Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (December 21, 2001), available at <http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf>. The Act can also be found on pages 324–348 of this issue.
See, e.g., RosenG., A History of Public Health, exp. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993);.
4.
PorterD., ed., The History of Public Health and the Modern State (Atlanta: Rodopi B.V., 1994).
5.
FeeE., “Public Health and the State: The United States,” in Porter, supra note 3, at 224, 227–28.
6.
See TobeyJ.A., Public Health Law: A Manual for Sanitarians (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1926): at 11;.
7.
ParkerL.WorthingtonR.H., Public Health Safety and the Powers and Duties of Boards of Health (Albany: Matthew Bender, 1892).
8.
See JostT.S., ed., Regulation in the Health Care Professions (Chicago: Health Administration Press, 1997).
9.
MullanF., Plagues and Politics: The Story of the United States Public Health Service (New York: Basic Books, 1989): at 14–57.
10.
See also DuffyJ., The Sanitarians: A History of American Public Health (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
11.
See ParmetW.E., “Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era,”Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 20 (1992): 267–335.
12.
An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, Pub. L. No. 77, 1 Stat. 605 (1798) (repealed).
See FredricksonD.S., “Health and the Search for New Knowledge,” in KnowlesJ.H., ed., Doing Better and Feeling Worse: Health in the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977): 159–70.
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. 91–596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970)
34.
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–677 (1994 & Supp. V1999).
35.
See FlemingS.H., “OSHA at 30: Three Decades of Progress in Occupational Safety and Health,”Job Safety & Health Quarterly, 12, no. 3 (2001): 23–32, available at <http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/osha-at-30.html>.
36.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
37.
See BruffH.H., “Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking,”George Washington Law Review, 57 (1989): 533–95;
38.
Symposium, “Presidential Oversight of Regulatory Decisionmaking,”American University Law Review, 36 (1987): 443–89;.
39.
McGarityT.O., “Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era,”Maryland Law Review, 45 (1986): 253–73;.
40.
DemuthC.C.GinsburgD.H., “White House Review of Agency Rulemaking,”Harvard Law Review, 99 (1986): 1075–88.
See Symposium, “The Council on Competitiveness: Executive Oversight of Agency Rulemaking,”Administrative Law Journal of American University, 7 (1983): 297–308.
43.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51, 735 (1993).
44.
AsimowM.BonfieldA.E.LevinR.M., State and Federal Administrative Law, 2d ed. (Minneapolis: West Group, 1998): § 7.8, at 492–98.
KinneyE.D., “Administrative Law Issues in Professional Regulation,” in Jost, supra note 6, at 103–28.
47.
See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421U.S.35 (1975) (addressing the combination of functions problem in ruling that members of a state professional licensure board could adjudicate a violation based on charges developed in its own investigation);
48.
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411U.S.564 (1973)
49.
(establishing a basis of unconstitutional pecuniary bias on the part of a professional licensure board).
50.
See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435U.S.519 (1978) (clarifying federal rulemaking requirements);
51.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467U.S.837 (1984) (establishing the standard for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations);
52.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (clarifying standing requirements for citizen suits in environmental statutes).
53.
See WrightR.F., “The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment” (note), Yale Law Journal, 93 (1984): 1127–46.
54.
See SchwartzB., Administrative Law, 3d. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991): § 1.1, at 2–3.
55.
See FoxW.F.Jr., Understanding Administrative Law, 3d ed. (New York: Matthew Bender, 1997): § 13, at 74–82.
56.
ParkerWorthington, supra note 5, § 73, at 85–86.
57.
Id.
58.
Institute of Medicine, The Future of Public Health (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988): at 11.
59.
Id.
60.
See GostinL.O., Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): at 47–55.
61.
ParkerWorthington, supra note 5;.
62.
PrenticeW.P., Policy Powers Arising Under the Law of Overruling Necessity (New York: Banks & Brothers, 1894);.
63.
FreundE., The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1904).
64.
See ParmetW.E., “Legal Rights and Communicable Disease: AIDS, the Police Power, and Individual Liberty,”Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 14, no. 4 (1989): 741–71.
65.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197U.S.11 (1905).
66.
Id. at 25.
67.
See U.S. Const. art I, § 1.
68.
See id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
69.
See GostinL.O., “The Future of Public Health Law,”American Journal of Law & Medicine, 12 (1986): 461–90, at 462.
70.
See AmanA.C.Jr.MaytonW.T., Administrative Law, 2d ed. (St. Paul: West Group, 2001): §§ 1.1–1.4, at 9–36.
71.
ParkerWorthington, supra note 5, § 80, at 90.
72.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
73.
PierceR.J.Jr.ShapiroS.A.VerkuilP.R.,Administrative Law and Process, 3d ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 1999): § 5.4, at 138–66.
74.
Id. § 5.7, 182–206.
75.
Schwartz, supra note 37, § 10, at 584–668.
76.
See Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 5–116, 15U.L.A.114 (1981);
77.
Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 15(g), 15AU.L.A.11 (1961).
78.
5 U.S.C. § 706(b) (1994).
79.
PierceShapiroVerkuil, supra note 54, § 6.3, at 221–75.
80.
North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211U.S.306 (1908);
81.
See AmanMayton, supra note 51, § 7.7.2, at 185.
82.
See Parmet, supra note 45.
83.
See ParmetW.E., “Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom: The Role of Affirmative Litigation in the Formation of Public Health Policy,”Houston Law Review, 36 (1999): 1663–712.
