May We Have a Say? Central Asian States in the Un General Assembly

Abstract

Since the demise of the USSR in 1991, the five Central Asian republics have joined a number of international organisations, most notably the UN. However, while their membership in this organisation is often taken for granted and used by scholarship on Central Asia as an example of their “race to membership”, few studies if none have addressed not only how these state relate themselves to the organisation, but also how they behave in it and what norms they support in it. By using the theoretical lenses of the English School and by adopting a multi-method analysis based on qualitative and quantitative strategies, this paper seeks to shed light on the normative stands of these states as expressed within the General Assembly, on whether common positions and strategies exist and on what the degree of their normative convergence is. Findings reveal that all Central Asian states favour a Westphalian world order, that among them there is high convergence on pluralist norms of international society, and that while their record of regional cooperation is poor, they tend to agree on many issues at the international level.

1 Introduction: The purpose of the study and its hypotheses

Since the demise of the USSR in 1991, Central Asia has been caught in two conflicting dimensions: victim of its past, hostage of its future. The literature on the international relations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan ¹ has often discussed how the past of the region could mark its future developments, how territorial and inter-ethnic strives, silenced under Soviet rule, would affect the intra-regional international relations in an explosive mixture of chaos and disorder. By the same token, the future of Central Asia has often been at the forefront of scholarly research on the region: what will happen in future has been the common question condemning Central Asia to a perennial status of suspension in the international system: on the edge of, on the brinks of, one step from (Akçali, 2003; Hashim & Rashid, 1992; Hyman, 1993; Jones Luong & Wienthal, 2002; Kleveman, 2003; Rashid, 2008). Very few academic works, if any, have highlighted the fact that, once independent, the Central Asian states have entered a world with not only material structures and geopolitical imperatives, but normative and institutional webs as well, where they had to find their place.

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While I am aware of the multiple meanings that the term “Central Asia” entails (see, e.g., Pourchot & Stivachtis, 2014), this paper considers “Central Asia” as specifically made up of the five former Soviet republics listed in the text, thus following the conventional use found in the literature on the region.

In fact, one of the first actions these states did once independent was joining the United Nations (UN), both to substantiate the de jure character of their independence and to participate in the shaping of those norms and rules that regulate and inform world politics. ² An analysis of the international behaviour of the Central Asian republics is still missing from the substantive literature on the region, which has been more concerned with assessing international influences on the region, rather than on how these states “see” the international (see for example Jackson, 2010; Kavalski, 2012; Lewis, 2012; Warkotsch, 2007). Thus, the first purpose of this brief study is to fill this lacuna in the literature on the international relations of the Central Asian republics.

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On March 2, 1992, all the five Central Asian states completed their procedure of admission to the UN, being accepted as full members with unanimous votes of the General Assembly at its 82nd plenary meeting.

A second aim of this study is to translate on the international dimension the cooperation–competition debate that has characterised the literature on regional politics in Central Asia. The literature on intra-regional relations has always stressed, with undoubted merits, the basic un-cooperative nature of Central Asian intra-regional relations, highlighting patterns of disintegration and competition, factors of de- if not of contra-regionalisation (Allison, 2008; Bohr, 2004; Cooley, 2012: 149–153; Libman & Vinokurov, 2011; Linn, 2007; Spechler, 2002). Bitter disagreements over energy and water resources, border delimitation and territorial disputes in the region make even the most optimist analysts doubtful of substantive regional cooperation in the near future.

Yet, I believe that given their common historical legacy, their common political background and the fact that the physical, geographic system presents them with the same, serious political, demographic and environmental challenges, at the international level there is more agreement among them than within the region itself. This may be explained by assuming that while at the international level norms and rules are only professed and supported, within the region decisions have to be taken, thus running the risk of challenging personal interests and sovereign rights (Collins, 2009).

Thus, the hypotheses that underpin this paper are the following:

• •

H₁: given their general condition as third-world countries (Abdullaev, 2002: 245; Ayoob, 1995) and their past political, social and economic experiences, their normative orientation in world politics is highly convergent ³ ;

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H₂: given their still incomplete process of state-building, the norms endorsed by the Central Asian republics are those typical of a pluralist, Westphalian inter-state system;

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H₃: given H₁, Central Asian states have used the international stage to act in concert to address several problems in their own region;

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H₄: given H₁ and H₃, Central Asian states present themselves as a coherent regional group in world politics.

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By normative convergence I mean that condition in which a group of states consider the same international norms and rules as the legitimate ones in managing and conducting world politics, sustaining their validity in a concerted way and reiterating their validity, necessity and importance in agreement with one another.

To verify these hypotheses, this paper sets the task of analysing the present state of the behaviour of Central Asian states within the UN, in particular within the General Assembly (UNGA), thus in line with recent literature discussing “regional positionality” on international issues (Bailey, Strezhnev, & Voeten, 2013; Burmester & Jankowski, 2013; Ferdinand, 2013; Hosli, van Kampen, Meijerink, & Tennis, 2010; Häge & Hug, 2013; Luif, 2003; Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013a). ⁴

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According to Strezhnev and Voeten (2013a), since 1998 almost 100 articles and papers have relied on voting data to construct preference measures for states and their governments.

This is for multiple reasons. Firstly, all Central Asian states are members of the UNGA, and therefore an extensive analysis of their normative stances is possible.

Secondly, they are not member of the Security Council or of other voting institutions; when this happens, such as membership of Turkmenistan in the ECOSOC or of Kazakhstan in the Council of Human Rights, the other Central Asian republics are not represented, and therefore an analysis of the whole group of states is not possible.

Thirdly, if the aim is to highlight and disclose the normative orientation of Central Asian states in world politics, shedding light on their attitude on normative issues with respect to problems of world governance, then the UNGA can be seen as the main arena where normative positions are held, explained, contrasted and challenged (Kim & Russett, 1996). As a global deliberating body, the Assembly appears to be “well suited to discussing the general principles and norms that do or should govern international relations” (Peterson, 1986: 259). The deliberative process of the UNGA is “a process of distributing desired symbolic and material values among members of society” (Peterson, 1986: 7).

