Abstract
Belarus remains the last authoritarian state in Europe. Fundamental rights and civil liberties are denied by the surviving anachronistic Soviet-style regime, drifting away from the European democratic model. This article describes today's Belarus, portraying the new brand of Soviet dictatorship represented by Lukashenka's Belarus (‘lukashism’), whose main features are fear, complete economic dependence of the population on the authorities and financial support from Russia. Since Belarus is in a strategically crucial position for the transit of energy sources to Western Europe, it is of utmost interest to European states to promote stability and democracy in the country. Accordingly, Europe (together with the US) has a key role in helping the Belarusian opposition open a dialogue for a democratic transition while preserving Belarus from the risk of unification with Russia, which could be the outcome of Lukashenka's last-ditch attempt to defend his neo-Soviet power.
Belarus is dying. It is dying as an independent and self-supporting state. It is true that the country is not at war, that it has not experienced any acts of terrorism and that it does not have any large-scale ethnic or religious conflicts. However, Belarus is not developing. It reminds one of a typical labour camp, a system of oppression, built by Joseph Stalin in the USSR. It is similar to this, even if one makes allowance for the differences of time, place and territory, and the fact that the government has no military nuclear technology. Formally Belarus remains an open country, but there is absolutely no place for human rights and freedoms. In fact, elected representative bodies with legislative power do not exist (members of the representative bodies at all levels are appointed). Ordinary citizens are used to and accept the fact that their rights are usurped by the state. It is difficult to resist repression alone for decades. Many leave the country for good. The country cannot find its place in the modern world and is unable to integrate itself into the system of European values. What should Belarus and Europe do for Belarus to travel the path from a neo-Soviet dictatorship to a European democracy?
Lukashenka's Belarus: a threat to Europe
The international community clearly underestimates the Belarusian problem. For many European politicians the problem of Belarus is not an item on the all-European agenda, but rather a local problem, not reaching beyond the territory of Belarus. This is a mistake. Belarus remains an experimental laboratory producing and disseminating the neo-authoritarian ideology of ‘lukashism’. Lukashism, representing a blend of communism, fascism and Latin-American-style populism, is the number one export product of the Belarusian regime. And it must be admitted that it is enjoying huge popularity in the former Soviet sphere. Russia and other post-Soviet republics are experiencing what Belarus endured some eight to ten years previously. This is a dangerous tendency with consequences not fully appreciated in the European capital cities.
For many years a full-scale cold civil war has been underway in Belarus. A small group of people (Lukashenka's clan) holds control over the state and uses it to destroy any alternative. The neo-Soviet state has usurped all the rights of citizens. A state monopoly (of Lukashenka's clan) has spread into political, economic and social sectors. There is no social contract. There is legal inequality—it is Lukashenka, not independent courts, who picks the guilty. Citizens have no part in governing the state. Power is not renewed. ‘President’ Lukashenka, having been in power for 14 years, has established his fundamental authoritarian power.
De facto and de jure, Lukashenka forbids any political competition. All opposition is squeezed out into non-formal niches and has no opportunity to be elected to local or national legislative bodies. Any political or social alternative is subject to systematic pressure by the special services, which have extraordinary powers allowing agents to establish surveillance and arrest any citizen without court authorisation.
During the 14 years of his rule Lukashenka has created a harsh authoritarian regime with marks of a dictatorship. It is a kind of Soviet Union in miniature, geographically located in the very centre of the European continent. That should make us want to understand better. What is the secret of the political longevity of the regime, which poses such an emphatic challenge to the whole of Europe? A regime based on one person stands on three pillars. First, on fear. This is not unique to Belarus. It is an effective tool—Lukashenka's favourite—of all the totalitarian regimes. A small but very significant detail: Belarus is the only state of the post-Soviet area to name its special services after the Soviet model—KGB. This fact alone makes it impossible for millions of Belarusians, brought up under the Soviet system, to object.
The second pillar is the financial and economic dependence of the population on the authorities. Some 80% of citizens get their wages, pensions, scholarships and so on from Lukashenka. People are deprived of a choice and an alternative and are forced into harsh dependence on the authorities. One more telling detail in this portrayal of the Belarusian reality: in the mid-1990s, during the first wave of legal proceedings against the opponents of the authorities, many judges refused to give politically motivated judgments. The people in robes had an alternative. In case of administrative pressure they could chose to work as notaries or take up private legal practice. Lukashenka immediately issued the decree which did away with private lawyers and notaries. Since then the court assembly line has worked perfectly. ‘Telephone’ law turned the legal system into a department of the Lukashenka administration.
