Democratically Digging Together: A Study of Archaeology and Civil Society

Abstract

Protecting archaeological sites increases the sense of belonging among the population. Political culture in authoritarian countries limits citizens’ opportunities for freedom of action and civic engagement. The authorities may perceive such engagement as a threat to the regime. Nevertheless, civic activism in protecting archaeological sites can provide an opportunity to increase the role of civil society in policymaking. This article interrogates civil society’s role concerning archaeology and its preservation in Kazakhstan. It considers three cases of how local communities participate in archaeological projects and their protection. It concludes that the degree of community involvement and the number of people involved in rural and urban settings differ. Kazakhstan occasionally manifests vigorous civic activity on archaeological issues at the national level. However, a certain level of resistance may demonstrate the potential for democratic development, with archaeology as one of the practical tools of civil liberty at the grassroot level.

Introduction

Democratic development is centred on the opportunities for individuals to translate their values into public policies. Elections and referendums provide periodic occasions for engagement, but the development of civil society is a vital sign of democratic cultures. Social-political action and public participation by members of communities (McGuire, 2008, p. 87) can lead to feelings of empowerment and furthermore alter power relations within society at large. Consequentially, in autocracies, the political elite is inclined to regard collective agency among citizens as a threat to the stability of a policy process characterised by top-down decision-making, particularly in areas where significant state resources are involved. Such concerns may inhibit the move from autocracy to democracy. Even if social and economic conditions favour change, the process may be significantly radicalised by widespread frustration and elite fears. Therefore, it is important to secure paths for the development of civil society that are both constructive and engaging across various stakeholder interests. The acute potential for realising political agency through archaeological praxis (McGuire et al., 2005) presents such an opportunity for shaping a civil society. Indeed as Barton (2021) suggests:

…activism in archaeology does not need to involve radical or explicitly political actions but can be practiced in subtler forms as a means of studying the past, informing the present, and creating a better future.

Archaeology can seek to address the state’s historical narrative through the discovery and considered reporting of material remains. It may also facilitate mutually beneficial engagement between local activists and the state in a characteristically non-confrontational manner, but not exclusively, whereas others call for archaeologists to recognise their acute responsibility to serve the public through contesting inherent systems of inequality in their work (e.g. McGuire, 2008). Involvement in local projects centred on preserving archaeological assets, for instance, can unleash the potential for collective agency in the public sphere that in other policy settings citizens may not experience.

Moreover, the reaction to initiatives that are aimed to enhance the role of civil society needs to be understood in the context of the prevailing political culture. As Almond and Verba (2015) frame it:

…attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system (Balen & Vandesande, 2015).

Countries with similar legally defined institutions and structures practice politics in distinct ways that reflect deeply ingrained social attitudes. Political cultures are slow to change even in the face of marked discontinuities in the institutional arrangements of the state. Long experience of autocratic rule may engender internal attitudes resistant to grassroots activism even in the context of potential local benefit.

Nevertheless, both elite and popular attitudes may be altered by the experience of incremental but positive change. Similarly, the official narrative of pro-democratic values, access to international media, and cross-border mobility may make national cultures more permeable. Evidence also suggests that generational change is generally favourable to the development of democracy (Welzel, 2021).

Particularly since the 1990s, field archaeology in Europe has increasingly become an activity with a broad range of stakeholders, including academics, cultural heritage professionals, governmental bodies, and various groups from the public (ICOMOS, 1994). Such a scenario involving multiple stakeholders is often accompanied by volunteer involvement in excavations under the supervision of professional archaeologists. The knowledge attained by communities of volunteers, whether consisting of indigenous, school, or residence groups (see McGuire, 2008, p. 86–88), increases a sense of ownership and facilitates local engagement in heritage making. Such engagement can encourage transparency and democratic participation that limits the potential for outside commercial or black-market exploitation. The communities’ sense of ownership protects cultural assets and may facilitate local involvement in tourism and the development of heritage centres. In Greece, for example, where cultural heritage is an essential aspect of national identity:

Public perception studies demonstrate that archaeology is valued highly…and even more so among communities local to archaeological sites, where participants interested in archaeology are the majority (Sakellariadi, 2022).

The coming together of professional and public interests is less evident in developing or authoritarian countries (Mozaffari and Jones, 2020). But, as Little (2007, p. 2) observes:

When archaeology is a tool for civic engagement, the emphasis is not usually on the political system in any formal way, although local politics will likely be involved.