Furthermore, considering the already noted trend in the literature, votes in the UNGA have become “the standard data source for constructing measures of state preferences as they are comparable and observable actions taken by many countries at set points in time” (Bailey et al., 2013: 1). In sum, the UNGA, like all other international organisations, is one of the elements that affect the process of world politics by providing the norms and institutions within which states and other actors interact in pursuit of their various goals (Luif, 2003: 13; Peterson, 1986: 5). Even if (or perhaps exactly because) resolutions are not binding, and are rather indications, suggestions, manifestation of the world's Zeitgeist in a particular moment on a particular issue of world politics, the vote and the justification for that vote are important spies of to what norms, beliefs and rules a country, or a group of countries, abides by.

2 The analysis of words and votes in the GA: A worthy exercise?

In one of the best discussions of the utility of analysing voting behaviour within the UNGA, Robert Keohane has addressed the important point of supporting an analysis of voting behaviour of states with the political processes of negotiations and tit-for-tat behind the scenes to substantiate the meaning of votes themselves (Keohane, 1967). According to him, a single vote or group of votes cannot speak for itself, and rarely are variables per se. More often, if not always, votes within the UNGA are the output results of endless negotiations, meetings, challenges, agreements and disagreements in the rooms behind the curtain, where states put on the table their cards and play according to their will, whether following their mere interest (in supporting, balancing on rejecting a given resolution) or following a normative commitment: “Important as the understanding of individual and group voting behaviour undoubtedly is, such analysis does not provide us with comprehensive knowledge of General Assembly politics” (Keohane, 1967: 221; see also Kissack, 2007). His target were those scholars who employed statistical techniques to simply find correlation between group composition and voting outcomes, without being interested in why certain groups supported (opposed) a given resolution or how that support (opposition) was created and sustained.

On this point, I agree with Keohane that a mere binomial correlation between states and votes does not demonstrate much. This is why, for the purpose of this paper, I conducted brief preliminary research to find those press-conferences and bilateral meetings where heads of states stressed the need to continue to cooperate within international institutions and the UN in particular that may be a sign of consultations and discussion on common positions to adopt within the UNGA. ⁵

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References to coordination in international bodies (always at the bilateral level in Central Asia) can be the following among others: Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan (http://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-19809.htm#sthash.uEwWgPLu.dpbs and http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/uzbekistan/2063132.html?); Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (http://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-20046.htm#sthash.lIYQM9ry.dpbs and http://www.inform.kz/eng/article/2566151?); Kazakhstan–Tajikistan (http://www.avesta.tj/goverment/17553-e-rahmon-vstretilsya-s-glavoy-mid-kazahstana.html); Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan (http://www.inform.kz/eng/article/2462872?); Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan (http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kyrgyzstan/2111346.html?); Kyrgyzstan–Kazakhstan (http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kazakhstan/2092499.html?). I also came to know about dialogue and consultation in UN bodies between Central Asian states through personal communications with official Uzbek sources in Tashkent (interviews conducted by the author in Uzbekistan on 6th November, 2013).

In addition, this paper adopts the use of speeches and declarations of political leaders as its method to give a tentative framework of discussion and consultation where to put the statistical component of voting behaviour in the UNGA (see Section 7 and Appendix). This move can also serve to reduce methodological biases deriving from “chance voting”, i.e. voting convergence driven by chance rather than by coordination (Häge, 2011).

However, while Keohane focuses on impact, and on how small states may influence the outcome of a resolution, in this paper I focus more on what a vote in the UNGA signifies from a mere normative viewpoint. As a matter of fact, I assume that to vote for a specific resolution or on a specific theme is not only a reflection of a state's interests, but it may well represent a support/endorsement for a given norm/rule in international relations as well. This is particularly true for small states and newly independent states, which having the advantage of holding the majority in the UNGA may oppose and contest norms that would hinder their development, infringe on their sovereignty and silence their cultural peculiarities. In sum, while the UNGA “is not a comprehensive reflection of the full range of foreign policy concerns of all states, or of the balance of priorities of individual states, […] voting cohesion there is still a very good indicator of common positions on the widest range of global issues” (Ferdinand, 2013: 3).

Since in this paper the stress is more on norms and rules rather than on material capabilities and physical dynamics of world politics and the intent is to show, to the extent that it is possible, the normative convergence of Central Asian states in the UNGA, I deem that to make use of English School (henceforth ES) categories of international society, pluralism, solidarism and institutions is a convenient move to grasp the complexities of Central Asian behaviour in the Assembly.

The ES maintains that states, although being in an anarchic system of relations (Waltz, 1979), manage to maintain order and stability among themselves adopting common norms, rules and institutions ⁶ that channel and guide the behaviour of states, thus forming an international society (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004). A society of states, however, can present itself in different facets, the main ones being pluralist and solidarist. In a pluralist international society, the common interests and values can be said to be the Westphalian ones, i.e. the avoidance of any kind of interference in domestic affairs, the territorial and political survival, the maintenance of the state's position as the only legitimised subject of international law, the relatively peaceful coexistence and the implementation of the minimal degree of cooperation among the units in the system. The basic rules deputed to make these interests and values effective and preserved are, therefore, the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.

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Due to the limited scope of this paper, I cannot provide an extensive discussion on the notion of institution as meant in the ES. It is sufficient to note that by institution it is meant durable but by no means eternal codified practices which channel the behaviour of the states (or, in general, political communities) forming the society, giving a sense of order and predictability to their actions (Buzan, 2004: 181). The following may be considered the pivotal institutions of contemporary international society: sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, balance of power, war and Great Powers management (Bull, 1977). Recent scholars focus also on the market, nationalism and environmentalism (Falkner, 2012: 511–515; Holsti, 2004). For a more detailed analysis, see also Linklater and Suganami (2006).

Conversely, a solidarist international society is one in which the sovereign character of the units is defined in a more elastic way, therefore allowing for more substantial cooperation in an enlarged number of fields, from the economy to human rights, from a more substantial protection of the environment to common projects of political convergence. The threshold that may be said to divide the two conceptions of international society is the number of norms and institutions shared by the actors and the impact that these normative, behavioural prescriptions have on the sovereign character of the units themselves (Buzan, 2004).

