Abstract
This article discusses Belarus’ transition towards democracy and a market economy, and the difficulties it currently faces as it attempts to pursue these changes. Belarus’ historically close relationship with Russia is discussed in detail, as is Russia's continual influence on Belarus's domestic and foreign policy. There are also internal challenges that hinder this transition. The EU strongly supports Belarus in this endeavour, and the authors encourage a proactive EU policy that will further facilitate the country's transition towards achieving a strong democratic tradition and a market economy model.
In many respects, Belarus could be called a paradoxical neighbour of the European Union (EU). Contrary to stereotypes, Belarus is not a very poor country. Its GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity is comparable to that of Bulgaria and Romania. It has a highly educated population (19% of Belarusians have a university degree) [1]. The EU is its biggest trading partner, taking 44% of Belarusian exports compared to the 32% going to Russia [10,1]. But despite geographical proximity and level of trade, the EU has not been able to make a significant positive impact on the country, because Belarusian authorities have been very reluctant to accept European standards of human rights and the market economy model.
Belarus can therefore be seen as a good case study which reveals both the opportunities and limitations of the EU's capacity to democratise authoritarian regimes in its vicinity. The objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) include the stabilisation of neighbouring countries, creating a ring of friendly, economically developed and well-governed countries. The EU admits that while fostering democratic values in neighbouring countries is the only reliable guarantee of their political stabilisation, the development of economic ties and free trade with the EU would lead to steady growth of their prosperity [5]. In return, the EU expects that the governments of neighbouring countries, which are very often corrupt and non-democratic, will initiate democratic and market reforms themselves, in the hope that such reforms would make these countries more attractive to foreign investors and gain open access to the EU common market.
Many scholars point to the inefficiency of such a democratisation policy when dealing with authoritarian regimes [3, 214]. They emphasise three main points:
The ENP does not offer neighbouring countries the prospect of EU membership, meaning it does not provide guarantees of tangible economic benefits stemming from membership. This reduces the economic stimulus for democratisation and market reforms.
The adoption of EU standards in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the implementation of EU law in the economic sector would result in significant loss of power for the ruling elites that cannot be compensated for by financial advantages. This is why the corrupt authoritarian elites accept the rapprochement with the EU unwillingly.
Another factor, and perhaps the main one, which determines the efficiency of the EU's policy vis-a-vis insufficiently democratic or even undemocratic neighbours is the existence of geopolitical alternatives. The fact is that the ENP is built upon a Eurocentric world view. For ENP authors, the EU is seen as the most attractive economic and political centre of the surrounding regions. They assume that the political elites of neighbouring countries perceive the EU as the only power capable of helping them tackle their problems—from unemployment and poverty to the need for economic development. But this is not always the case. No ruling elite would agree to introduce EU-based reforms if an EU competitor were to offer economic and political gains without asking for political concessions in exchange. This is especially true in the case of Belarus.
Recent relations between Belarus and the European Union can be divided into two periods. From 1997 to 2008, the EU pursued a policy of isolation and visa sanctions in response to regular and increasing violations of democratic rules and human rights by the Belarusian authorities. Over this period, Belarusian President Alaksandr Łukašenka undertook economic and political integration with Russia, which was much more profitable for him. Russia opened its large market to Belarusian goods while providing Minsk with cheap gas and oil and did not require any democratic reforms. According to some estimates, the annual energy subsidies from Russia during this time were more than 10% of Belarus’ GDP [27, 69].