Third, Lukashenka annually gets a $7-$8 billion grant from Moscow, giving the Belarusian leader the means to bribe the larger part of the population. However, despite the fact that the Kremlin's charity has declined somewhat recently due to the changes in price for energy transit, the Red House (Lukashenka's official residence) is still getting huge amounts of money. It is evident that without such colossal financial support the Lukashenka regime would not have existed for so long.
The importance of Belarus for Europe
Belarus is an important part of the energy corridor providing a supply of strategic raw materials from Russia to Europe. Any instability in Belarus increases the risks to Europe's energy security, provokes political speculation and raises psychological uncertainty about the future of the whole continent. Today Belarus is formally a stable state. But stability is supported only by repression; i.e., it is short-lived. Before long the ‘system of Lukashenka’ might collapse because of the serious shortage of financial resources and the excessive corruption of the state apparatus. The situation is fraught with the danger of a coming period of instability. It is important for Europe to have a correct understanding of the events that are happening in Belarus, not to ignore these events and not to wait and hope that the problem of the last dictator will be solved on its own. Adequate and balanced support for the Belarusian opposition forces, which have already developed effective programmes for the period of transition from dictatorship to democracy, will help to ensure that the period of post-Lukashenka instability is relatively brief.
The second danger is Russia. In a desperate situation, Lukashenka's clan may finally unite Belarus with Russia. This will give the Russian Federation one more weighty tool to strengthen its potential role as an energy monopolist in Europe.
Lukashenka: a barrier to democracy
Formally Lukashenka is the President of the Republic of Belarus. But in reality he is a usurper: he made illegal changes to the Constitution and cancelled the statutory limitation on the number of terms in office. After that he organised and ‘won’ (although there are no real elections) unconstitutional presidential elections, which were not recognised by the democratic countries. Lukashenka controls the territory of Belarus, but, in essence, his edicts and decrees are illegitimate and will be repealed and cancelled as soon as there is a change in the political system in Belarus. Lukashenka alone has full power in all functions in Belarus and bears full and direct responsibility for creating an organised criminal community in Belarus, which is involved in arms trafficking and the abduction of people.
Lukashenka is not only an authoritarian governor, but also a leader of revanchist forces in the territory of the former USSR. He has initiated the most ambitious plans for returning to the past, to the Cold War era. Therefore, he is the one that those people, nostalgic for the days of the Soviet empire have pinned their hopes on.
Lukashenka's vision for Belarus has been to negate democracy by liquidating any form of political competition and using violence and repression as instruments of power to reach his objective. He also has abandoned all forms of social equality in favour of state bureaucracy. The result of this has been to create a constant Soviet-style agitation and the destruction of any alternative source of information.
The West (first of all the European West, the countries of European democracy, the Euro-Atlantic community) is perceived extremely negatively by Lukashenka. The principles of these civilisations are cardinally different from the principles cultivated by Lukashenka. The Belarusian dictator does not accept the need to elect governing bodies, the replacement of ruling elites, the vital role of an opposition and strongly rejects public control over authorities. Lukashenka relies on the violent suppression of dissent and prohibits any political or economic alternative. That is why Lukashenka would never take steps towards the West, and will desperately resist the democratisation of Belarus. At his earliest convenience he would be happy to support oil and gas monopolists in a big energy war between the European Union and Russia.
The Belarusian opposition and its influence
The Belarusian opposition is a constructive political group, virtually united around a single concept—the need to return the country to the constitutional sphere, revive political competitiveness, base authority on elections and overthrow the usurper. This is the primary aim. Formally, however, the opposition is divided into distinct groups based on their ideological principles. There are rightists, leftists and centrists.
The Belarusian opposition faces two key problems. The first is total and merciless pressure from the state (the state has actually waged war on the opposition and is trying to drive it underground or destroy it by means of prison sentences). The other problem is the absence of adequate internal financial support (the state—Lukashenka's clan—controls all the domestic financial resources and cuts short any attempts to raise domestic financing in Belarus). The lack of financial resources for basic organising activities and campaigns turns opposition members into social outcasts without the right to a job and a salary. At the same time, the opposition forces actively defend human rights and organise protest and information campaigns. The internal conflicts that sometimes occur are, as a rule, inspired by the state agents (officers of the Belarusian KGB) and aimed at splitting the opposition unity on the principle issue, a future without Lukashenka's clan.
