Belarusian youth: Europeanisation on the agenda

Abstract

In this article, the author presents the choices young Belarusians have to make today, after nearly 20 years of living under an authoritarian government. Some have known no other form of state system. The economic crisis of 2011 has forced many young professionals to seek employment abroad. Belarus is facing the great threat of brain drain, though remittances from abroad are helping to keep the weak Belarusian economy afloat. Despite all the inherent difficulties, Belarusians favour European values rather than a closer alliance with their eastern neighbour, Russia. The EU can help the younger generation in Belarus to Européanise their country by engaging more and being present in the country, supporting reforms in education, assisting civil society and political parties alike, and facilitating greater mobility.

Introduction

Young people, like the rest of the population in Belarus today, belong to various groups. Despite the divisions, Europeanisation is growing–-there is a positive attitude towards and perception of the EU and interest in knowing more of its values. Alarmingly though, most young educated Belarusians are united by the desire to seek better opportunities abroad due to the declining economic opportunities and social problems in the country. Attracted by Russian salaries, they emigrate to work in the neighbouring country.

Paradoxically, this labour migration to the east goes hand in hand with a preference for Western values. The default preference for Russia and the Commonwealth of the Independent States no longer prevails (Office for a Democratic Belarus 2013). This new preference is also accompanied by a more critical assessment of the current government policies in Belarus. Russia is seen as a supplier of energy resources and an important trade partner. The EU is viewed as a partner in reform towards effective governance and sectoral cooperation.

The EU should not lose its momentum and should engage more actively with the younger generation of Belarusians by providing opportunities such as support for education reforms. Reaching out to the wider civil society, including professional communities, universities and business, remains essential. External assistance in capacity building should be distributed equally among civil society groups and political parties. Finally, liberalisation of the visa regime would open more channels for the further Europeanisation of Belarus.

Belarus: no longer the only black sheep in the region?

Continuously authoritarian, with no signs of development towards a more democratic style of governance, Belarus is no longer an exception but almost the norm in the region. The recently released ‘Nations in Transit’ 2013 report from Freedom House (2013) provides evidence of a democratic deficit among most of the countries in the post-Soviet space. Russia tops the list, with its regressive statistics of serious concern for the West, including its influence on the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative.

Belarus traditionally occupies one of the bottom places on the 7-point Freedom House scale, where 7 is the worst score. It ranked especially poorly for its electoral process (7/7), its judicial framework and independence (7/7), the independence of its media, and its national and local governance. In the space of a year, the climate for civil society has also worsened, according to the report: Belarus has moved from a score of 6.25/7 to 6.5/7. Together with Russia, it falls into the category of a consolidated authoritarian regime.

Ukraine's performance, according to the same report, has continuously worsened during the ‘post-Orange revolution’ period. However, Moldova and Georgia provide some sources for hope–-if the latter can prove the sustainability of the consolidation of its stronger government institutions.

Russia's strong influence on regional developments will continue. Following the recent decision of Armenia to give up on the Association Agreement with the EU and join the Russia-led Customs Union instead, the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies called the policy pursued by Putin his ‘grand design to destroy the Eastern Partnership’ (Emerson and Kostanyan 2013). Pressure will continue to be applied to the six partner states by Moscow beyond the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. Belarus remains at the very centre of Russia's grand plan.

Lack of strong institutions and democratic values

In an interview with Radio Liberty (Europe 2013b), American political scientist Francis Fukuyama named a lack of strong institutions as one of the main challenges to democratic transition in the post-Soviet region. The absence of strong political parties and civil society groups is an additional factor that hinders prospects for progress. Finally, a democratic state is not possible without the society at large having an understanding of basic democratic values.

Under the authoritarian rule of President Lukashenka, no mandated divisions, and no checks and balances exist in the institutions of the governance machine. The early signs of democratic reform, which were evident before 1994, the year of the first presidential election in the independent Belarus, were buried by the newly elected leader.