I decided to adopt this theoretical framework in this paper because, as said, I mean to shed light on two related aspects of Central Asian international politics: whether the competitive nature of regional politics is reflected also at the international level, and, if not, what the norms shared among them are, whether pluralist or solidarist. The ES, being a via media between realism and liberalism, allows to focus on this relational, normative dimension of international relations while not dispensing the non-cooperative behaviour at the regional level. This would then contribute to the literature on regional cooperation dealt with in the introduction, as it would focus on a peculiar situation: cooperation and normative convergence at the global level but poor record of mutual understanding regionally. An ES reading of Central Asia's attitude in the UNGA, therefore, allows to consider those norms and institutions that inform the international relations of Central Asian states, discloses the perspective that Central Asian states have on global international society and offers an alternative view on why, despite their poor record of regional cooperation and indeed growing competition, these states have managed so far to coexist in their regional space.

In addition, and not less importantly, the attempt of this paper to apply an ES reading on Central Asia would expand a new theoretical agenda that has been inaugurated only very recently (Costa Buranelli, 2013; Kaczmarska, 2013; Pourchot & Stivachtis, 2014).

3 Methodology and methods

The next step to make is to determine the right methodology and methods to disclose the hypothesised normative convergence. In line with an ES approach, I opted for a qualitative, interpretive analysis of two kinds of sources (Navari, 2009).

The first one are the official documents from 1992 to 2012 retrieved from the UN online archives and web databases submitted by Central Asian governments, alone or in common, to the UN, whether to the Secretariat or to the UNGA directly.

The second one is the whole array of declarations, speeches, interviews, press-conferences and addresses made by government representatives within the UN itself, where the intention to abide by specific norms and institutions of international society is advocated by the speakers (on behalf of the state they represent). Sources of this kind were available only for the years 2011 and 2012. Dealing with these two kinds of sources, I coded those terms, phrases and expressions that signal, contain or simply make reference to a specific norm or institution of international society.

Yet, in order to substantiate my claims and to strengthen the validation of the hypotheses set above, I tried to engage in a triangulation of methods opting for a multi-method research (Mason, 1996: 25, 42). While the first two groups of sources are scrutinised in a qualitative way, I have also adopted a quantitative analysis of a third group of sources, which is the similarity of positions in the UNGA among nations expressed in votes on a single issue over time, from 1992 to 2012. To analyse this third group of sources, I relied on the Index of Affinity of Nations (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013a). This index calculates the similarity of positions among nations within the UNGA, posing it on a (0–1) scale, where “0” represents the highest disagreement and where “1” represents the highest agreement and convergence. The added value of integrating the qualitative strategies adopted in this paper with this quantitative tool is the possibility to verify that the normative convergence of Central Asian states is expressed not just on paper and verbally, but is also translated in documented outcomes. The multi-perspective corroboration of the hypotheses was thus sought via an integrative, multi-faceted methodology based on interpretivism and descriptive statistical correlation.

While the use of such a quantitative technique may not fit well in a paper that claims to follow an ES approach to sustain its claims, I believe there is nothing that a priori prevents the mixing of methods to present more nuanced and more rounded conclusions (6 & Bellamy, 2011; Greener, 2011). As a matter of facts, while relying on mere qualitative analysis would prevent me from verifying how this convergence is played out in the UNGA, the mere quantitative aspect would prevent me from knowing on what norms there is convergence. This is why I endorse a multi-method analysis to disclose possible normative isonomy among Central Asian states in the UNGA. With respect to the last, quantitative part, it should be noted that contrary to Ferdinand (2013) I employ only one index of convergence, and not three. This is because this paper does not intend to be a quantitative analysis of voting convergence. Rather, one of its aims is to show a perhaps less precise but more rounded picture of normative convergence among Central Asian states, and therefore deems appropriate to be methodologically extensive and not intensive. In addition, I am aware that the use of these different methods does not provide a perfect picture of the normative convergence of Central Asian states within the UNGA, and some problems are still left out. These problems, however, will be dealt with in the conclusion, and will certainly (and hopefully) represent opportunities for further research.

4 Structure of the paper

The paper is structured as follows: in the first section, I will scrutinise and analyse the norms endorsed and supported in the official documents submitted to the UNGA by Central Asian states as a group. Therefore, in this section I will also focus on the “regionness” of Central Asia, meant as the ability to act on the world stage as a coherent group of states capable of acting in concert and presenting a common identity to the world. This section, in sum, will offer a collective overview on their normative convergence. In the second section, conversely, I will offer a discrete overview of their normative convergence. I will code declarations and speeches of each Central Asian state-representative to see what norms are adopted and embraced by singular leaders. As it can be expected, the hypotheses listed above will be validated if both the collective and the discrete overview will bring the same results. In the third section, I make a quantitative shift, and I will discuss the normative convergence of Central Asian states in voting sessions in the UNGA to verify if this convergence is also sustained at the decisional level. In the conclusions, I will discuss the findings of the research and the position of Central Asia in the global international society, as well as the value that an ES approach can add to the study of international politics in Central Asia.

5 Normative convergence in UN Documents submitted by Central Asian countries

The first examples of normative convergence and societal attitude among the five Central Asian states date back to the mid-1990s and the end of that period, when the Central Asian Union was still alive (1994–1998). ⁷ Despite the already noted neglect of the wide literature on the matter, that period and that experience proved to be significant in terms of defining and sharpening the normative directions of Central Asia in world politics.

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The Central Asian Union was an international organisation set up by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan aiming at creating an integrated market and a common economic space. The organisation had an inter-committee of Presidents, one of Prime Ministers and one of Foreign Ministers. In addition, it had its own bank (the Central Asian Bank) and even its monthly publication, “Central Asia: Problems of Integration”. However, disagreements on payment methods, tariffs and duties slowed down integration consistently. In 1998, the organisation was renamed Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) and included Tajikistan as well.

For example, in the document “Towards a Culture of Peace” (A/52/558 31st October, 1997), the five Central Asian governments presented a roadmap of how international relations should be conducted. References to multiculturalism and pluralism (§ 6. “We are unanimously of the view that mankind's cultural diversity is an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of alternative paths to the further development of mankind” and § 13. “The meaning of civilization is multiculturalism. This is the only acceptable and realistic idea of the present and the future. The cultures of small peoples are equal and irreproducible in their unique distinctiveness and the multiplicity of their hues”), sovereign equality (§ 7. “to devise a new world order in which, on the basis of equality of rights and mutual respect, account would be taken of the interests of all peoples”), international law and diplomacy (Annex II: “The development of bilateral inter-State relations on the basis of the norms of international law has become a guarantee of the successful conduct of [our] policy”) were endorsed and reiterated.