The United Democratic Forces (UDF) is a broad coalition, uniting not only 11 ideologically different parties and movements, but also all supporters of change. The New Strategy and a set of positive alternatives, including the Small Constitution and Economic Platform, were adopted at the Congress of Democratic Forces, which took place in May 2007, with more than 700 delegates from all regions of the country.
We cannot say there is complete harmony within the circle of opponents of the Belarusian regime. But there are common goals. A pattern of making compromise settlements using democratic procedures has been worked out. At present, the role and prospects for the coalition of the UDF are being discussed. The greater part of the organised political actors is in favour of preserving and strengthening a wide coalition—the UDF. Supporters of this strategy come from the point of view that this will result in a real opportunity to nominate a single candidate from among the supporters of changes during the presidential elections of 2011. This standpoint is based on the positive experience of 2006, when the right-wing and left-wing forces, putting aside their ambitions, worked to coordinate ground rules for nominating a single candidate for the presidency.
Some analysts and journalists, including foreign ones, believe the Belarusian opposition is weak. However, the facts prove otherwise. If this were the case, the authorities would not have organised death squads that specialise in abducting and murdering the leaders of those who support change. Thousands of people wouldn't have been thrown into prison, as happened during the presidential campaign.
To all these facts one must add the totally different capacities of the forces confronting each other. Powerful information and propaganda machinery works for Lukashenka on a daily basis. He has at his disposal tens of thousands of representatives of law-enforcement structures and huge financial resources. In these conditions not only is the opposition surviving, it is able to keep on fighting.
The upcoming parliamentary campaign
In September 2008 Belarusian voters will choose members of the Chamber of Representatives. On 2 March the UDF agreed on a unified list of candidates, which includes representatives of each of the 11 members of the coalition. At present a common platform is being developed.
When speaking about the coming election campaign, it is important to define the terms. We do not use the word ‘elections’, because for a voter from Belgium, Germany, Lithuania or the Czech Republic that word has certain associations, e.g., the free access of candidates to electronic mass media, opposition representation on election committees and unhindered communication with the voters. All these have nothing to do with the Belarusian reality. For instance, there was only one representative of the opposition among the 120 thousand members of the election commissions during the presidential campaign.
We are in a situation where Lukashenka personally appoints members of the Chamber of Representatives, without any exceptions. And the Chamber of Representatives itself serves as a department of Lukashenka's administration.
In this situation the UDF has agreed on limited participation in the election campaign. What does this mean in practice? The UDF is participating in all stages of the election campaign but for the last one—ballot counting. The UDF reserves the right to withdraw all its candidates from the single list in case the legislation and, most importantly, its direct use go unchanged.
The role of Europe in the democratic transition
Alexander Lukashenka will certainly leave his post. He will not be able to remain a lifelong president for a number of subjective and objective reasons. He will also not be able to transfer power to the people of his circle. The problem is that Lukashenka has no strong ruling elite. The whole structure of power is based only on his dictatorial initiatives. Lukashenka does not have enough financial and material resources for the dictatorship to continue. After the recent escalation of the conflict between Russia and Belarus his resources are literally melting away. The standard of living of the people is plummeting.
Negotiations continue to be the only acceptable means of removing Lukashenka from power. However, negotiations should be carried out with a broader involvement of many different parties and according to strict rules. Europe should participate in the negotiations in close cooperation with the Belarusian opposition forces. Russia could perhaps also play a role in the negotiations. The Belarusian President should receive certain guarantees. In exchange he should agree to hold early parliamentary elections and to delegate a significant part of his powers to the parliament (including the appointment of the Prime Minister).
The removal of Lukashenka will be good for Europe, because in this case Belarus will immediately begin to move towards European values. The country will immediately turn into a more stable and predictable state.
Conflict between Belarus and Russia: consequences for Europe
For a long time Lukashenka has gambled on revanchist neo-Soviet ideas. He promoted the myth that it is possible to restore the Soviet empire on the territory on the former USSR. He demanded cheap energy from Russia in exchange for his public support. However, the situation has changed. Putin's Russia demands a clear answer from the Belarusian usurper—either join Russia (and then Lukashenka turns into one of several dozen powerless Russian governors), or pay full price for everything. Both options annoy the Belarusian dictator greatly, because one of the elements he built his state on (the Lukashenka system) was energy parasitism.