Such multi-stakeholder action contributes to developing a level of social capital generally marked by trust, reciprocity, and local connectivity, essential elements of democratic societies. As Putnam (1994) suggests the strength of social capital plays a decisive role in the relative success of areas with very similar institutions. As Sung (2022, p. 77) presents it, the benefits of social capital formation may be broad:

…residents’ participation in the management of cultural resources is closely related to other initiatives, such as the sustainable development of the region, responses to climate change, cultural heritage preservation activities, and world heritage site protection.

This article seeks to show how efforts to build a local sense of custodianship could protect tangible cultural assets in the context of the infrastructural change that accompanies economic development. It also reflects on the potential for participation among various communities, framed broadly here as members of the public that share a common goal and interest, in developing local heritage policies to encourage democratic transition. It employs examples in Kazakhstan to examine the possibility and parameters of engagement as identified within different communities in a developing and autocratic state.

The methodology employed involves a comprehensive review of past literature, an exploration of available online resources, and a thorough analysis of media news reports. Through this approach, the analysis aims to elucidate the significance of local custodianship in safeguarding tangible cultural assets amidst infrastructural transformations accompanying economic development. The comprehensive review of past literature involved scrutinising academic studies, scholarly articles, and historical documents pertaining to heritage preservation, community engagement, and economic development, both within Kazakhstan and globally. The research further explored available online resources, including archives, and media news reports, capturing the contemporary discourse surrounding heritage initiatives, public perceptions, and policy developments in Kazakhstan to gather diverse perspectives and empirical evidence relevant to the study. Drawing upon three examples from Kazakhstan, the analysis examines the feasibility and contours of community engagement within diverse socio-political contexts, particularly within a developing and autocratic state.

Institutional Structures and the Expression of Local Preferences

Community participation in cultural heritage projects in developing and autocratic countries may be constrained by institutional structures that effectively limit the expression of local preferences and issues of widespread concern. The top-down nature of autocratic regimes may leave little room for anything other than perfunctory local involvement and thus disincentivize meaningful engagement in cultural initiatives. At the same time, local actors may only appreciate the value of artefacts and other discoveries in immediate monetary terms. The initial reaction of local individuals may be to assess the advantages of looting and black-market trading. By creating a more positive role for local communities to participate and promote an appreciation for the value of local heritage, the political system may develop forms of engagement that facilitate incremental democratic change. It may also augment social capital formation, which, as Little (2007, p. 2) suggests, in the context of archaeology, is:

…good will, fellowship, and social interaction that counts in the daily lives of people who make up a social unit. Social capital give rise to connections of trust, reciprocity. Shared values and networks among individuals.

McGuire (2008) also delves into the connection between archaeology and politics, asserting that archaeology is fundamentally political and has been utilised over history to advance different political motives. It is frequently utilised to impose governmental authority and validate specific beliefs. Various entities, including governments, colonial powers, and other groups, have utilised archaeology to create historical accounts aligning with their objectives. McGuire (2008) further outlines the potential of archaeological sites and artefacts to hold symbolic weight that can be interpreted to support specific identity narratives. As a result, McGuire (2008) urges archaeologists to be cognisant and acknowledge their work’s political aspects and participate in initiatives that advance social justice and fairness in the field.

Research Context: Kazakhstan and Archaeological Engagement

This article focuses on an autocratic country that, in January 2022, experienced a significant outbreak of political and civil unrest. In some instances, protests at government policies led to violent confrontations between protestors and the security forces. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s leaders espouse a commitment to developing a democratic system. The account offered reflects on normative participation, inclusion, and community engagement ideals (Groot & Abma, 2022). It also acknowledges the significance of the legacy of the totalitarian system of the Soviet period (Ojala, 2014). In the totalitarian regime, scholars and others engaged in the public space were expected to avoid any accounts that might question the official historical narrative.

Kazakhstan is a relatively new state formed in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The autocratic regime that was established suggested that democratic reform was on hold pending substantial economic development (Pomfret, 2005). As in many newly independent jurisdictions, the governance style reflects the methods of the previous regime. As Omelicheva (2016, p. 481) suggested:

The two and a half decades since the breakup of the Soviet Union have seen the emergence of stable authoritarian regimes that adopted the formal trappings of democracy yet made no progress in democratic transformation.

Kazakhstan was one such state, though, as Omelicheva (2016) also suggests, the state’s modus operandi was widely accepted as appropriate at the time by the general population enculturated within Soviet-style top-down administrative practices. A core task for the new regime has been the development of a national narrative that stresses Kazakhstan’s continuity and deep historical roots. The conventional approach to cultural heritage emphasises ‘its role as a living testimony of ancient traditions’ (Mazzocchi, 2022, p. 393). While much of the cultural heritage of Kazakhstan as Kendirbaeva (1999) claims was for older generations preserved in poetry, music, and storytelling, physical archaeological material is also important and its legal protection rests on the contributions of local government. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that, except at the lowest tier, municipal chief executives are appointed centrally and do not currently report to locally elected bodies.

