Bolivia v. County of Riverside, Riverside County Superior Court, #159780, 1983.
2.
Bouvia v. Superior Court (1986) Cal.App.2d slip opinion, at 7.
3.
Id. at 1a.
4.
Id. at 23.
5.
Id. at 7.
6.
Id.
7.
Id. The majority opinion of the court stated: Petitioner is without means to go to a private hospital, and apparently, real parties’ hospital as a public facility was required to accept her. Having done so it may not deny her relief from pain or suffering merely because she has chosen to exercise her fundamental right to protest what little privacy remains to her, at 26.
8.
Barber v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1006.
9.
Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Cal.App.2d. at 20.
10.
Id. at 17.
11.
Id. at 8-9. “It follows that such a patient has the right to refuse any medical treatment, even that which may save or prolong life.” Id. at 8.
12.
Barber v. Superior Court, supra. 163 Cal.App.3d. 186, Bartling v Superior Court, (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 186.
13.
Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Cal.App.2d. at 19-20. One must wonder how this young woman can consider her existence meaningless when her case has put virtually an entire nation on edge!
14.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Trial Court, The Probate and Family Court Department, Norfolk Division, #85E0009-G1. Patricia E. Brophy, Guardian of Paul E. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. Judgment at 4-5.
15.
In the Matter of Claire C. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 458-60, 464 A.2d 303, 305-6 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1983) at 313-4.
16.
Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Cal.App.2d. at 22. The majority opinion held: Being competent she has the right to live out the remainder of her natural life in dignity and peace. It is precisely the aim and purpose of the many decisions upholding the withdrawal of life-support systems to accord and provide as large a measure of dignity, respect and comfort as possible to every patient for the remainder of his days, whatever be their number.
17.
Id.
18.
This judgment was disputed by Judge Lynn Compton in his concurring opinion: I have no doubt that Elizabeth Bouvia wants to die; and if she had the full use of even one hand, could probably find a way to end her life — in a word — commit suicide. In order to seek the assistance which she needs in ending her life by the only means she sees available — starvation she had to stultify her position before this court by disavowing her desire to end her life in such a fashion and proclaiming that she will eat all that she can physically tolerate. Even the majority opinion here must necessarily “dance” a round the issue. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Cal.App.2d, concurring opinion, Judge Lynn Compton, at 2.
19.
The court held that: Moreover, the trial court seriously erred by basing its decision on the “motives” behind Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to exercise her rights. If a right exists, it matters not what “motivates” its exercise. We find nothing in the law to suggest the right to refuse medical treatment may be exercised only if the patient's motives meet someone else's approval. It certainly is not illegal or immoral to prefer a natural, albeit sooner, death than a drugged life attached to a mechanical device. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Cal.App. 2d. at 24.
20.
Id. at 13-4.
21.
The court, however, apparently referred only to the California cases of Bartling and Barber, but did not mention the landmark Quinlan or Conroy cases which restricted withdrawal of respiratory or nutritional and hydrational assistance to those who were terminally ill. The Conroy decision explicitly limited removal of care and treatment to those who were terminally ill, and it was open to criticism by some for that judgment.
22.
Id. at 14-17.
23.
Id. at 16-7.
24.
Id. at 19-25. The court never did explicitly address the issues of protecting innocent third parties or protecting the professional medical ethics, and it argued that the motive of desiring to commit suicide was not relevant to one's freedom to exercise the right to refuse medical treatment.
25.
Id. at 9-10. These were quoted from Barber v. Superior Court, supra. Cal.App.2d. at 1019-1020.
26.
Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Cal.App.2d. at 25-6.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 19-25.
29.
Id. at 19. What the court failed to mention was that Elizabeth was medically stable and that denying her food and fluids would be to introduce a new and independent lethal cause. Ordinarily, both the law and morality consider this to be killing, but the court did not give any consideration to this.
30.
Id. at 20, 22.
31.
Id. at 19-20.
32.
Id. at 24-25.
33.
Id. at 2-3, Concurring opinion of Judge Lynn Compton.
34.
Id. at 4.
35.
The pure contentless patient model is a “quick fix” to a deeper problem of growing mistrust between health care professionals, patients and our nation's courts. This mistrust was generated in large part by the rise of the abortion movement over the past 20 years where many physicians abandoned life-saving for life-taking. It made many physicians into life-destroyers rather than healers, and this profoundly shook the prestige of health care providers. Patients who had almost a blind confidence in physicians that they would always and everywhere preserve and promote life, came to distrust many of them, believing they had abandoned their classical professional ideals. But since then, American physicians became the only class of private citizens in our nation to have the legal power to destroy innocent unborn human life by their own authority. This virtually unlimited power spawned a great deal of mistrust among patients, who retaliated with threats and actions to make physicians pay for their negligence and malpractice as a way of getting them to refrain from destroying life.
36.
See ConneryS. J., John“In the Matter of Claire Conroy”,Linacre Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 4, November, 1985, pp. 324–5.
37.
It is necessary for this categorization because the law has the power to prohibit competent and rational individuals from electing certain medical treatments for their own benefit. It is because of this that the law can prohibit competent and rational decision-makers from taking laetrile which is an unproven medical treatment. The best way of protecting competent persons from committing suicide by rejecting life-sustaining and medically providable food and water is by placing these in the category of normal care along with other forms of patient maintenance as hygienic care, protection from exposure, psychological support and exercise.