One year later, in the A/53/62 Document, the five Central Asian states reaffirmed their normative convergence on the world stage professing strongly pluralist values and norms. For example, the values and institutions of sovereignty, non-interference, international law and diplomatic resolution of conflicts take a whole paragraph of the document:

“Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, desiring to deepen the ties among their countries and peoples on the basis of the principles of respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, rejection of the use of force or threat of force and rejection of economic or any other means of exerting pressure, conscientious fulfilment of their obligations, and compliance with the universally recognized norms of international law”.

At the same time, the institution of Great Powers management is evident in the five states’ assessment of the Afghan peaceful settlement: “[the sides] reaffirmed their readiness to continue their joint efforts to settle the situation in Afghanistan under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of neighbouring countries, the Russian Federation and the United States of America”. In addition, the regional identity of Central Asia ⁸ was entrench and enhanced, signalling that all regional states adhered to those norms and principles:

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Already one year earlier Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov stated that “We [Uzbeks] continue to believe that Central Asia has its own characteristics; he also made reference to a “regional identity”, although he did not explain what he meant (A/51/PV.21).

“the leaders of the five States noted their States’ enormous historical potential and common historical roots, the interrelatedness of their destinies, their traditions of friendship, the similarity of their cultures, customs and mores, and the stability of their good-neighbourly relations”; “Bearing in mind the similarity of their goals and objectives with respect to the independent development of their countries, consolidation of their statehood, and their international recognition as full subjects of international law”; “The sides unanimously noted the usefulness and timeliness of the Ashgabat meeting, which helped strengthen mutual understanding and confidence, and clarify positions on key issues concerning relations among the five fraternal countries”

Interestingly, however, application of the pluralist values of sovereignty equality, non-interference and coexistence are to be found in the region itself, especially when stressing

“their determination to consolidate their political and economic independence [and] their unwavering commitment to deepening friendly, equitable and mutually advantageous relations based on a long-term partnership and consistent with the national interests of all five States, and to security and stability in the region”.

In a third document, A/53/96 (Letter dated 9 April 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations), which followed the Tashkent Declaration signed on March 26, 1998, the parties emphasised once more the values of sovereignty and non-interference (“They regard the integration of the States of Central Asia as a natural and objective process which is conditioned and determined by the vital interests of each country”), of international law as the main and indeed only mean of communication among nations (exemplified by the long list of agreements made, “To ensure the strict implementation of the joint agreements adopted”) plus the common references to peaceful coexistence and fraternal ties (which would imply a commitment to diplomacy when dealing with potential interstate conflicts and disagreements). Also in this case, the construction and the perpetuation of a concrete regional coherence are visible:

“On the basis of the common history and culture of their peoples, the Heads of State of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan…”; “They regard the integration of the States of Central Asia as a natural and objective process”; “[the parties] emphasize that they would also welcome the participation of Turkmenistan in a form acceptable to it”; “The Presidents declare their firm resolve to do everything possible to strengthen eternal friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Central Asia, which are in conformity with their vital interests”.

Already from this short analysis of principles endorsed by Central Asian states, it is notable the interrelation between norms and regional context, as well as between norms and regional identity: in the words and minds of State leaders, Central Asia was a coherent, convergent and distinct region of world politics.

The trend of normative and regional convergence did not stop with new millennium, but actually received more impetus with the setting up of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) (2002–2005). In the document A/57/614–S/2002/1246 (Letter dated 14th November 2002 from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations), for example, we find a clear common commitment to the preservation and implementation of pluralist values in international relations within the region: Central Asian states are said to be

“Guided by their common interest in promoting the stability, security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States of the region and in strengthening cooperation between the States of the region in areas of common interest”.

At § 5 we find a renewed commitment to the norm of environmentalism:

“The Heads of State emphasize the need for increased cooperation in the area of the protection and enhancement of the environment, the prevention of transboundary pollution, and the prevention of natural and technogenic disasters in the States of the region and the elimination of their consequences”,

paired with the intention to abide by the prescriptions and dictates of international law:

“[the States] reaffirm the need for coordinated and concerted action in that area on the basis of the generally recognized principles and rules of international law”.

As in other documents, however, the use and validity of international law is reinforced by that of protection of borders and sovereignty, § 7:

“The Heads of State emphasized the importance of the speedy completion, on the basis of the rules and principles of international law, of the process of the legal establishment of the State border lines between their States as a basic element of the sovereignty and independence of States”.

Such principles are also recalled in the Dushanbe Declaration, annexed to the document itself. There, we find also support for the rules of diplomacy and coexistence in interstate relations: “taking into account the interests of all the countries of the region and in compliance with the principles of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect”. Regional coherence is also reaffirmed: the signatories present themselves as “The Presidents of the States of Central Asia — the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan”.

In 2003, the Joint statement by the heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan was submitted to the UNGA and the Secretariat (A/58/131–S/2003/703). Again, the usual pluralist norms of coexistence, limited and short-termed cooperation and respect for sovereignty and international law are professed, while clearly identifying themselves as a region. As a matter of fact, the Heads of State addressed “the questions of developing multilateral regional cooperation within the framework of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), the situation in and around the region”, thus creating a divide between them, Central Asians, and the external realm. Indeed, one should never forget that the fact that these documents were submitted to the UN were also an attempt to gain international recognition as a group.

Towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium, however, the five Central Asian states lost any sense of regional grouping, being without a Central Asian regional organisation representing them. In parallel with the entry of Russia in the region, ⁹ pristine animosities especially on border issues, water and energy resources, old divides and mutual distrust among the leaders of the republics prevented them to present themselves on the world stage as “Central Asia” as we saw above. Nonetheless, while the regional convergence decreased in centripetal form, normative convergence, especially around the pluralist normative bulk of the region, has remained present.

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After joining CACO in 2004, Russia merged CACO with EurAsEc (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) at the St. Petersburg Summit of 2005, de facto silencing the only Central Asian regional organisation then still alive.