[The] Kazakhstan model of local government is based on the French experience of state regulation, where the key role is played by a prefect who is the representative of governmental authority over local authorities and determines all areas of local activity (Bimendeyev et al., 2016, p. 55).

The local government structure has three layers:

- Regional (oblast) level – 17 oblasts and 3 cities with similar status;

- District level – 161 rural districts, 16 urban districts, and 37 cities; and

- Local level – 2391 rural and 51 sub-district administrations.

In 2021, Kazakhstan introduced direct elections of its executive mayors (akims) at the lowest level of local government (law on local public administration and self-government, article 36, 2021). Whereas at the higher levels, the executives are centrally appointed.

Studies on local governments in Kazakhstan have found that they do not have real power to address local issues adequately, as they are heavily subordinate to the higher government tiers in all areas (Zhumashov, 2022, p. 180).

Reforms in 2022 may make parts of the local government system more electorally accountable, but the administrative culture remains ‘top-down’, and the local population’s engagement is limited.

The responsibility for finding and accounting for historical and cultural heritage in need of protection is laid on the local executive authorities, which are not always the most efficient…many countries, having recognized the importance of conservation of traces of history that have yet to be found, have acquired the necessary archaeological expertise…this expertise has not been properly determined in the legislative acts of the Kazakhstan Republic (Auganbai et al., 2020, p. 382).

To date, the imperatives of economic development as mitigated via commercial construction have been much more pressing for local officials than the protection of yet-to-be-discovered cultural artefacts. In addition, as Auganbai et al. (2020, p. 382) suggest:

…advocates of the governmental budget and civil rights of the land users are much more proactive as compared with the proponents of the ‘salvation’ of history and culture.

The primary performance indicators for municipal leaders are economic rather than ideological. Further, President Tokayev identified the construction sector as among the ‘most corrupt spheres’ (Shayakhmetova, 2022a). Local officials may find resistance to public engagement as much as their central government colleagues. The legal protection of known sites of importance for cultural heritage reasons is weak but:

…the main threat to historical and cultural heritage objects is current construction, and there is no reliable legislative protection of archaeological objects which are still not known to archaeologists, and which are still buried in the earth (Auganbai et al., 2020, p. 384).

In this context, the construction work associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and related Kazakh programmes are particularly relevant with regard to how decisions to disseminate and shape a national image are enacted at the policy level (Dupuy et al., 2022). To date,

…the discursive field of the nationalizing regime is dominated by a small group of people, mainly from the presidential administration; it structures the actions and decisions of elites within the regime on the basis of loyalty to the president, regardless of the [democratically ambitious] discourse the regime is propagating (Kudaibergenova, 2017, p. 343).

Knox and Janenova (2022, p. 16) also suggest that, in Kazakhstan, the role of elected politicians is counterproductive:

…given its relatively stable political context, higher level of professionalism, and greater policy capacity amongst its officials, notwithstanding its consistent authoritarian leadership. When politicians interfere in the work of officials, it results in lower impartiality and constitutional uncertainty.

Nevertheless, elite politicians and appointees in senior bureaucratic positions generally followed the same hegemonic agenda.

Regarding public participation in policy issues other than via political parties, the 1996 Law on Public Associations and the 2001 Law on Non-commercial Organisations regulate non-governmental organisations (Kabdiyeva, 2015). This legislation facilitates formally organised groups in many fields, including those formed to ‘protect historical and cultural heritage’ (The Law on Public, 1996). Registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs) enjoy tax and other legal advantages. However, the law states that ‘activities of unregistered public associations are prohibited’. Much of the NGO activity is enabled by government support and reflects the weak tradition of volunteerism inherited from the Soviet experience. Some observers point to this close relationship with the government and a lack of transparency to explain the reluctance of some citizens to engage with Kazakhstan’s NGOs (Kabdiyeva, 2015). It is also suggested that, while they may be consulted about the early stages of the government’s policy agenda, they have little influence on final decisions. Thus, the link between NGOs and local communities is weak and their role to date in developing civil society is marginal. As Knox and Yessimova (2015, p. 14) conclude:

…. civil society is neither embryonic nor strong and influential.