Since 2007, relations between Belarus and Russia have stalled. Fearing the loss of his personal power, the Belarusian President refused to fulfil his previous promises to almost completely reintegrate Belarus with Russia, which would have included privatising major enterprises with Russian capital and introducing the Russian rouble in Belarus. Russia responded by increasing its oil and gas prices. So the Russian alternative became less attractive for the Belarusian leadership, and official Minsk started sending signals to the EU. A number of positive developments took place, such as the release of political prisoners, some easing of the political and media climate and a mild economic liberalisation. In 2008, high-level political relations between the EU and Belarus were resumed, and the policy that Brussels started to implement in Belarus was described as an ‘engagement strategy’. In 2009, Belarus was invited into the Eastern Partnership. The Belarusian regime started talking about the need for the economic modernisation of Belarus, changed its rhetoric and turned to the EU, which ‘possess[es] the most advanced technologies, mighty investment possibilities and huge intellectual potential’, as its main partner in modernisation [12]. The results of the new policy are yet to be seen, but only a few question it, since the political isolation of the earlier period had not resulted in President Łukašenka's initiating reforms.
This article will discuss the major obstacles and challenges to achieving democratic changes in Belarus and allowing it to fully benefit from closer cooperation with and, eventually, integration into the EU.
Factors impeding Belarus on the path to democratisation and Europeanisation
The political regime
The very nature of the political regime is a major obstacle. Over the course of his 16-year rule, Alaksandr Łukašsenka has created an extremely centralised system of government in which all major decisions in the country are taken by himself, with no effective separation of power. Any decentralisation of the government, such as free parliamentary elections as demanded by the EU, would limit the powers of the president and create the potential to oust him from power. The same threat is perceived in the extension of the freedom of speech. Łukašenka and/or his entourage are alleged to have been involved in killing a number of their political opponents and in large financial misdoings. Thus they fear that after being removed from power they may be called to account for their actions. These circumstances substantially narrow the possibility of a peaceful transition from authoritarianism by reaching an agreement between the authoritarian elite and the opposition. As long as Łukašenka is in good health, any substantial extension of civil liberties in Belarus is highly unlikely. What might be expected is a decrease of repression against the civil society. The EU has already achieved some progress in this area [2].
Nevertheless, the Belarusian regime has proved to be capable of evolution. Under the pressure of economic crisis and worsening trade conditions with Russia, the Belarusian authorities had to start decreasing their control over the economy, improving the business climate and implementing very cautious privatisation— steps that seemed unlikely few years ago. The promised economic liberalisation would create a window of opportunity that may allow the EU to increase its leverage over official Minsk.
The unreformed economy
The unreformed economy remains one of the main obstacles in the way of economic and political openness. Lacking market mechanisms, the economy is state controlled but still extremely dependent upon external markets. Reforming such a system is necessary, but would inevitably lead to rising unemployment and falling standards of living among many social groups.
The bulk of the Belarusian economy is represented by the public sector, which generates 75% of GDP. The private sector accounts for only 25%, and a mere 15% of GDP is generated by small and medium-sized enterprises [17]. The skeleton of the national economy is made up of 171 large enterprises that continue to be essentially state-owned. Each employs over 1,000 persons; some of them, such as the Minsk Automobile Plant or the Belarusian Potash Company, provide jobs for 20,000 persons [26].
The state enterprises mostly use obsolete equipment. The state protection and the absence of competition do not create incentives for innovative development. Belarus lags behind its European neighbours in productivity, while the number of employees at Belarusian enterprises well exceeds the number of employees at similar EU enterprises. The government supports inefficient sectors by redistributing the resources from highly profitable enterprises to loss-making ones. Moreover, the Belarusian economy is hardly diversified. About half of the GDP comes from three sectors: petrochemical, chemical and construction. This makes the country extremely vulnerable to external shocks.
Many economists agree that the Belarusian economy was only able to generate profits thanks to cheap energy provided by Russia. The rising price of energy as well a drop in demand for Belarusian goods have severely affected the economy, and the need for reform has become more pressing.
The only advantage of an economy built around a network of large state enterprises is the possibility of easier control. Bearing in mind that Belarus’ public sector employs about 50% of the country's workers, it becomes obvious that Belarusian authorities maintain this system in order to control society.