Especially in the field of security and nuclear non-proliferation, the Central Asian states have been successful in using the UN as a rostrum from where they could prove to be able to successfully bargaining matters related to their survival, even proposing themselves as an example for other regions to the world. The formal setting up for the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) started already in 1997. In the Statement issued at Tashkent on 15 September 1997 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, then submitted to the UN (A/52/390), the states agreed to sign a treaty instituting the CANWFZ, following their common commitment to sovereign equality, use of diplomacy and international law as means for peaceful coexistence and stressing those rules facilitating security maintenance and survival among nations. The process of setting up the CANWFZ lasted more than 10 years (2005: A/59/733–S/2005/155; 2009: A/63/782, 2012: A/67/409). The UN noticed the normative convergence of the Central Asian states in the realm of non-proliferation, declaring that the Treaty on a NWFZ in Central Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region, constitutes an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and ensuring regional and international peace and security (A/67/409).

Thus, even at a time when Central Asian countries were not supported by (and, perhaps more importantly, decided to not support any more) regional projects specifically “Central Asian”, these states have been able to find an agreement and to meet each other's interests following the pluralist norms of coexistence exemplified by sovereignty protection, international law and diplomacy. ¹⁰

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In the Press Conference on CANWFZ Treaty, March 30, 2009 Monday (States News Service), Nurbek Jeenbaev (Kyrgyzstan) stated that the five countries had reached their agreement out of a desire to promote regional and international peace and security; Aksoltan T. Ataeva (Turkmenistan) said that, while each of the five nations had its own identity, they also shared a common history, and Murad Askarov (Uzbekistan) added that the signing and quick entry into force of the Treaty was also a clear indication that all five countries were fully aware of their role in maintaining international security and contributing to a more stable world.

6 Speeches and norms

This section addresses the norms professed by each Central Asian state in the UNGA in the last two years via direct speech. As we have noted, there are no Central Asian regional organisations any more, and therefore each Central Asian state on the stage speaks only for itself and not on behalf of the regional group. However, the analysis shows that while the regional convergence has lowered significantly, the normative convergence has remained high. Methodologically speaking, I will rely on the ten speeches made at the UNGA Plenary Meeting by the five Central Asian representatives in 2011 and 2012.

Starting with the 67th General Debate in the UNGA, 27 September 2012, the first speaker was Kairat Umarov for Kazakhstan (Umarov, 2012). In his speech he emphasised Kazakhstan's commitment to security, reform of the UN System (“multipolarity…trust and political tolerance”), no-nuclear weapons (“Kazakhstan fully supports the proposal by the United Nations Secretary-General to adopt a nuclear weapons convention”), international law and diplomacy (“new principles…should be enshrined in…the entire international law system; we call upon the Governments to adhere to their international obligations to protect diplomatic representatives in their countries”), non-interference (“we believe that it is fundamentally important to ensure strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in international affairs of States”). Other norms and institutions mentioned were sovereignty (“The principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs must be respected”) and environmentalism (“Kazakhstan will actively promote the development of a project of sustainable development goals”).

The second speaker was Asylbek Jeenbekov, representing the Kyrgyz Republic (Jeenbekov, 2012). In his speech, he made reference to the following norms: the respect and inviolability of international law (asking for “commitment to international legal obligations” in international relations), more equitable order, diplomacy (“we also reject the use of force against diplomats of every country”), non-intervention (“Kyrgyzstan is advocating an open international dialogue between the forces [in Syria]”), Great Powers management. Furthermore, there were references to reform of the UN (“Reform of the UN is still a priority”), sovereignty (“One can clearly see the sanctity of our fatherland”) and more equitable and democratic order (“we propose to expand the membership of the UNSC to make it more representative, transparent and democratic”), environmentalism (“Kyrgyzstan made its choice of its future route towards long term sustainable green development and green economy”).

Then it was the turn of the Tajik representative, Hamrokhon Zarifi (Zarifi, 2012). We read about the importance of the UN (“it is impossible to address global and regional issues without strengthening the central role of the UN”), reform of its system (“it is necessary to carry out a rational reform of the Organisation”), sovereignty, pluralism (“Tajikistan is convinced that respect for cultural and religious diversity…is essential for global peace and understanding”), non-interference, international law (“it is necessary to behave according to international treaties…”), environmentalism (“in Tajikistan special attention is given to effective, rational and protective use of natural resources that constitute the main dimension of the ‘green economy’”). In addition there were references to norms of good neighbourhood, diplomacy, pacta sunt servanda (“we expect…parties in the region will abstain from hasty and not thoroughly thought out statements and actions that can run counter to the existing international agreements and spirit of friendship, cooperation and good neighbourhood”).

The Turkmen representative, Rashid Meredov (Meredov, 2012), made reference to environmentalism (“The UN Conference on Sustainable Development “Rio +20” held in June this year clearly identified the need to consolidate efforts on ecological issues and environmental protection”), international law (“Turkmenistan seeks to act in accordance with international law and the resolutions of the General Assembly”).

Finally, the Uzbek speaker Abdulaziz Kamilov (Kamilov, 2012) followed on the same lines on non-intervention and sovereignty (“The problems of Central Asia must be addressed by the countries of the region without interference of external powers”), international law (“We are deeply convinced that al issues and energy problematic in our region…must be considered in line with universally recognized norms of international law; Uzbekistan calls on to be guided by these principles and norms”) and a pluralist vision of world order (“Uzbekistan proceeds from addressing all outstanding political, economic and ecological problems of the region on the basis of mutual consideration of interests, constructive dialogue and norms of international law”).

Moving now to 2011, we see that some of the protagonists have changed, but again the discourses of State representatives are not different from 2012.

This time, the Kazakh speaker was the president himself, Nurusultan Nazarbayev (Nazarbayev, 2011). Norms endorsed were non-proliferation (“We have become one of the world's first newly independent non-nuclear states”), environmentalism (“Kazakhstan has called for the adoption of a Global Energy and Environment Strategy and has put forward an ambitious ‘Green Bridge’ environmental initiative”), sovereignty, non-intervention and international law (“[t]oday, the principle of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity is often exposed to erosion. This could undermine trust between nations. Today, it is essential to upgrade the norms of international law concerning the national sovereignty of States”).