Most NGOs are based in the largest city, Almaty. Their focus is mostly on social welfare (Naidenova, 2019). As an EU-funded research report put it: ‘NGOs are somewhat a deficit in rural Kazakhstan as a whole’ (‘Ecological Tourism and Public Awareness in Central Kazakhstan’, 2021). These groups seldom challenge the established order or mobilise local communities. At the same time, senior regional akims (mayors/governors) have emerged as powerful actors at the local level though, as Knox (2022, p. 46) outlines, they are:

…heavily dependent on, and controlled by, the centre. This relationship is compounded by the fact that they do not feel any sense of responsibility to local citizens.

This perspective, together with measures to counter it, was a central theme in President Tokayev’s state of the nation address in March 2022:

It is the governors’ offices that are called upon to interact with citizens and promptly solve their problems. However, this often does not happen (‘State-of-The-Nation Address by President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’, 2023).

Regime support in Kazakhstan has traditionally been higher than in other Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, public backing for the autocratic system weakened amid marked economic inequalities and other social pressures. The protests in early January 2022 were, for the most part, focused on wage levels, energy prices and social welfare provision. In the wake of the protests, the government of President Tokayev undertook to initiate a broad-based democratisation campaign. As Tokayev repeated in January 2022, ‘We are building up a listening state’ (Shayakhmetova, 2022a). In a separate initiative in 2021,

…reforms were introduced to expand the role of elections at the local level in order to build a culture of democracy from the grassroots up. Such elections have now been introduced in rural areas as a pilot project (Cornell et al., 2021, p. 10).

In his presidential address to the nation in March 2022, Tokayev committed to strengthening local representative bodies and increasing the role of civil society institutions (Shayakhmetova, 2022b). In June 2022, a referendum sanctioned further changes at the local level and altered the constitutional balance at the centre. Thirty percent of parliamentarians are to be elected from constituencies, thus incentivising local politics. In addition, village mayors will be elected, again strengthening grassroots representation though this change will not be reflected in the larger cities.

These initiatives are unlikely to bring radical change in the short term, but they signal a more encouraging environment for community engagement. The Transparency Kazakhstan index of participation and influence of citizens on law-making also shows an increased propensity for citizen engagement though state bureaucracies do not engage with citizens readily (Transparency Kazakhstan, 2022). The Civic Forum, which takes place every two years and is organised by the Civil Alliance of Kazakhstan, is supposed to encourage dialogue between the government and civil society but in reality it makes very little contribution. The Civil Alliance itself has a low public profile (Yuvitsa, 2021).

If we turn our attention to the direct links between archaeology and the state, it can be observed that the ruling party’s historical narrative emphasises the antiquity and continuity of the Kazakh experience. The influence of the county’s large neighbours, especially Russia, is framed in terms of imperialism and totalitarian domination. As the Taiwanese experience shows, it is important to recognise the significance of regime change for the emphasis ascribed to archaeological engagement with the state.

Until the late 1980s and the beginning of the democratisation process, the Kuomintang party-state maintained a well-defined national narrative…exclusively rooted in continental Han China…[A] new dominant narrative appeared after 1987 that focused instead on what could differentiate Taiwan from China (Wang et al., 2021, p. 105).

In the post-1987 period, Taiwan also faced a dilemma like that in Kazakhstan:

The rapid economic development… triggered tension and conflicts between the necessity to construct large-scale infrastructure projects and the necessity to preserve cultural heritage (Wang et al., 2021, p. 106).

The pressure of infrastructural initiatives facilitated in Taiwan ‘a more capitalistic and managerial logic’ in which academic and community involvement was marginalised (Wang et al., 2021, p. 106). Studies of rural Kazakhstan, where many archaeological finds are made, show that current economic conditions are at the top of the agenda for most inhabitants. In recent years:

…a decrease in the number of economically active population (by 6.4%) is observed in rural areas, the problem of ‘hidden un-employment’ or self-employment exists, which is one of the main factors of the low standard of living of rural population (Moldashev, 2020, p. 21).

Community engagement is also valued but preserving tangible cultural heritage may seem to be less pressing particularly in what Tiberghien (2019) calls ‘“off the beaten track” Central Asian destinations’. Higher on the agenda of many parts of rural Kazakhstan are safe water supplies and sanitary conditions (Kurbanaliyev et al., 2022). Primary healthcare accessibility is another issue for many rural communities (Shaltynov et al., 2022). Community engagement in rural areas, in part, reflects residents’ trust in the broader political system. Confidence in the system mirrors the collective memory of communities related to past interactions with the state (Nikolova, 2022).

Archaeological assets are important for the narrative of nation-building, and Kazakhstan’s government has been proactive nationally and internationally in protecting its cultural heritage. Kazakhstan has served on the nominating committee for cultural and historical properties of UNESCO (2013 to 2017). It has five World Heritage Sites, with 14 on the tentative list, including several along the Silk Roads (UNESCO, 2022). In some instances, foreign and EU aid has been used to preserve sites but, Chang (2020, p. 89) reports:

…akims and other officials…also play an important role in supporting archaeological research in their regions. Often these bureaucrats have funds from their local or regional coffers to aid in costly research work, protection of collections, and furthering museum collections.

