Cooperation with Evil: Its Contemporary Relevance

We refer in this article to harm/wrong for reasons which become apparent later. Simply put, harm seems to have connotations of objectivity, while wrong seems to be more subjective.

We distinguish complicity as positive collaboration from complicity as tolerating evil. Supporting racist employment policies, for instance might constitute a case of tolerating evil, but blame for such toleration is more difficult to justify.

A primary offense in contrast, in itself violates a norm — killing, for instance — and, according to the principle of double effect, may be allowed only by reason of its circumstances.

Hart H.L.A. , and Honoré Tony Causation in the Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2nd edition. 1985.

Hart/Honoré Causation, p. 136

See Smith in general; Fletcher. Rethinking, 640ff; and Kadish, Complicity, 343.

Tertullian. On idolatry. Ante-Nicene Fathers. Alexander Roberts, D.D. and James Donaldson, LL.D. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1957. 64.

Aquinas Thomas Summa Theologica. London: Blackfriars and McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1964. 2a2ae. 169, 2 (hereafter ST).

Charles E. Curran Cooperation: Toward a Revision of the Concept and its Application. Linacre Quarterly. 41(3). 1974. 152–167.

See Curran Charles E. , Cooperation. Hayes E.J. , Hayes P.J. , & Kelly E.D. Moral Principles of Nursing. New York: Macmillan. 1964. Charles J. McFadden. Medical Ethics. Philadelphia: F.A. Davis Co. 1961; Henry Davis, SJ. Moral and Pastoral Theology. New York: Sheed and Ward. 1952.

Some might claim that the influence consists in the scandal the cooperating agent provides. But the notion of scandal, one, begs the question and two, constitutes a separate category of offense, one which exceeds our explanation.

Pellegrino. Cooperation, Moral Complicity, and Moral Distance: the Ethics of Forensic, Penal, and Military Medicine. International Journal of Law and Ethics. Vol. II. 1993. 371–91.

The AMA has spoken out recently censuring physician participation in executions.

We are thereby alleviated from joining the debate about the possibility of “intrinsically wrong” acts.

We might take the example of the assisting surgeon in an abortion whose actions so patently parallel the principle surgeon's that the two are virtually alike. We agree therefore with Germain Grisez (Christian Moral Principles. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press.) and Thomas O'Donnell (Morals and Medicine. Westminster M.D.: The Newman Press. 1956), about the meaninglessness of the distinction between the immediate material act and the primary offense as illustrated in this case. We concur that such acts require no analysis. Because they so closely resemble the primary offense, to maintain that they were indirectly intended in the specific sense would be inconsequential. The question of justification for cooperation arises then, only in mediate material cooperation which we could describe as influencing and/or aiding.

Grisez , Christian Moral Principles.

O'Donnell , Morals and Medicine.

Richard McCormick denies that his proportionalism would make him a consequentialist. However, some interpret him in this way (Doing Evil to Achieve Good.).

We assume here that the agent does not intend the wrong of the primary offense. We can see here the value of describing the cooperating act as non-violating and incomplete in order to distinguish it further from the “morally neutral” act of double effect. The morally neutral act can, by itself, produce harm/wrong.

Within the doctrine of double effect the question of proportionality as having possible consequentialist impact is important. The doctrine is designed to work within a deontological framework which eschews consequences as a measure of moral worth. Even if this or some other interpretation of proportion, such as McCormick's (see his Doing Evil to Achieve Good) constitutes a problem for double effect doctrine, the situation differs for cooperation-with-evil. In this latter case, we already concede the primary offender's act to be wrong. Whether we censure that act wrong for deontological or consequentialist reasons does not matter. At issue is the culpability of a cooperating act which merely contributes to the already condemned wrong.

I have recast the proportionate reasons condition in terms of prudence at the suggestion of Kevin Wildes, SJ.

William C. , Spohn SJ . The reasoning heart: An American Approach to Christian Discernment. Theological Studies. 44: 1. 1983. 30–52.

The final end distinguishes Aristotelian phronesis from scholastic prudence. For cooperation doctrine of course, this issue is theological and not within the scope of this paper.

Robert Henle SJ . Prudence and insight in moral and legal decisions. The role and responsibility of the moral philosopher. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America. 1983.

Hart's notion of the “internal aspect” of rules could be applied to the prudent agent. Hart suggests that those who subscribe to norms or values penetrate their meaning in a way that differs from that of the mere observer. Surely the prudent agent must view the norms or values in the way Hart describes (The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1986, especially 97-120.)

Jonsen Albert R. , and Toulmin Stephen J. The Abuse of Casuistry. Berkeley: University of Chicago Press. 1988.

Associated Press. More than 5,000 Exposed to Radiation in Experiments. Washington Post. April 6, 1994. A17.