For the Kyrgyz Republic, the speaker was Roza Otunbayeva (Otunbayeva, 2011): she professed the values of democracy, which she considered a Kyrgyz peculiarity, but also those the norms international law, non-intervention (“external intervention should remain a measure of the last resort and be used only and exclusively with the sanction of the UN Security Council”), diplomacy, environmentalism (“Kyrgyzstan is concerned with the decline of the world community's attention to the issues of global climate change”), non-proliferation as foundational norm of the region (“Kyrgyzstan as one of the initiators of creating a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia and as the depositary of this treaty, which entered into force on 21 March 2009, considers important the promptest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and strengthening of the universality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”), plus references to Central Asia as a region, sovereignty, pluralist world order passim.

The speaker for Tajikistan was, again, Zarifi (Zarifi, 2011): he supported the institutions of diplomacy, sovereignty, market economy (“We believe that the system of international trade must remain open, fair, based on agreed upon rules, predictable and non discriminatory. Guided by these principles, Tajikistan is currently holding negotiations on joining the World Trade Organization (WTO)”), environmentalism (“It is widely known that in the second half of the 20th century the Central Asian region faced a severe ecological crisis that is degradation of the Aral Sea. It was irrational, careless and irresponsible use of the natural resources that caused actual death of the Aral Sea”), references to Central Asia as a region (“My country firmly supports a mine free zone in the Central Asian region”), international law, Great Powers management, reform of the UN for a more equitable order (“It is impossible to address global issues and most urgent regional tasks without strengthening the UN system”).

Another presidential figure present at the General Debate was Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov for Turkmenistan (Berdymukhamedov, 2011). In one of his rare appearances on the world stage, he endorsed the norms of diplomacy (“Turkmenistan attaches paramount importance to the regulation of any situations by peaceful means and methods”), de-institutionalisation of war (“we absolutely reject military forces as an instrument of foreign policy and intergovernmental relations”), plus a declaration on priority introduction of political and diplomatic tools in solving international issues, references to Central Asia as a region (he advanced the proposal for an Advisory Council on peaceful development in Central Asia), reform of the economic order, environmentalism (“The environmental sphere is the priority direction of international cooperation of Turkmenistan”).

The last speaker was the Uzbek Foreign Minister Elyor Ganiev (Ganiev, 2011). He supported the norms of a social market economy (“The ‘Uzbek model’ of democratization of the country and transition to socially oriented market economy adopted in the early years of our independence served as a basis of these achievements”), sovereignty (“In all 20 years passed since the time when the Republic of Uzbekistan became an independent state and joined the ranks of full-fledged members of the United Nations”), reference to Central Asia as a region (“the tragic events in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 became a serious challenge to peace and stability in the Central Asian region”), ¹¹ diplomacy (“there is no military solution to the Afghan problem”), non-interference (“It is our firm belief that the Afghan people must resolve their country's problems on their own”), environmentalism (“the socio-economic development not only of our country but the entire Central Asian region is influenced by the environmental disaster of the Aral Sea”), international law (“any action on using the resources of transboundary rivers must take into account the interests of all states located in their basin and on the basis of international law”; “the position of our country not only fully goes in line with the international law and the rules in this area [water], but not least, comes out of them”), multilateralism (at least at the global level) (“Uzbekistan fully shares the importance of strengthening the multilateral mechanisms to ensure a stable and just world order”) .

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All these references to Central Asia as a region show how despite the fact that Central Asia lost its “actorness” (as a regional group) it still exists in the mind of regional statesmen as a field of closely interdependent relations. This was confirmed to me in more than 30 interviews with experts, analysts, academics and diplomats that I conducted in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan between October and December 2013.

What does all this reveal? Bringing together the various declarations of Central Asian state representatives made from the UNGA rostrum, it is possible to have a preliminary map, although partial and imperfect, of their normative orientation in world politics. They all endorse all those norms and rules associated with a pluralist account of international society (sovereignty, non-interference, international law, diplomacy).

In addition, speaking in ES terms, they all seem to advocate the institution of Great Powers management, although sometimes this poses difficulties in matching it with the norm of non-intervention (as the case of Uzbekistan exemplifies). While all of them endorse, in different degrees, the principles of the market economy, only Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan make explicit reference to them. However, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are mildly referring to them as well in the conduct of international relations (note that both states have engaged with the WTO with respect to their future entry, although at different paces. While Uzbekistan has recently slowed down the whole accession process, Turkmenistan has recently set up a commission to study possible accession).

Furthermore, all Central Asian states adopt a multicultural, pluralist and democratic vision of global order, rejecting the supremacy of the more developed countries at the expenses of the poorer ones, both in terms of resources and representation in institutional forums. Last but not least, all Central Asian states seem to endorse the principle of multilateralism in solving global issue, although this can be also seen as a derivative of their vision of international society as a pluralist environment. Unilateralism is explicitly rejected, and the role of the UN in ensuring multilateral arrangements in the security, economic and environmental fields is constantly stressed. Thus, even if Central Asian states do not present themselves as a regional actor any more, they show a substantive degree of normative convergence, in some cases a real symmetry. The question to ask now is: is this normative convergence empirically observable in the UNGA?

7 Votes and convergence

This third and last section seeks to discover whether the normative convergence analysed and contextualised above is reflected in the voting practice in the UNGA. Before presenting the data, however, I need to specify some conditions, not last the method I use.

Firstly, I make clear that I look at those resolutions that 1) require a vote ¹² and 2) do not concern the organisational structure of the UN, but actually concern issues of world politics such as questions about sovereignty, nuclear weapons, economic order, environmental issues, peaceful settlements of conflicts, human rights and so forth.

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Following Ferdinand (2013: 3), I do not consider resolutions adopted by consensus. This, however, is a very (methodologically speaking) sensitive issue in scholarship on UNGA voting. For a comprehensive analysis of the problem of “consensus voting” in the UNGA, see Häge and Hug (2013).