While employing large numbers of qualified specialists in different spheres, government agencies largely follow the cemented Soviet model. The majority of civil servants misunderstand the concept of democratic governance–-as they have never experienced it–-and the idea that a state institution serves the government, and not the interests of the people, prevails.

Internal democratic governance within most opposition parties in Belarus is in a similarly weak state. The lack of a democratic political tradition and the long years of work in a repressive environment, coupled with a great dependency on external financial sources, have created obstacles to transformation. ‘Fresh blood’–-the young people whose interest and participation would normally form the basis for progress in party building–-is scarce. Young Belarusians are leaving their native land en masse, looking for a brighter future abroad.

The International Organisation for Migration says that 1.2 million Belarusian citizens work abroad (Astapenia 2013). This figure constitutes almost one-third of the total workforce, as per data provided by the World Bank (2013). Most of those seeking foreign employment are young, educated and skilled Belarusians. The brain drain is becoming a real threat to the country's development and is increasing the prospect of it becoming ‘another Moldova’, where the economy survives thanks to the flow of foreign remittances.

Belarusian civil society is small in size and rather weakly developed. The USAID Sustainability Index (USAID 2012) recorded 2,477 civil society organisations (CSOs) registered in Belarus as of December 2012. In a population of almost 10 million, this is a very modest number. In difficult conditions, these non-profit associations implement projects in social, environmental, economic and other spheres aimed at increasing the quality of life for Belarusians. At the same time, according to the results of a survey on civic education commissioned by the Office for a Democratic Belarus (Korzh et al. 2013) and carried out by the Office for European Expertise and Communication in Minsk in 2013, many CSOs lack an understanding of why they even exist in the context of addressing the interests of their respective communities, and adopting a grass-roots driven governance model and action plans developed with local target groups. As in Belarus’ political parties, leadership built around strong personalities is widespread among civil society groups. Youth organisations are no exception to this rule.

Turned off by the threat of repression, the limited successes of the political opposition parties and their long-lasting leaders, many young people are reluctant to become political activists. Instead, they opt for apolitical civil society work to exercise their desire to bring about change, even if on a more modest scale. Many realise that the conditions for a ‘grand changement’ do not exist, and prefer to use the space available today for incremental reforms. Thus, democratically oriented active young people promote change either through radical actions of resistance or by engaging in cautious reform processes.

Democratic reformers versus Lukashenka's youth

Inspired and proactive, young promoters of democracy in Belarus lack support from other young people, the overwhelming majority of whom, according to the Belarus Digest website (Astapenia 2012), are interested neither in politics, nor in private business. Because there are only the two extremes available, in the form of either the pro-Lukashenka Belarusian Republican Union of Youth (, BRSM) or opposition-run organisations such as the Young Front (), youth are reluctant to become involved in any political action. The ‘new majority’, of those who previously supported the government of Lukashenka and today do not support either side, is most probably not political but social (Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies 2013) and its mobilisation for political ends is very unlikely.

There is also already a generation of young Belarusians who have grown up knowing nothing but Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the unchanging head of state. They have been taught his state ideology, the Soviet interpretation of the Second World War, and have witnessed the opening of the Stalin Line near Minsk–-the ‘historical and cultural complex’ ( 2008), or theme park–-where young Belarusian families take their children for days out. It would be a paradox to expect the majority of this generation, raised in an authoritarian state by authoritarian means, to understand and promote democratic reforms.

Inspired by the Serbian non-violent resistance movement, Resistance (Otpor), and later its Ukrainian incarnation, It's Time! (Pora), the Belarusian civic youth organisation Bison (Zubr 2006) ¹ was among the most active in fighting for revolutionary change in Belarus. Limited in membership, Zubr ceased to exist after the presidential election of 2006, when the majority of its members emigrated. Another youth movement, the Young Front, ² which has its origins in one of the oldest, centre-right political parties–-the Belarusian Popular Front ()–-was established in 1997 and unites those willing to promote ‘the Belarusian national idea, Christian-democratic principles, a civil society built on the Foundations of democracy and free markets, and the development of a spiritually and physically strong generation’ in Belarus.