Europe will not gain anything from Belarus joining Russia because it will lead only to an even greater energy-transit and raw-materials monopoly for Russia. There is no advantage for Europe to flirt with Lukashenka, because the Belarusian dictator wants to take, but not to give anything in exchange. Europe needs Belarus as a democracy with direct elections and the regular alternation of people in power.
Belarus’ eastern neighbour is still performing the role of donor and advocate for the Lukashenka regime. The older examples of preferential treatment, low prices for energy carriers, have been recently joined by new ones. In particular, a cheap line of credit has been opened for Minsk. In December 2007 it was decided to allot US $1.5 billion to Belarus, and readiness to allot an additional credit of US $2 billion was indicated. Here we can observe an intention to put Lukashenka not only on an energy but also on a financial leash, and a poorly concealed desire to prevent profound economic reforms in Belarus. Cheap loans kill motivation for change and any prospect of the reform of the Belarusian economy. In so doing the Kremlin manifested the intention to keep up the policy of geopolitical patronage over Minsk. Compare the following: not so long ago the issue of state union was at the top of the agenda of talks between Putin and Lukashenka; but today the accent has shifted towards the economy. The threat to Belarusian economic sovereignty is truly increasing.
Putin wants to go down in history not only as the politician who restored the greatness of Russia, but also as of the one who restored the territory of the former USSR. In late 2007 and early 2008, Minsk and Sochi hosted intensive talks between Lukashenka and Putin. The official information agency, publishing the data of surveys conducted by the information and analytical centre of the Lukashenka administration, helped to make the subject of the talks clear. The surveys show extremely low support for the idea of state unification. Only some 3% of Belarusians support the idea. It is interesting that none of the aspects of Belarus–Russia union gained majority support among Belarusians. Thus, the common defense system is supported only by 21.2%, a single currency by 20.4%, common citizenship by 17.8%, a common information space by 6.4%. The data presents the lowest-ever support for the idea of state unification. Here is evidence that the Belarusian authorities have publicly acknowledged the fact of consensus in Belarusian society for preserving Belarusian statehood. This signals that Minsk is readying itself for defeat in the referendum insisted on by the Kremlin. It shows that in late 2007 and early 2008, Putin came back to the issue of the Constitutional Act and was ready to take on the role of the President of the unified State (instead of becoming its Prime Minister), the role of a man wearing ‘Monomakh's hat’ (symbolising ruling status). However, all the attempts to talk Lukashenka into being the second man in the united State failed. Lukashenka's ambitions stood up to Putin's. Lukashenka refused to yield the ‘T-shirt’ of integration leader he has been wearing since the mid-1990s.
This means that Lukahsneka will now be smothered by the Russian economic embrace. Russia is asking for the Belarusian family silverware, i.e., some 120 successful enterprises that are of some interest to Russian business. This is an indication not of convergence but rather of a clash of interests between the Kremlin and Lukashenka's clan. For 14 years the regime has gained economic and financial strength. For the members of the entourage, privatisation is a project with short- and long-term opportunities.
Thus the core of Medvedev's and the Kremlin's strategy towards Belarus will be a maximum slowdown of Belarus’ development as a national state with its own identity, lowering the cost of Russian resources in exchange for keeping Belarus in its sphere of influence and strengthening Russia's presence in Belarus as much as possible.
The role of Europe in solving the Belarusian crisis
There is no single solution to the Belarusian crisis. Because of his world view, upbringing, education and social circle, Lukashenka does not accept the need for dialogue, which would require him to step back from his positions. Lukashenka does not want to transfer power democratically (i.e., through elections). On the other hand, force is not an option in Belarus.
Conditions need to be created that would force Lukashenka to agree to a dialogue. After that the parties need to come to agreement on a process of transition to a democratic form of government.
What should Europe do?
The situation requires that the US and the EU develop a common strategy regarding Belarus. We recommend a return of the practice of European Commission and US Department of State representatives visiting Minsk. Minsk should be addressed in one voice, from an agreed standpoint. Lack of close coordination revealed itself in the dialogue with Minsk on the issue of freeing political prisoners. Washington insisted on all the prisoners being released, and within a strictly agreed periods of time. Some European countries would be content with a partial solution of the problem. Lukashenka has made use of the discord to postpone the release of A. Kazulin for an indefinite period of time.