One should not forget that the redistribution system created by Łukašenka continues to provide a certain level of well-being and social protection to large groups of people. Its dismantlement might result in substantial unemployment. One of the most urgent issues to be tackled by the first democratic government of Belarus will be how to implement structural reforms and create new jobs. A successful solution to this problem will determine to a large degree Belarus’ chances of opting for democratic development.
Weak civil society
The third factor which impedes the process of political democratisation in Belarus is the relative weakness of civil society. This is a common feature of all post-Soviet countries. The societies emerging after the end of Communist dictatorship had no tradition of self-organisation, no elementary forms of self-government or cooperation in the economic field. Groups of citizens were not allowed to articulate their interests and only the state could express the interests of citizens in the Soviet Union.
Łukašenka's authoritarian system continues the former USSR's tradition of distrusting any self-organisation by citizens. The state officials consider NGOs not as partners and legitimate representatives of citizens, but as competitors who illegally intervene in the sphere of the state's exclusive competencies. Many independent organisations have been closed or denied registration. Furthermore, at the end of 2005 the regime introduced a new article into the Criminal Code establishing criminal responsibility for acting on behalf of non-registered organisations. Article 193-1, used from 2006 to 2008 to punish and intimidate many democratic activists, is still in force despite regular calls from the EU and OSCE to abrogate it [4].
The weakness of Belarusian civil society is due not only to a lack of traditions, a hostile attitude or even intimidation from the state. Instead, a number of experts link low levels of civic activism among Belarusians with the so-called social contract tacitly agreed to by the authoritarian state and its citizens [8].
Łukašenka has in fact restored a client-patron system of relationship between society and the state. Since the state is the largest employer, a large number of Belarusians are made dependent upon the state. The economic livelihood of many office employees, public servants and plant workers is linked with the state. The state guarantees them regular, even if minor, salary raises and job security, while preventing them from protesting or taking the initiative to protect their interests. Thus, it is easier for citizens to complain and address the state institutions than it is to get together with like-minded people to protect their rights and interests. Some argue that such a client–patron system will inevitably disappear once the private sector plays a much larger role in the economy and social transfers from the state decline.
A diffuse national identity
The democratic and European choice for Belarus is also blocked by Belarusians’ rather weak national self-identity. There are two competing visions of national identity. The first, cultivated until recently by Łukašenka before he started emphasising the value of independence and a particular kind of separate ‘Belaru-sian-ness’, sees Belarusians as part of a great Russian nation who should be guided not by Western values but by the ‘values of Slavonic orthodox civilisation’. According to this vision, the West is an eternal enemy of Belarus and the natural reference point is Moscow.
The second vision of national identity emphasises Belarus’ distinctive history and language, its 500 years of common history with Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians, its being part of a common European cultural movement for centuries. From this perspective, Belarus is a part of Europe, now artificially cut off from it but searching for a way to rejoin.
This split in national identity is also reflected in the geopolitical preferences of Belarusians [18]. Both visions have historic grounds. The choice between them can only be made as a result of democratic public discussion, which is impossible under the current authoritarian regime. One cannot be entirely sure that, following the change of regime in Belarus, the European vision will prevail. What is, however, certain is that the democratic future of Belarus will be firmly assured when its citizens identify themselves as belonging to Europe and accept European values. Recent opinion polls from the past several months show that the number of Belarusians who would vote to join the EU tomorrow exceeds the number of those who would support unification with Russia (42.2–34.9%). 1
According the September 2010 opinion poll run by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), in a hypothetical referendum on the EU membership 42.2% would vote ‘yes’ and 32.5% ‘no’ (36.4–39.4% in June 2010). The same poll asked about voting in a hypothetical referendum on unification with Russia: 33.1% would be in favour and 45.4% against (29.3–48.6% in June 2010) (accessed 5 October 2010).
