Trust in the Justice Administration: Is it Dependent on the Economic Cycle and on Decentralization?

Abstract

Trust in the justice administration conditions the sustainability of the very rule of law, and can even promote interpersonal trust and, hence, social capital. Inferring its determinants, which is what I seek to do for the Spanish case, is therefore of paramount importance. I find that the level of trust is dependent on the economic cycle (with evidence of anticyclicality) and independent of whether the service provision is decentralized. These outcomes suggest that citizens expect the justice administration to play a positive role in insuring them against a negative economic shock, unless the economic downturn is particularly marked, while they do not expect—independently of the state of the economy—decentralization to improve performance (or are unaware of which tier of government is responsible for its provision). Finally, we obtain indirect evidence that trust would be strengthened if the resolution rate in the civil jurisdiction were to increase substantially (by around 25%), while in the criminal jurisdiction this margin of improvement is moderate.