It would be worthwhile to renew the work of the European Parliament, The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the format of a troika that includes representatives from these organisations. Otherwise Minsk will continue to use the principle of divide and conquer.
It will be important to organise negotiations on strict conditions; linking the talks to Belarus–EU and Belarus–US economic and political relations. For example, the EU could hold a special international conference on Belarus, involving representatives from the authorities, the UDF and responsible international organisations (the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and international parliamentary organisations). A conference would be a tool enabling us to get a clearer understanding of Lukashenka's readiness to change. The only condition for such a conference, initiated by the EU, should be the release of the political prisoners. There should be only one issue on the agenda—elections held according to OSCE standards. The conference may result in forming a working group, which would prepare changes to the Electoral Code and law enforcement practice. Lukashenka should be left with a choice: either a special conference on Belarus, which would create conditions for elections according to OSCE standards, or an international tribunal for the Belarusian regime and the ideology of lukashism.
Belarusian political prisoners and European values are the two incompatible positions. The problem requires the joint efforts of supporters of changes and the entire international community. We expect increasing activity through diplomatic channels using a diverse range of tools to affect the Belarusian authorities. So long as there are political prisoners, so long as there is no possibility for free elections, so long as Belarusian newspapers are forced to be printed abroad, there are no grounds for relaxing strong sanctions against some Belarusian officials.
We have stated it clearly—the UDF stands for a dialogue with the authorities. This is clearly stated in the New Strategy of the UDF. We cannot shake a hand clenched into a fist. We cannot shake the hand holding the keys to the prison cells of A. Kazulin and A. Kim.
We need a negotiation process with a clear agenda and an exact time frame to reach results. The dialogue should be trilateral, involving Belarusian officials, the UDF and responsible international organisations acting as mediators.
We have to acknowledge that the importance of a real dialogue on concrete issues such as political prisoners, free elections, etc., is sometimes overlooked by claims for the importance of dialogue. There is a danger that the international community will be stuck in talks that have neither a time frame nor a clear agenda. Today Lukashenka is outplaying Europe tactically. He artificially puts up barriers (political prisoners, travel restrictions on some politicians, etc.), and then turns them into bargaining chips with the international community.
We have not only to gain the release of prisoners but also to prevent the conviction of new people. And there is a real threat of this. For example, a criminal case is now underway against participants of the ‘Entrepreneurs March’ of 10 January. Twelve activists from youth organisations are accused.
It is imperative that we increase direct investment in democracy. This is the most useful and effective investment. And today we are speaking of the necessity for a considerable increase in assistance to civil society organisations and the independent mass media. It is high time that a fund to support democracy in Belarus be created. A key component in realising this objective will be reinforcing the international presence in Belarus.
The agreement to open the office of an EU representative in Minsk has been signed. It is a good sign, but we should not delude ourselves. We have witnessed the devaluation of the OSCE office in Minsk, which has turned into an organisation arranging semi-annual visits of PACE members to Minsk. Therefore, the mandate and the strategy of the representative office are extremely important.
Utopia: Belarus 2010
At present, Lukashenka is still the dictator, who is unable to travel practically anywhere in the world and who is hiding in bunkers instead. There is as yet no self-sufficiency. There is a country that is strongly dependent on world humanitarian aid. A third of the population has migrated to the countries of Western Europe and Russia. The standard of living reminds the one of North Korea: there is a lack of basic food products. State gangsterism is flourishing in the country. Lukashenka has to make his territory available as base for numerous terrorist groups. This allows him to make money and hold the rest of the population in terror (terrorists have merged with state security bodies). There is practically no transit of oil and gas through the territory of Belarus, leading to an increase in prices and a deficit of raw materials in the Western markets. Russia encourages instability in Belarus and is trying to organise something similar in Ukraine.
I am ashamed of the fact that Belarus is the last enclave of dictatorship on the European map. I know that Belarus and its people deserve a better future. And this better future is called democracy, and European values and standards. The solution to the Belarusian problem lies in Minsk, however, not in Washington, DC, Moscow or Brussels. No one but we Belarusians will solve our problems. We are not going to host a team of democracy builders from Lithuania or Slovenia. This is our country and our responsibility.
We are not waiting for a miracle in 2008, although this is a special year for us. This is the 90th anniversary of the proclamation of the Belarusian Peoples’ Republic and the year of parliamentary elections. This brings special responsibility for all the supporters of change. As a leader of political optimists, I believe in the inevitability of change and the future of Belarus.
Footnotes