Secondly, I consider each vote in the GA as a support/rejection for the norm and/or institution embodied in the resolution under debate. Although this move has been endorsed in the literature (Keohane, 1967; Peterson, 1986, more recently Boockmann & Dreher, 2011; Puchala, 2005; Voeten, 2012), ¹³ it may still require an explanation. There is a reason to believe that a vote can be linked to a normative stance especially given that 1) states are aware of the one-head-one-vote rule, and therefore are not tied to regional or global hegemons, and 2) most of the votes have not binding nature. Given that resolutions are not binding, therefore, states are more inclined to vote for what they deem to be right rather than for what they think it may be useful. ¹⁴

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Referring to votes on Human Rights, Boockmann and Dreher refer to the “expressive nature” of voting in the UNGA as opposed to an “instrumental” one (2011: 462).

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An instrumental adoption of a norm, however, can be seen as a normative commitment as well. The only thing that differs from a “heart-felt” adoption of a norm is the level of “depth” of internalisation, and therefore the likelihood/probability of infringement in the future (Buzan, 2004).

We should also clarify the method adopted. As anticipated, I use the UNGA Voting Dataset, which contains also the Affinity of Nations scores (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013a). ¹⁵ To calculate the degree of convergence among Central Asian countries in the UNGA, I have used the variable “agree3un” – Voting similarity index using the interval (0–1) – computed using three categories of vote data (1 = “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for an issue). ¹⁶ Abstention, therefore, is counted as half-agreement with a “yes” or “no” vote (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013b). I considered the “agree3un” variable since 1992 (first date available) and computed it for each dyad of Central Asian countries (10 dyads) and then calculated the mathematical average value for each dyad over the years. Detailed voting convergence data are in the appendix (see Appendix); however, in what follows I focus on the most striking similarities between the Central Asian countries.

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The dataset is available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtmlglobalId=hdl:1902.1/12379.

16

I follow Boockmann and Dreher (2011) in maintaining “abstention” and “vote against” separated.

Two possible objections may be made to this analysis. Firstly, one may argue that the normative convergence among Central Asian states is meaningless because they may share a high degree of convergence with other countries as well (see, e.g., Stavridis & Pruett, 1996: 4). Clearly Central Asian states share many concerns of their post-colonial fellows in world politics (Ayoob, 1995), and this is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that these states are sympathetic with the demands and normative stances of the Non-Aligned Movement (of which Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are members and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are observers). ¹⁷ But this misses the point made at the beginning of the paper, when it was stressed that given the present-day literature on the centrifugal character of the Central Asian region it was necessary to focus on the region itself to have more room for problematisation. We should not forget that the focus of this paper is specifically on the five Central Asian republics and on their convergence at the international level. The fact that Central Asian states share a high degree of normative convergence with other states does not go against the fact that Central Asian states share a high degree of normative convergence among themselves, and this is particularly important since, as noted, they are usually considered in the literature as incapable of agreeing on anything.

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The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded in 1961. Common objectives of the NAM through the years have been: 1. south–south cooperation; 2. territorial integrity and respect of sovereignty; 3. reform of the UN system; 4. sustainable development; 5. multilateralisation in response to US uni-polarity; 6. cultural diversity and differentiation of human rights. In addition, the Central Asian states share the so called “Shanghai Spirit” promoted by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), characterised by highly pluralist norms (Ambrosio, 2008; Lanteigne, 2006). However, common positions at the UN within the SCO framework have never been discussed, since as said Central Asian states rely much more on bilateralism when it comes to coordinate positions within international organisations.

Secondly, there is the question of Great Powers. They may influence Central Asian states’ votes. To what extent do Central Asian states show normative convergence with Russia and China, for example? On the utility of this question, the previous answer may still work. However, it is interesting to see that, while the data for China have not be computed yet, dyads with Russia show a statistically lower degree of agreement for all the five republics. Clearly we are in the realm of agreement and convergence, but figures are lower than among Central Asian states sometimes with significant (low) peaks (see Appendix). Task for future research, however, would be for example to understand and show on what issues the Central Asian republics and the former patron disagree the most (sovereignty and territorial integrity seem to be good candidates, as well as nuclear matters). ¹⁸

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For example, on issues concerning recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, all five Central Asian states voted exactly the opposite of Russia.

All dyads of Central Asian states show a high degree of convergence, with the highest value of 0.953 of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and the lower one of 0.895 of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is interesting to see how Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, commonly considered reciprocal foes in the region, have nonetheless quite a strong record of convergence (0.914 and 0.916 respectively), with indeed a rising trend over the last five years (see Appendix).

With respect to Russia, there is convergence as well, but less than among Central Asian states themselves (see Appendix). All values are below 0.88 on average, with significant low ebbs over the years (0.66 with Turkmenistan in 1996, a 0.70 with Kyrgyzstan in 1994 and a 0.68 with Uzbekistan in 1997). Perhaps not surprisingly, given their high dependence on military supply, security provision and economic investment, the two countries that enjoy the highest affinity with Russia are Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (0.86 and 0.87 respectively).

Going back to common voting behaviour among Central Asian states, recent examples of unanimity are to be found on equitable development (A/67/455); sovereignty and auto-determination (A/67/456; A/61/442; A/67/444), matters concerning globalisation and cultural diversity (A/67/457/Add.2; A/66/462/Add.2); unilateral coercive measures in case of infringement of human rights (A/67/457/Add.2); right to development (A/67/457/Add.2; A/61/443/Add.2); equitable international order (A/67/457/Add.2; A/61/443/ADD.2; A/66/462/Add.2); security and nuclear matters (A/67/406; A/67/409) thus in line with the analysis conducted on the other two groups of sources. A thorough analysis of the precise issues on which there is unanimity, however, has yet to be done.

8 Findings and conclusions

In this paper, I have tried to set out four hypotheses. Here, I discuss their validity. An accurate, scrutinised analysis of speeches, documents and voting convergence in the UNGA has revealed that the five Central Asian republics endorse the same norms and agree on a number of them. Referring often to environmental problems, security-related issues, possible ethnic clashes and fearing domination from the Great Powers, they support strong pluralist norms and values of international relations: territorial integrity, Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty, reliance on international law and diplomacy as the sole modes of conflict resolution, an equitable global economic order, plus a common solidarist concern on the environment.