Another source of resources is commercial tourism entities or eco-tourism operators, though they may not rank archaeological finds highly.

A majority of tourism providers considered the fauna and flora of the steppe’s landscapes were key elements in portraying an authentic image of the nomadic culture (Tiberghien, 2019, p. 501).

Similarly, cultural projects are occasionally funded by companies in the extractive sector to garner support in the local communities though archaeological assets are rarely the focus (Makatova, 2022). Some commentators point optimistically at the role of social media in facilitating and encouraging civic engagement (Kwon et al., 2021). In autocratic regimes, however, participants in online activism may be wary of official surveillance if their subject of interest is potentially contentious (Wood, 2022).

…99% of the total Kazakhstani population was projected to be covered with internet access by the end of 2020…The vast majority of young people in…Kazakhstan (85.1%) use the internet every day (Sairambay, 2022, p. 11).

Internet usage declines in the older age groups and rural areas but is still pervasive. Access to the internet is, however, subject to government control and can be suspended either nationally or locally in periods of political crisis (Freedom House, 2020).

Case Studies: Archaeology and Local Communities

Three examples of local community engagement in archaeological projects are outlined below. The cases chosen illustrate the contrasting reaction of citizens in a relatively remote rural area, in a major city, and a commercial centre. The selection of cases underscores the diversity of local community engagement in archaeological initiatives across Kazakhstan. The selection of specific cases within Kazakhstan’s archaeological landscape was guided by several key considerations aimed at providing a comprehensive understanding of community engagement dynamics across diverse socio-cultural contexts. Firstly, we chose cases that are widely recognised and celebrated within the academic, cultural, and local community spheres, ensuring that they represent prominent examples of citizen involvement in heritage preservation efforts. Moreover, the diversity of selected cases is instrumental in capturing the range of socio-economic, geographical, and cultural factors that shape community responses to archaeological projects in Kazakhstan. By examining contrasting reactions from citizens residing in a remote rural area, a major urban centre, and a commercial hub, the study aims to highlight the nuanced ways in which local contexts influence perceptions, priorities, and levels of participation in heritage initiatives. This comparative approach enables discernment of patterns and variations in community engagement practices, offering valuable insights into the contextual factors that facilitate or hinder collaborative efforts in heritage preservation. Furthermore, the selected cases provide a platform for exploring the intersections between heritage conservation, economic development, and democratic governance in Kazakhstan. Each case represents a unique socio-political milieu, where competing interests, power dynamics, and policy frameworks shape the landscape of community engagement. By examining these diverse contexts, the analysis seeks to uncover the complex interplay between local custodianship, infrastructural change, and public participation, shedding light on the opportunities and challenges inherent in fostering inclusive approaches to heritage management.

Case 1 Arkharly: Professional Pressure Group Response

The Arkharly Mountains contain a storehouse of archaeological monuments within the Almaty Oblast’s Kerbulak district. Its administrative centre located in the town of Saryozek. ¹ Arkharly is home to thousands of documented archaeological sites, of which a large proportion include ancient rock carvings (petroglyphs), along with the addition of ancient burial grounds, settlements, and undefined stone enclosure (Goryachev et al., 2021). Archaeological surveys conducted there during the early 1990s categorised the archaeological monuments of Arkharly as dating as early as the Neolithic (prior to 3000 BC), with most of the monuments belonging to the Bronze Age (ca. 2500–1000 BC) and later periods. The chronology is primarily based on the study of its rock art, which contain well-known styles of the Bronze Age (Andronovo), Iron Age (Saka, ca. 500–200 BC), Turkic and Medieval (ca. 700 CE onwards) and onward into the 18th–19th century AD. The main clusters of rocks are concentrated near the settlements and burial grounds and along what are thought to have been ‘the traditional routes of cattle movements, which connect them with the economic activity of the ancient population’ (Goryachev et al., 2021). Various government departments have dealt with the issues of the petroglyphs of Arkharly. These include the Ministry of Culture and Sports, the Institute of Archaeology of Kazakhstan, the akimat of the Kerbulak district, the akimat of the Almaty region, within which the Department of Culture, Archives and Documentation of the Almaty region is responsible for historical and archaeological sites (Gumirova, 2022).

