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The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) is codified both in 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. and as FDCA §1 et seq. Throughout this article, we will use the U.S. Code (U.S.C.) sections.
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The scope of this article does not include foods, cosmetics, biologics, and animal drugs.
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