Relative isolation
Another factor which separates Belarus from Europe is the paradoxical isolation of Belarusian society. Despite its being a direct neighbour of three EU Member States, most Belarusians have never visited the EU. According to a recent opinion poll, 67% of Belarusians have never been in neighbouring Lithuania or Poland, let alone more distant European countries [6]. The cause of this phenomenon lies in high visa prices and complicated visa procedures. Few Belarusians visit the EU, because of weak business contacts between entrepreneurs and the insignificance of academic exchanges. Civilian contacts with other countries dropped significantly after the new EU Member States had joined the Schengen zone. For example, in 2008 Poland issued 70% fewer visas for Belarusians than in 2007, the last year before it joined the Schengen zone [7,3].
Belarusians receive very little information about the EU as such and life in its Member States, even in those that have recently joined. The audience for most media financed by the European Commission or by individual EU countries and the US—the Belarusian Service of Polish Radio, Radio Liberty, Radio Racyja, European Radio for Belarus, Belsat TV—does not exceed 5% of the adult population; these media are often underfunded [19]. The only exception is the Russian Service of Euronews, watched by 16% of Belarusians.
Russia's role
Finally, one of the main obstacles to Belarus’ way to democracy is the fact that the key to political and economic stability in Belarus is to be found not in Minsk or Brussels, but in Moscow. A rapid and smooth political transformation will be possible in Belarus only when combined with a positive attitude (or at least noninterference) from the Kremlin. Russia has many tools of leverage over the Belarusian economy. First of all, the Belarusian economy is critically dependent on the Russian market. Despite having important trade turnover with the EU, its structure is very limited. Up to 70% of Belarusian exports to the EU consist of three types of products: petrochemical products, potash fertilisers and ferrous materials [21]. For most other products, the Russian market is the main and often the only one.
In 2009, for example, 99.9% of Belarusian exports of meat, 93.6% of footwear and 96% of television sets went to Russia. Russia is also the main importer of Belarusian road-building machinery (82.2%), engines (79.1%), engineering tools (85.6%) and furniture (70.7%) [13,2]. The closing of the Russian market would have catastrophic effects on the Belarusian economy.
Russian energy subsidies represent another leverage tool. Since 2007 they have been regularly and irreversibly cut, but they still play a key role in maintaining the competitiveness of the Belarusian economy. In 2010, Russian energy subsidies are estimated to be $4.6 billion, which represents about 8% of the Belarusian GDP [24]. At the same time, Belarus is critically dependent on Russian energy resources. As mentioned earlier, the chemical and petrochemical industries provide the larger part of Belarus’ revenues, but 90% of oil and 100% of gas consumed by the Belarusian economy originates in Russia.
Belarus is also dependent upon the Russian labour market. According to estimates made by Wilson and Popescu, over 700 thousand Belarusians work in Russia, annually sending home $2 billion in remittances [25, 34]. Russian media still carry a not-insignificant influence in Belarus.
Is Russia really interested in a democratic Belarus? In a word, yes, but the reality of the Russian ‘overmanaged democracy’ [20] does create strong doubts about the real objectives of Russia's policy regarding Belarus. One should not rule out, especially in light of recent increased tensions between Russian and Belarusian leaders [14], the Kremlin's interest in removing Łukašenka and seeing a more predictable and even more liberal leader come to power in Belarus. But what is much more important to underline is that Russia is interested in a Belarus which chooses neither political nor economic integration with the EU.
In 2005 and 2006, influential Russian experts Sergei Karaganov and Andrey Suzdaltsev put forward a number of conditions that Russia would always expect Belarus to meet, regardless of who is in power in Minsk. First, Belarus must always be a political ally of Russia and avoid joining any military or political organisations to which Russia does not belong (this concerns the EU and especially NATO). Second, Belarus must guarantee the secure transit of Russian goods (including oil and gas) to the West. Third, Minsk must also provide help to maintain the link between the Russian mainland and the Kaliningrad region. Finally, Belarus must open its market to Russian goods and investments and also ‘respect the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Belarus’ (even though most Russian speakers are ethnic Belarusians) [22,23]. These conditions reflect Russia's interests, but their fulfilment risks denying Belarus any opportunity to develop its own independent foreign policy and grants Russia huge possibilities for interfering in the domestic affairs of Belarus.