In 2017, Arkharly was designated to become a quarry wherein stones containing ancient rock carvings would be removed and crushed to provide gravel and flagging stones for use in urban development. Residents of the Kerbulak district, upon seeing the destruction of the rock art sites, brought it to the attention of archaeologists. However, many of the monuments had already been destroyed by this point. In response to these events, in August 2017, a small expedition led by the local activist and volunteer group ‘Petroglyphs Hunters’ along with archaeologists produced photographic documentation and survey data of the surviving monuments and the areas lost to the quarry. Their actions were done so as to bring public and government awareness to the compromising of Arkharly. Their report was passed onto a local cultural resource management firm Archaeological Expertise LLP in the effort to have the stone mining halted and so that the site would receive government protection (Gumirova, 2022). Archaeological Expertise LLP studied the volunteers’ report and sent their conclusion along with a proposal to conduct a more detailed expedition of Arkharly to the Centre for the Protection of the Historical and Cultural Heritage of the Almaty region. In the same month, the Almaty region government (akimat) promised that, with the Institute of Archaeology, they would conduct an expedition to approve the number of monuments in this territory in the spring of 2018.

Tragically, following the passing of one of the founders of the central and contributing archaeologists, the akimat did not fulfil their promise to work towards preserving Arkharly. However, the self-funded volunteers continued to petition for its protection. In October 2018, they again appealed to the akimat of the Almaty region, the Kerbulak district and the village of Zholaman and presented documentation of the destroyed petroglyphs. As a result, the local government office installed two billboards at the site entrance, providing an overview of the cultural significance of the Arkharly – but the quarry continued to operate. In 2019 and 2020, the volunteers continued their expeditions and recorded several additional archaeological sites.

In the spring of 2021, the parliament drew attention to the issue, and the Department of Culture of the Almaty region gave the task to archaeologists to explore the Arkharly tract. During the expedition, burial mounds, petroglyphs, and settlements together numbering in the thousands were discovered. In December 2021, the certification of most objects was completed; they were taken under the control and protection of the state. Today, the sacred status and government protection of the archaeological remains of Arkharly are in effect. Work on the extraction of flagstone, crushed stone and gravel has ceased. Overall, the initial opening of the quarry to the final government protection of Arkharly took four years of persistent and combined efforts from local volunteers, professionals, and government representatives, during which the value of archaeological/cultural heritage won out over the value placed on the economic development of the country.

Case 2 Taldykol: Urban Community Mobilisation

Thirteen thousand years is the approximate age of the Taldykol lake system, which includes five lakes located near Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The lake’s total area is about 600 hectares, and these lakes are located on the left bank of the Ishim River. This system consists of five lakes and is of ecological and historical value to Kazakhstanis. Five large cemeteries were located near these lakes, but today, only three remain intact.

As in many other cases of destruction of archaeological sites around the Taldykol lakes, local authorities and developers aim to continue the construction of elite residential buildings along with social facilities. Twenty-one plots around Malyi (Small) Taldykol have been designated for development (e.g. SAT Group Construction). The founders of some companies that own land and conduct construction work are interconnected with the government. For example, according to media reports, one such company involved in the construction is owned by one of the country’s major political parties ² . According to the general plan, one of the residential buildings earmarked for construction will belong to the Nur Otan Party (Loginova, 2021). Starting in 2010, local authorities initiated artificial drainage of the Malyi Taldykol. Then, in 2013, President Nursultan Nazarbayev instructed Prime Minister Serik Akhmetov to eliminate Taldykol by 2015 (‘The President instructed the Prime Minister’, 2013). In 2014, the Mayor of Astana, Imangali Tasmagambetov, stated that the reclamation of drained places would be completed by 2016 (‘Purified wastewater in Astana’, 2014). In 2015, the elimination of Taldykol turned into a project that was supposed to be completed within 5–6 years (Islamov & Nurkenov, 2015). In 2017, Bolat Davletov, chief engineer of the research design Institute ‘Astanagenplan’, stated that the project entitled ‘Drainage and Liquidation of Lake Taldykol’ was focused solely on reducing the size of the lakes (‘Two years left for residents’, 2015). However, the emphasis on lake drainage did not in turn consider the environmental damage or repercussions of the removal of water from a wetland ecology, nor of the simultaneous removal of lakeside archaeological sites.

The actions of the authorities and construction companies pose threats to archaeological monuments near the lakes. Graveyards from the 18^th–20^th centuries AD and earlier are located around the lakes. Among them, the Omar cemetery, in the middle of the construction site of a new road, is the most vulnerable of what remains of three necropolises. Archaeologists have suggested that the size of this burial ground is more extensive than currently recorded, with the implication being that new roads should not be permitted close by. Graves within the graveyard contain inscriptions in Arabic, with more recent graves containing years inscribed. Earlier and heavily worn tombstones also exist where it is impossible to recognise the inscription year.

