The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: Necessity and Justification

For a further discussion of the necessity of various animal uses and of the material in this section, see Francione G. L. , Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000): 1–49. Discussions of the necessity of animal use outside the context of research do not usually ask whether it is necessary to use animals at all for a particular purpose, but whether particular instances of pain or suffering are necessary even if the general use of animals in that context is not necessary. For reasons that I discuss later in this essay and in my other work (see, e.g., id., at 50–80), that understanding of necessity is problematic. In the context of biomedical research, the necessity analysis focuses more on whether it is necessary to use animals at all for this purpose.

For a general discussion of animal welfare laws, including anticruelty laws and statutes such as the Animal Welfare Act, see Francione G. L. , Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).

For a discussion of the variety of uses of nonhumans in vivisection, including product testing and education, see Francione , supra note 1, at 45–49. I do not discuss experiments intended to address health concerns of domestic nonhuman animals as I argue that if we took animal interests seriously, we would not continue to facilitate the production of domesticated nonhumans for human use. See Francione , supra note 1, at 153–154.

For a discussion of these campaigns, see Francione , supra note 2, at 72–78, 179–183.

Id., at 165–250.

Bailey J. , “Non-human Primates in Medical Research and Drug Development: A Critical Review,” Biogenic Amines 19, no. 4–6 (2005): 235–255, at 247–248.

LaFollette H. Shanks N. , “Animal Experimentation: The Legacy of Claude Bernard,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8, no. 3 (1994): 195–210, at 204.

See Bailey , supra note 6, at 249.

Enterline P. E. , “Asbestos and Cancer,” in Gordis L. , ed., Epidemiology and Health Risk Assessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988): 82–84.

See, e.g., Çetinkaya H. Domjan M. , “Sexual Fetishism in a Quail (Coturnix japonica) Model System: Test of Reproductive Success,” Journal of Comparative Psychology 120, no. 4 (2006): 427–432; Jenkins J. A. Williams P. Kramer G. L. Davis L. L. Petty F. , “The Influence of Gender and the Estrous Cycle on Learned Helplessness in the Rat,” Biological Psychology 58 (2001): 147–158.

Phillips M. T. , “Savages, Drunks and Lab Animals: The Researcher's Perception of Pain,” Society and Animals 1 (1993): 61–81.

For a further discussion of the basic right of humans not to be treated exclusively as means to the ends of others, see Francione , supra note 1, at 90–98, 156–157.

For a further discussion of the reasons that have been offered to justify animal use, see id., at 103–129.

For a discussion of modern philosophers who apparently adopt the Cartesian position, see id., at 104–106.

Darwin C. , The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): At 105, 76, 77.

See, e.g., Bekoff M. Jamieson D. , eds., Readings in Animal Cognition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Griffin D. R. , Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Hauser M. D. , The Evolution of Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Hauser M. D. , Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (New York: Owl Books, 2001); Ristau C. A. , ed., Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals: Essays in Honor of Donald R. Griffin (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991); Savage-Rumbaugh S. Lewin R. , Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind (New York: Wiley, 1994).

For example, Frans de Waal states that “honesty, guilt, and the weighing of ethical dilemmas are traceable to specific areas of the brain. It should not surprise us, therefore, to find animal parallels. The human brain is a product of evolution. Despite its larger volume and greater complexity, it is fundamentally similar to the central nervous system of other mammals.” de Waal F. , Good-Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996): At 218.

I argue that sentience alone is sufficient for full membership in the moral community, which involves the right not to be treated as a resource. See Francione , supra note 1, at 92–100, 116–119.

I maintain that any being who is sentient is necessarily self-aware. Id., at 114, 137–142.

Carruthers P. , The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): At 181.

Rawls J. , A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971): At 505.

Id., at 512.

Cohen C. , “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,” New England Journal of Medicine 315 (1986): 865–870, at 866.

See Francione , supra note 1, at 122–123.

See Rawls , supra note 21, at 512.

See Carruthers , supra note 20, at 98–121.

Id., at 114.

Id., at 114–115.

Id., at 117.

See Cohen , supra note 23, at 866.