The basis of a just and moral economic model for health care is examined in the context of Catholic social teaching. The performance of the current model of “central economic planning” in medicine is evaluated in terms of the core principles of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church and compared to freedom-based economic models. It is clear that the best way to respect and serve human dignity, the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity in medicine is through the establishment of a true, free-market health economy.
Lay Summary: This article reviews the impact of recent healthcare reforms as well as traditional “third party payment” models for healthcare financing in America (insurance). Impact on patients and doctors are evaluated in the context of Catholic social doctrine and the Catechism. The many shortcomings and negative consequences of an economy planned centrally by government are compared to the benefits of a true free-market medical economy with empowered individuals. The analysis shows that interference in the patient–physician relationship and the centrally planned medical economy itself violates Catholic teachings, harms patients and doctors, and create morally evil outcomes and economic structures.
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