The economic integration of Belarus with the EU is also viewed negatively by Russia, since it treats the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the sphere of its exclusive economic interests, a vital space needed by Russia to keep its ‘great power’ status. As is clear from the report entitled ‘Economic Interests and Objectives of Russia in the CIS’, published by the Institute for Contemporary Development, whose board of trustees is headed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Russia will continue to develop integration projects in the post-Soviet space. It is vital for Russia to have access to the intellectual potential and infrastructure of its neighbouring countries and to create a common market dominated by Russia so it can cooperate on an ‘equal footing’ with the EU [9,6]. Thus Russia sees the EU as a competitor in the post-Soviet space and Russia wants to win this competition.
Conclusion: the EU's role in the democratisation of Belarus
There are high expectations within the pro-European part of Belarusian society for the EU's role in helping to achieve democratic changes. As Alaksandr Milinkievič, leader of the Movement for Freedom and the best-known figure of the Belarusian opposition, put it, ‘[T]he EU has played an outstanding role in helping its new members to consolidate democratic traditions and to modernise their economies. We expect the EU to play the same prominent role vis-à-vis Belarus, i.e. helping to bring Belarus back to the European family of free nations’ [16, 258].
The changes in public mood, with a greater value attached to independence and closer cooperation with the EU, the high interest of Belarusian authorities in the Eastern Partnership programme and the ongoing conflict between Łukašenka and Russia's leaders create a unique opportunity for the EU to develop a proactive policy vis-à-vis Belarus. The EU should decide whether it is really interested in the democratisation and Europeanisation of Belarus and ready to pursue its own agenda without allowing Russia to have the final say, especially in the context of a ‘reset button’ policy between Moscow and Washington, on the character and direction of imminent changes in Belarus.
The objectives of a proactive EU policy may be expressed as follows:
Using the Eastern Partnership mechanisms to reduce Belarus’ energy dependence on Russia. This objective can be achieved by actively supporting projects aimed at developing new routes of oil transport to the country, creating energy interconnections, strategic storages of gas as well as improving energy efficiency;
Reducing the dependence of Belarusian enterprises on the Russian market thanks to intensification of trade relations, to be framed by a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement;
Strengthening the economic independence of the region's countries, including Belarus, by developing transport infrastructure linking the Baltic and Black Seas;
Stimulating the Belarusian government to carry out economic, administrative and legislative reforms aimed at improving the business climate, guaranteeing the security of investments and continuing liberalisation;
Supporting projects aimed at developing local communities, contributing to the decentralisation of the authoritarian system of government;
Intensifying interpersonal contacts thanks to an immediate, unilateral if necessary, Schengen visa fee reduction from ∊60 to ∊35 and progressive visa liberalisation, and through greater involvement of Belarusian partners, especially universities, in academic and cultural cooperation;
Increasing the visibility of the EU in Belarus via greater support for independent media and a broader dissemination of information on the results of economic, political and cultural cooperation between Belarus and the EU as such and its Member States;
Increasing support for an independent civil society while prioritising media freedom, human rights protection and pro-European activities, and bypassing the regime's bureaucratic obstacles.
The EU should consider that such policies could be ‘re-appropriated’ by state entities or state-controlled NGOs. The EU should be ready to promote the strategic agenda of Europeanisation across the entire society [11] while paying ‘more attention to tactical issues, such as “road maps” and interconditionality of concessions in bargaining with the government’ [15, 71].
Despite many negative stereotypes, the inclusion of Belarus in a common European system of democratic states and market economies should not be such a difficult task. One should not forget that united Europe is largely perceived in Belarusian society as a model in terms of standards of living, technological development and the rule of law. Europeanisation and democratisation of a country located in such an important region will, beyond all doubt, contribute to the peaceful future of Central and Eastern Europe and to the security of the EU as a whole.
Footnotes