1

For more information, see http://www.zubr-belarus.org.

2

For more information, see http://mfront.net/category/english.

Unlike the motivation of Bison's membership, the determination to fight for a democratic Belarus among Young Front members stems from the idea of Belarus's independence, the promotion of its historical and cultural heritage, and the reintegration of the country into the European family where it belongs. Two further strong components and sources of inspiration are its Christian values and democratic principles. Though limited in number and in space for action, there is a variety of ongoing youth initiatives in Belarus. Young Belarusian freedom fighters provide an example of courage and the strong will needed to bring change to their country. Zmitser Dashkevich, who has led the Young Front since 2008, has served two prison terms. He was sentenced to 18 and 24 months of imprisonment in 2006 and 2011 respectively and was recognised as a political prisoner by both Belarusian and international human rights organisations. Upon his release on 28 August 2013, Dashkevich declared his strong commitment to continue his active political engagement (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 2013a).

Young political activists from the Tell the Truth (Govori Pravdu) and the For Freedom (Za Svabodu) political movements together with the Belarusian Popular Front have launched an attempt to reach out to the ‘new majority’. Joined by several other reform-oriented political entities, they are travelling around the country identifying the most pressing issues for Belarusian society. The campaign's end goal is to increase the visibility of the most pertinent problems in society and force the government to work on solutions. The promotion of active citizen participation–-a basic European value–-is also on the agenda.

While the Europe-oriented youth struggles to reach out to the population, the artificially created, state-led BRSM, which receives about 98 % of all state financial resources earmarked for youth policies in Belarus, has also failed to become an influential actor (Astapenia 2012). Its isolated policies, widespread corruption and lack of links with other youth organisations within or outside Belarus, makes the BRSM more of a vehicle for young opportunists within the government to advance their career or receive material benefits than an organisation promoting the interests of Belarusian youth.

The age of technology, with its great access to diverse sources of information and its ability to increase contact with the outside world, has facilitated the rise of a ‘creative class’ in Belarus. Young people who think differently and feel European in today's authoritarian post-Soviet state are the ones who are opening hostels, organising street performances, launching online journals and inviting their European friends for a holiday in the ‘last dictatorship of Europe’. ³ These young people are the backbone of future change–-but only if they stay in the country.

3

Belarus was labelled the last dictatorship by Condoleezza Rice (US Secretary of State under George W. Bush).

This creative youth is largely not interested in political action. The government of Belarus and its citizens live in parallel worlds in a way: the former preserves and consolidates its power; the latter accept the reality, even if they are not happy with the state's performance (Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies 2013) and see no way out. The beating and jailing of opposition activists after the elections in 2010 offers an example of the powerful tools used to discourage the expression of an active political position. Many creative young people emigrate to seek the opportunity to live like young Europeans from democratically developed nations.

Why and to where do young Belarusians emigrate?

Seeing no opportunities at home in the struggling unreformed economy, with its unclear employment prospects, guaranteed low salaries and growing social problems–-such as the alcoholism rate (Zajac and Jakaulieu 2012), in which Belarus ranks among the top 10 globally–-young Belarusians leave for Russia. The Russian labour market, unlike that of the EU, is easily accessible. There are no visa or language barriers, and the highly qualified Belarusians are welcomed by Russian businesses. Belarusian labour is cheap and of good quality, the Russians admit.

On the one hand, labour migration to Russia creates a substantial gap in the composition and availability of trained professionals within Belarus. On the other, however, it helps to reduce the unemployment rate and contributes to the country's economic balance sheet. More accumulated wealth, in combination with people's ability to travel, may, in the long run, facilitate the establishment of a stronger middle class.

The Office for a Democratic Belarus (2013) commissioned a survey on European and national values in Belarus, which took place from May to September 2013. In a comparison with similar data collected in 2008, there is now a higher level of awareness, more solid knowledge of EU structures and policies, more interest in EU affairs, and a greater appreciation of EU support for reforms among Belarusians. Most importantly, Belarus is increasingly identified as being an integral part of Europe.