The movement to save the lakes and heritage monuments within their vicinity has gained relatively wide popularity in the country. The opposition to the potential archaeological damage was part of a broader concern for the ecology and natural integrity of the area. Over 150 central activists leading a civic protest under the banner #SOSTaldykol and through Instagram are supported by over 9,000 subscribers, with an additional 5,000 citizens having signed a petition to oppose development near Taldykol (Mukhanova & Kulygin, 2021). Activism has further involved peaceful rallies in the lakes’ vicinity. In December 2020, the local authorities announced that the areas under protest would not be affected by the developments, signalling a win for civic protests. However, in the spring of 2021, construction work resumed, which caused a new wave of discontent among citizens (Sorbello, 2021). The struggle for the Taldykol Lakes is ongoing.

Case 3 Taraz Bazaar: Economic Interests

The city of Taraz, located in southern Kazakhstan, is among the oldest documented cities in the country (Bajpakov, 1998). It was founded in the 1^st century AD and is mentioned in early Byzantine, Arabic, and Chinese sources in relation to the Silk Roads (Dawkes, 2013). During the past 2000 years of its history, the city has undergone several rebuilding and renovating phases within the main citadel as well as having endured through a Mongol invasion during the 13^th c CE (Osserbayev & Gabitov, 2021). Archaeologists have documented at least four building phases of the Medieval city dating between the 9^th and 12^th c CE that track architectural evolutions and changing activities through time. For example, there exist preserved mudbrick and stone architecture from sophisticated plumbing systems, Islamic buildings, a Zoroastrian temple, crafting workshops and several bathhouses (Dawkes, 2013). Other objects show early connections to Byzantium, as well as an outlying urban complex complete with streets and multi-roomed houses (Skripnik, 2012).

Today Taraz is home to a multicultural populace numbering over 400,000 people deriving Kazakh, Uzbek, Uighur, and Korean ethnicities, among others (Yemelianova, 2018). A notable feature of the city today is the surviving remnants of its medieval citadel and attached structures that weave throughout its younger residential and commercial neighbourhoods. The palimpsest of different stages of the city’s history poses an ideal opportunity to investigate the realities and tensions of safeguarding culture heritage while at the same time achieving economic prosperity for living communities engaged in mercantile trade.

Today the major commercial activity in Taraz is centred around its Green Bazaar, which is a large market place consisting of indoor and outdoor stalls selling foods, household goods, mechanical hardware, housing eateries, and repair shops. The bazaar is located directly on top of the citadel of Medieval Taraz mentioned to in historic texts. Since the country’s independence, and in the wake of Kazakhstan’s efforts to safeguard its cultural heritage, archaeologists and governments have given particular attention to its Silk Road sites. Within such an effort, the operating Green Bazaar came under threat in 2011 when a proposal was put forward to initiate archaeological excavations on the site that would mean closure of commercial operations on a large section of the bazaar and the permanent transfer of the market over to an archaeological heritage centre and open-air museum. The excavations were to be carried by the late archaeologist Karl Baipakov in collaboration with ‘Archaeological Expertise’, a local cultural resource management firm, and the Centre for Applied Archaeology from the United Kingdom (Perring, 2011).

The proposed excavations became a source of tension. On the one hand, the operating bazaar was under the regional control of the ‘Directorate for the Protection and Restoration of Historical and Cultural Monuments’ of the Department of Culture, Archives and Documentation of this region of Kazakhstan. Therefore, a study of Taraz’s heritage monuments was within the jurisdiction of the city zoning. However, there was a clear and obvious conflict of interest. Salespeople who controlled retail outlets located within the bazaar territory recognised the threat that the archaeological investigations would pose to their ability to conduct business, ensure their own economic livelihood, and secure their occupational identity.

In early October 2011, a portion of the Taraz populace demonstrated through rallies and protests in opposition to the commencement of excavations upon the claim that the affected businesspeople were not briefed on the project before its approval by government (Kovalev, 2011). The demonstrations were unsuccessful. Again in 2012, additional rallies conducted in the central business district of Taraz were ended with police intervention (Yalomenko, 2012). In due course, a section of the bazaar was closed and the excavations commenced over an area of 400 square metres (Dawkes, 2013). In 2014, further sections of the bazaar were closed as part of the heritage project covering several hectares of the bazaar’s original territory. While merchants received around 900 million Kazakh Tenge in 2013–2014 in compensation from the state, discontent regarding this initial act of government and the now deconstructed zones of the original bazaar has lasted for several years (‘Shahristan market in Taraz’, 2014).

