): 838–845, at 842.

Levine R. , Ethics and Regulations of Clinical Research 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986): at 67–93.

James D. Noggle S. Swigut T. Brivanlou A. , “Contribution of Human Embryonic Stem Cells to Mouse Blastocysts,” Developmental Biology 295, no. 1 (2006): 90–102.

“Following from our work, it is feasible that mouse/human chimeras could be generated in which hESCs are engrafted into pre-implantation stage mouse embryos and distributed throughout the host anatomy through gastrulation. This may allow for chimeras in which hESC derivatives are ‘seeded’ into an array of developmental niches within a viable mouse, which would be of considerable value for the modeling of human development and disease in live animals.” And “[I]n order to further explore the utility of embryonic chimeras as a vehicle for examining the emergence and behavior of human cell types, we must characterize the extent to which human cells can contribute to a viable mouse–human chimera. Allowing progression of chimeras to later developmental time points would indicate whether hESC derivatives are capable of integrating functionally into host anatomy.” Id., at 100.

See the National Academies' Guidelines, supra note 7, at 41.

Greene M. , “Moral Issues of Human Non-Human Primate Neural Grafting,” Science 309, no. 5733 (2005): 385–386.

International Society for Stem Cell Research, “Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research,” December 21, 2006, available at <http://www.isscr.org/guidelines/ISSCRhESCguidelines2006.pdf> (last visited March 25, 2010).

Hyun I. Taylor P. Testa G. Dickens B. Jung K. McNab A. Robertson J. Skene L. Zoloth L. , “Ethical Standards for Human-to-Animal Chimera Experiments in Stem Cell Research,” Cell Stem Cell 1, no. 2 (2007): 159–163, at 162.

National Institutes of Health, National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 2009.

Brownback S. , “Human-Animal Hybrid Prohibition Act of 2009,” S. 1435, available at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s1435is.txt.pdf> (last visited March 25, 2010).

Wertheimer R. , “Understanding the Abortion Argument,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971): 67–95, at 94 [hereinafter cited as Understanding the Abortion Argument].

Id., at 92.

Id., at 94.

Gutmann A. Thompson D. , “Moral Conflict and Political Consensus,” Ethics 101, no. 1 (1990): 64–88, at 73. Note that it is standard in the philosophy literature to use “fetus” to refer to the conceptus, the product of fertilization, from conception to delivery.

See Understanding the Abortion Argument, supra note 19, at 94.

Ronald Green has also persuasively argued that fertilization is an event with indeterminate temporal boundaries. But such vagueness is quickly resolved as fertilization proceeds beyond any reasonable cut-off point, whereas the kind of indeterminacy being discussed here would persist throughout the organism's lifetime. See Green R. , The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Sapontzis S. F. , Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987): at 27–46.

See Understanding the Abortion Argument, supra note 19, at 77.

Prentice E. Crouse D. Mann M. , “Scientific Merit Review: The Role of the IACUC,” ILAR News 34, no. 1–2 (1992): 15–19.

Streiffer R. , “Academic Freedom and Academic-Industry Relationships in Biotechnology,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 16, no. 2 (2006): 129–149.

See the National Academies' Guidelines, supra note 7, at 46.

For an argument that great apes are borderline persons, and consequently that a large range of research on them is impermissible, see DeGrazia D. , “Human-Animal Chimeras: Human Dignity, Moral Status, and Species Prejudice,” Metaphilosophy 38, nos. 2–3 (2007): 309–329.

Dworkin R. , Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Vintage Books, 1993) [hereinafter cited as Life's Dominion].

Id., at 154–159.

Id., at 153.

Id., at 151–153.

Brighouse H. , School Choice and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): At 7–8; Streiffer R. Hedemann T. , “The Political Import of Intrinsic Objections to Genetically Engineered Food,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18, no. 2 (2005): 191–210, at 197–198. It should be noted that by “purpose” and “intent,” I am not speaking of the beliefs motivating particular legislators, but rather of the rational reconstruction of the aim of the policy. Much of Life's Dominion consists of empirical arguments about how to best interpret the beliefs actually motivating the various parties to the abortion debate. Such sociological arguments are relevant to whether legislators are acting permissibly in supporting legislation, but they do not settle the question of whether there are, in fact, legitimate justifications for banning abortion. The presence of an illegitimate motive, unlike the presence of an illegitimate intent or purpose, does not entail that the legislation is illegitimate.

Rawls J. , Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), at 199–200 [hereinafter cited as Political Liberalism].

Stroud S. , “Dworkin and Casey on Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 25, no. 2 (1996): 140–170, at 152.

Robertson J. A. , “Autonomy's Dominion: Dworkin on Abortion and Euthanasia,” Law & Social Inquiry 19, no. 2 (1994): 457–486, at 472.

Streiffer R. , “Informed Consent and Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research,” Hastings Center Report 38, no. 3 (2008): 40–47.

Thomson J. , “Abortion,” Boston Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 11–15, available at <http://bostonreview.net/BR20.3/thomson.html> (last visited March 31, 2010). Thomson does not explicitly say that no other grounds are available that would justify banning abortion and which could not also be reasonably rejected, but if the argument is to be valid, then something similar to that principle must be added.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Rawls J. , “Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” in Copp D. Hamptom J. Roemer J. , eds., The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 233–255; see Rawls , supra note 36; Cohen J. , “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus,” in Copp D. Hampton J. Roemer J. , eds. The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 270–291.

Rawls J. , “The Idea of Public Reason,” in Bohman J. Rehg W. , eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997): 93–141, at 97.

Gutmann A. Thompson D. , “Moral Conflict and Political Consensus,” Ethics 101, no. 1 (1990): 64–88, at 73.

See Rawls , supra note 36, at xlvi, 50, 137, and 226. See Scanlon T. , “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in Sen A. Williams B. , eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 103–128, at 111, for why the principle should be articulated in terms of “cannot reasonably reject” instead of Rawls's more common locution of “can reasonably accept.”

Thomson J. J. , “Judith Jarvis Thomson Replies,” Boston Review 20, no. 5 (1995), available at <http://bostonreview.net/BR20.4/Thomson.html> (last visited March 31, 2010).

Rawls J. , “The Idea of Public Reason,” in Bohman J. Rehg W. , eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997): 93–141, at 94–95.