The survey findings suggest that despite limited EU-Belarus contact on the political level, the greater engagement with society has paid off. The increasing presence of the EU and more effective communication from it on the ground have influenced the national and social preferences of the population. Incremental changes can be observed in people's behaviour, including a change of preference in favour of the EU as the regional power–-not Russia.

This is a good example of segmental evolutionary changes in people's mindset, and their behaviour thereafter, which can increase the space available for the greater promotion of shared European values and the opportunity to build a common ground with the democratic Europe. As the survey confirmed, while taking the opportunity to make a living in Russia due to the absence of technical barriers, young Belarusians are increasingly European and want to live in a society ruled by democratic universal values.

What the EU can do: it's about values

The European Union can help Belarusian young people in their quest to Europeanise themselves and their country. The value-based trends prevailing today constitute a solid foundation for the further spread of democratic values. Below are some recommendations for the EU to consider.

Be present, reach out and engage

In order to expand opportunities for democratic reform and transformation in Belarus, the EU should intensify further contact and cooperation with a wide range of societal groups: universities, the business community, professional associations, the media and non-governmental organisations, among others. Developing people-to-people contacts will lead to more opportunities for the exchange of knowledge and best practices in all areas. Multilateral projects should take place, involving participants from the EU, Belarus and other Eastern Partnership countries, to further increase interconnectivity, mutual learning and understanding.

State institutions should be engaged on an equal basis with civil society groups to strengthen their professional capacity and to receive inspiration, a better understanding and the tools needed to implement reform. Not least important for government-affiliated experts is the need to gain knowledge of the role and place of civil society groups in the policymaking process. Exposure to European practices will bring about a change in attitudes towards grass-roots-driven democratic practices.

Support reform of higher education

The EU supports a number of measures to offer scholarships for young Belarusians abroad. This is an important tool but has a number of shortcomings, mainly that most students never return to live and work in Belarus and that the cost of studying abroad is often excessive. Follow-up measures for the scholarship scheme should include mechanisms to create interest and opportunities for Western-educated Belarusian professionals to contribute to the transformation of their native country.

Even more important is to contribute to the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Belarusian education system. The EU should aim to foster an Eastern Partnership network of excellence among higher education institutions and facilitate wider public outreach and engagement with other community stakeholders, including those in Belarus. Belarus's neighbour, Lithuania, which is a member of the EU, could share its experience of the European faculties model. These European faculties would act as knowledge hubs for implementation and information resources and would be able to offer a range of expert lecturers from the EU, and research and exchange opportunities for students and professors. Under the auspices of the European faculties, universities could organise public events and training sessions, and revive and develop European Documentation Centres accessible to the public.

Provide assistance to civil society and political parties alike

The experience of Ukraine in the post-Orange Revolution era underlines the importance of strong management practices and the need for political parties and civil society representatives to have sufficient capacity to take up government posts. Belarusian political parties are facing difficult times and are in need of self-reform to create a strong basis for future transformation. Western assistance, thus, should not focus solely on civil society groups but should create an opportunity for the oppositional political spectrum to grow. Similarly, by addressing the lack of dialogue and unity within the political forces, the EU should facilitate a culture of dialogue and mediation and unification practices among the leadership of the political opposition in Belarus.

Increase mobility opportunities

Last but not least, the EU can take further solid steps towards greater mobility for young people, despite the reluctance of the Belarusian authorities to engage in negotiations on visa liberalisation and readmission agreements. Belarusian citizens should profit more from the existing visa code provisions. More free-of-charge visas could be issued by EU Member States, especially for young people. Bona fide travellers with a proven track record should receive long-term multiple-entry visas valid for periods of three to five years.

Conclusion

The majority of young Belarusians is politically passive. Only a small number of them are willing to take the initiative and the risks associated with the in-country promotion of democratic reforms. The desire of young Belarusians to emigrate to look for better employment opportunities should be taken seriously by the government of Belarus, which should take immediate measures with regard to improving the quality of education and the creation of in-country opportunities for the younger generation. Some help can come from the EU too.