The very interesting preliminary finding of this paper is that while at the regional level there is seldom meeting of minds, at the international level the five republics speak the same language, and abide by the same institutions. This seems to be in line with what other senior scholars have said on the region, namely the presence of a Central Asian “club” (Cummings, 2002: 11) or of a “Central Asian standard” (Cooley, 2012: 151). Thus, the first two hypotheses seem to be correct. A task for future research will be that of bringing to the surface the reasons for this regional–global divide Central Asian states, as well as possibly enhancing the arguments made in the paper with additional fieldwork data and even more interviews with protagonists.

However, the findings do not suggest in any way that there is something specific to the way that Central Asian states conduct their international relations. Rather, the paper has showed how Central Asian states have adopted and endorsed the most common pluralist norms of international society, thus favouring a world order based on the values on peaceful coexistence and limited cooperation. It should be noted that the emphasis of the paper was on cooperation among Central Asian states at the international level, and therefore on their normative convergence, not on their normative distinctiveness as a group.

In addition, the UN has been called upon by Central Asian countries several times to back and arrange regional cooperative arrangements, as it was the case of the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the CANWFZ. The common appeal to the UN has been made possible by a normative convergence on the realist values of security, stability and survival, and their common interest in preserving their sovereignty, statehood and territorial integrity has stimulated cooperation at the international level. ¹⁹ Also the third hypothesis is, therefore, defensible.

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The UN has also been recently involved in another regional dispute, that over the Roghun dam. While Tajikistan favours the construction of the dam as it would generate electricity for its own domestic consumption, thus avoiding dependence on neighbouring countries, Uzbekistan strongly opposes it, as it would impact on its agricultural production. The two parties, after a long series of disputes and hostile acts, have agreed to defer the controversy to the World Bank, whose technical report is expected to be released in early 2014.

The fourth hypothesis seems to be the weakest one. In the analysis presented above there is hardly something that can lead to think that there is a distinct, identifiable Central Asian identity, meant as a set of political, normative and cultural features that distinguish this region form others. It may have been the case during the 1990s, where environmental problems inherited from the USSR, the ethnic split among the republics, their new entry in the global market economy and their “autocratic solidarity” to counter instability and regional conflagration were voiced at every international occasion as special features of the region. Common references to “Central Asia” in the UN documents discussed above prove this. After 2001, however, the trend is that of a region which is still perhaps existent in terms of a weak regional security complex (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, see also Bayzakova, 2010; Burnashev & Chernykh, 2013), but not as a coherent group of states that are linked by normative or political peculiarities, and certainly not by a common identity. As we noted, there is still a great deal of convergence on numerous issues, but this convergence is not framed in a “regional narrative” any more. This finding is quite an important one, since it departs from the conclusions drawn by Ferdinand on the ASEAN case, claiming that “[vote similarity in the UNGA] suggest[s] a coherent regional identity on the global stage” (2013: 14). Disproving the hypothesis made in the introduction, the analysis above has showed how among Central Asian states there is strong convergence on several pluralist norms of international society, but this convergence is not imbued with “regionness”. Notably, this finding comes from the multi-method adopted in the paper: having looked not also at the quantity of the normative convergence, but also at its quality, I was able to describe how the normative convergence was played out by the actors, whether alone or in group.

Where from here? This paper did not intend to describe Central Asian states as highly cooperative. Converging voting patterns “do not necessarily mean comprehensively close foreign relations, still less coordinated political action” (Ferdinand, 2013: 16; see also Alker & Russett, 1967: 60; Bailey et al., 2013: 30–31). Rather, this paper has made a case for considering voting behaviour and behaviour in general in the UNGA as an indicator of the pluralist, defensive normative position of the Central Asian states, thus shedding light on their sociability as actors in international society and value-laden position in it. An ES reading of their position in the UNGA has revealed that these states agree on common norms and rules typical of a pluralist international society, and that despite their disagreement and competition in the region they endorse similar positions at the international level. Even if in relative conflict with each other, Central Asian states have managed to live together for the last twenty-two years advocating, adopting and implementing those international norms and rules that guarantee survival, peaceful coexistence and common life. ²⁰ The main aim of this paper was indeed to focus on the international cooperation, or rather, dialogue, between Central Asian states, “for it is a reality and it is a constant and under-considered element in foreign policy-making. It establishes parameters for cooperation inside as well as outside the region. It can counterbalance the nationalist excesses. It shows that there is more common ground on broad foreign policy between the states in [Central Asia], and therefore the basis for closer potential cooperation, than accounts of the territorial disputes usually allow” (Ferdinand, 2013: 16).

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The norms and rules supported internationally by Central Asian states in the UNGA are indeed practiced and followed in the region itself. Many of the diplomats and analysts I met in the region in the period October–December 2013 referred, among other factors, to “informal mechanisms to prevent major conflicts”, “bona fide rules” and “normative thresholds” to explain why in Central Asia “coexistence” and “stable neighbourhood” have been possible in the last two decades.

Therefore, Western policy-makers and diplomats engaging with Central Asian states should take this values and normative orientations as basis for their political prescriptions for regional actors. This is especially true if the neo-patrimonial nature of their governments is taken into consideration as well (Collins, 2009: 277).

Their pluralist normative stance, as explained and illustrated by the findings, is the product of the recent birth of these states, of their precarious position in a challenging regional environment and of their historical, economic and political legacies. If cooperation among Central Asian states is achievable, then it is likely to be effective only if based on the norms and institutions discussed in this paper, and it will be, at least in its initial manifestations, short-termed, pragmatic and on specific issues. The value of the ES approach adopted in this paper has been exactly that of shedding light on this via media between pure competition and pure cooperation, which have been the most common lenses of analysis to study international relations in Central Asia.

In a world that is speaking increasingly different languages, especially when it comes to principles, norms and rules, to map and understand what states think is appropriate in international relations may be a useful point of departure to preserve order and predictability in an increasingly fragmented international society. And even if they are not as fashionable as Great Powers are, Central Asian states are no exception.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the audience at the BISA Annual Convention 2013, Birmingham, UK, June 20-21, where an earlier draft of this paper was presented. The author is grateful to BISA for providing him with the financial means that allowed him to attend the conference. The author would also like to thank Dr. Ruth Deyermond, Dr. Valentina Feklyunina and Dr. Natasha Kuhrt for their helpful comments and insightful suggestions on earlier drafts.