This event brings to light several tensions. Retail outlets are a vital source of income for the population in Taraz, and present economic interests concerns in this case outweigh local interests in safeguarding and uncovering knowledge of the city’s Silk Road heritage. Archaeological excavations designed to uncover the city’s former prominence along the Silk Roads to be preserved in an open-air museum foregrounds the question of who benefits from archaeology? In the case of Taraz, it would be difficult to confidently state that inhabitants of the city reaped benefits, such as through resulting tourism revenue, considering a sizable portion of the central market place was closed to make way for the operations. The potential for a growth in tourism should be measured through a longitudinal study of city income and as weighed against to local values placed on mercantile identity in the present.

Discussion

As previously noted McGuire (2008) argues, archaeology and politics have been historically interwoven. This link is because the discovery of sites and objects has been utilised to support or question dominant political narratives. The three cases outlined above testify to how archaeological issues have mobilised different civil society actors in Kazakhstan. The instances are unusually disparate, each representing different levels and modes of popular participation. The three cases – a rural area, major city, and commercial centre – provide independent insights into how and why populations might engage in heritage and development issues across civic and government spheres.

The first case demonstrates a situation in which residents of the rural Kerbulak district of south-eastern Kazakhstan initiated a civic-led movement to protect nearby Arkharly, an area rich in petroglyphs, from being designated as a quarry to supply stones for road and pathway constructions. However, the final protection of Arkharly required the concerted effort of various influential elements to prevent the continued destruction of the site. Instead, a coalition of activists, professionals, volunteers, and government representatives ultimately mobilised the support necessary to counter an economic-focused activity and gain federal protection for cultural assets.

By contrast, in the second case, residents of the capital city Astana in northern Kazakhstan have been engaged in a multi-year battle over government plans to develop land around the Malyi Taldykol Lakes into apartment complexes. While civic activists successfully organised several protests using social network channels, and collecting signatures from several hundred residents who wanted to see the lakes preserved, the development project is still underway. Perhaps significant here, however, is that efforts to protect Taldykol began due to concerns about the potential environmental degradation such developments would initiate. In this respect, the protection of cultural heritage emerged after the ecologically focused problems that drove local people to action.

In the case of the Green Bazaar of Taraz in southern Kazakhstan, local peoples’ concerns differed from the other two instances outlined. Here local store and stall owners’ economic livelihood derived from commercial dealings inside and around the bazaar. Their interests had taken precedence over promoting and displaying the city’s long archaeological heritage. Eventually, despite the residents’ concerns, archaeological research was preferred over the demands of the retail sector. The Arkharly case shows that sections of the public can be mobilised to impact policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the Taldykol and Taraz examples illustrate how economic development and infrastructural projects in urban landscapes illicit complicated decisions by policymakers. Taken together, popular involvement in state decisions needs to be more significant – whether regarding culturally or economically focused initiatives.

In his 2023 New Year address, Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, said he was ‘confident that new democratic traditions will be formed, and political culture will be raised in this country’ (‘Kazakhstan: President cites “complicated” year’, 2023). If such a change is to occur, the case studies suggest that greater transparency and bureaucratic responsiveness is needed. Similarly, the contrasting extent of the public’s involvement in rural and urban settings must be addressed. The greater use of elections to choose local officials currently being rolled out may facilitate this development. Similarly, the place of cultural artefacts in the national narrative of Kazakhstan will also need to be promoted. In this context, the extensive infrastructural development projected under the BRI and Kazakhstan’s related projects may significantly increase the discovery of archaeologically valuable sites.

In authoritarian states, the past may be used to justify the restrictions imposed as the regime articulates the journey to a brighter and restored path to former glory. There may be a ‘need’ to postpone democratic reform to facilitate the underlying social contract. Eventually, all the people will prosper. Social cleavages, such as class, ethnicity, and language, may cause tensions and lead to political disruption. Archaeological discoveries, however, may demonstrate the underlying patriotism of those whose immediate interests may be compromised. Road projects may be delayed, new housing rezoned, and commercial activities interrupted, but all in a common national cause.

By facilitating archaeology, government officials, local inhabitants, and business interests may experience the process of compromise, adjustment, and accommodation, which underscores democratic development. By coming together, residents may see that joint action may lead to fruitful outcomes, even in autocracies. Those in power in central and local government can demonstrate that they are approachable and capable of responding to widespread concerns. To facilitate the process of democratic development, archaeologist, too, must reflect on how they prioritise and present their work. As the case studies above show, archaeologists must traverse complicated ethical landscapes, balancing the needs of diverse stakeholders while respecting ideals of integrity, respect, and accountability in their research work.