84.
See ParmetW.E., “From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public Health,”American Journal of Legal History, 40, no. 4 (1996): 476–505.
85.
See also BurrisS., “Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health,”Villanova Law Review, 34 (1989): 933–82.
86.
See FurrowB.R., “Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 131 (1983): 1403–67;.
87.
BazelonD.L., “Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process,”Cornell Law Review, 62 (1977): 817–32;.
RabinR.L., “Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective,”Stanford Law Review, 38 (1986): 1189–326.
90.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
91.
See Symposium, “The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law,”Administrative Law Review, 40 (1988): 507–59;.
92.
GiffordD.J., “Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Toward a New Paradigm,”Administrative Law Review, 32 (1980): 577–620.
93.
See WilliamsS., “Hybrid Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis,”University of Chicago Law Review, 42 (1975): 401–620.
94.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435U.S.519 (1978).
95.
See also United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410U.S.224 (1973).
96.
See StewartR.B., “Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure,”Harvard Law Review, 91 (1978): 1805–22;.
97.
ScaliaA., “Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court,”Supreme Court Review, (1978): 345–409.
98.
See SmithL.P., “Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law,”Duke Law Journal (1985): 427–66.
99.
DavisK.C., “An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,”Harvard Law Review, 55 (1942): 364–425.
100.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467U.S.837 (1984).
101.
AsimowBonfieldLevin, supra note 31, § 9.2, at 566.
102.
Id. § 9.2, at 567.
103.
See SunsteinC.R., “Law and Administration After Chevron,”Columbia Law Review, 90 (1990): 2071–120;.
104.
FarinaC.R., “Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,”Columbia Law Review, 89 (1989): 452–528.
105.
DavisK.C.PierceR.J.Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994): at 112–14.
106.
See, e.g., LitanR.E.NordhausW.D., Reforming Federal Regulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983);.
107.
BreyerS., Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
108.
See FreemanJ., “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,”University of California Los Angeles Law Review, 45 (1997): 1–98;
109.
Symposium: “Private Accreditation in the Regulatory State,”Law & Contemporary Problems, 57 (1994): 1–242;.
110.
MichaelD.C., “Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique,”Administrative Law Review, 47 (1995): 171–253.
111.
LyonT.P.MaxwellJ.W., “‘Voluntary’ Approaches to Environmental Regulation: A Survey,” in FranziniM.NicitaA., eds., Economic Institutions and Environmental Policy: Economics: Past, Present and Future (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 2000);.
112.
SteinzorR.I., “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control,”Harvard Environmental Law Review, 22 (1998): 103–202.
113.
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Gauging Control Technology and Regulatory Impacts in Occupational Safety and Health — An Appraisal of OSHA's Analytic Approach, OTA-ENV-635 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1995).
114.
See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448U.S.607 (1980);
115.
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452U.S.490 (1981).
116.
See McGarityT.O.ShapiroS.A., Workers at Risk: The Failed Promise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993).
117.
ShapiroS.A.RabinowitzR., “Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA,”Administrative Law Review, 52 (2000): 97–155.
118.
See, e.g., AyresI.BraithwaiteJ., Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992);.
119.
McGarityT.O., Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991);.
120.
BardachE.KaganR.A., Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982);.
121.
BaramM.S., Alternatives to Regulation: Managing Risks to Health, Safety and the Environment (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1982).
122.
See, e.g., BreyerS., Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993);.
123.
SternP.C.FinebergH.V., Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996).
124.
See, e.g., ArrowK.J., “Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?,”Science, 272, no. 5259 (1996): 221–22;
125.
Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health, National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983).
126.
ApplegateJ.S., “The Perils Of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control,”Columbia Law Review, 91 (1991): 261–333.
127.
SunsteinC., The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2002).
128.
MashawJ.L., Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997);.
129.
RobinsonG.O., American Bureaucracy: Public Choice and Public Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991);.
130.
SunsteinC.R., “Interest Groups in American Public Law,”Stanford Law Review, 38 (1985): 29–87;.
131.
StewartR.B., “The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation,”Wisconsin Law Review (1985): 655–86.
132.
See Gostin, supra note 43, at 85–109.
133.
See, e.g., CooperE.B., “Social Risk and the Transformation of Public Health Law: Lessons from the Plague Years,”Iowa Law Review, 86 (2001): 869–947;.
134.
NelkinD., “Communicating Technological Risk: The Social Construction of Risk Perception,”Annual Review of Public Health, 10 (1989): 95–113.
135.
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529U.S.120 (2000), aff'g 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
136.
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801).
137.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529U.S. at 161.
138.
See FazioliJ.A., “Chevron up in Smoke?: Tobacco at the Crossroads of Administrative Law,”Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 22 (1999): 1057–80.
139.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529U.S. at 161.
140.
Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y.1987).
141.
CalahanD., ed., Promoting Health Behavior: How Much Freedom? Whose Responsibility? (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000);.
142.
CoughlinS.S.BeauchampT.L., eds., Ethics and Epidemiology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
143.
See KinneyE.D., “The International Human Right to Health: What Does it Mean for Our Nation and World,”Indiana Law Review, 34 (2001): 1457–75;.
144.
ToebesB., “Toward an Improved Understanding of the International Human Right to Health,”Human Rights Quarterly, 21 (1999): 661–79;.
145.
GostinL.O.LazzariniZ., Human Rights and Public Health in the AIDS Pandemic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).