Political Research Quarterly

In attempting to identify institutional factors that influence a nation's per capita growth rate, scholarship in political science has focused almost ex clusively on differences in political regimes. This article argues that if we are interested in understanding why some nations grow faster than others, then we must redirect our inquiry and focus on property rights. Using new measures for property rights protection and democracy, and building on an endogenous growth model, this study presents the first approximation of the relationship between property rights, democracy, and economic growth. These relationships are tested using cross-national panel data from 1960-90. The evidence supports two conclusions: (1) economies of na tions that protect property rights grow more rapidly than those of nations that do not protect property rights; and (2) the nature of a political regime influences economic growth indirectly through its commitment to prop erty rights.

Area specialists have observed that one way elite decision processes can vary is in the proportion of the decision-making group seen as necessary to support group action: decision-makers can aim for consensus, or they can aim for less inclusive support. Is this distinction of theoretical sig nificance ? I argue that it is through an examination of three sources: (1) rational-choice analyses of unanimity and majority rules; (2) social psy chological studies of the effects of these rules in the laboratory; and (3) descriptions of dispute resolution processes as these appear in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and American fiction. These sources indicate that con sensual decision processes tend either to inhibit collective action, induce cognitive effort and commitment, or promote particular definitions of issues depending on the motivational orientation of decision-makers-on whether they are interest-maximizers, information-processors, or social beings. This conclusion, I argue, has broad implications for the study of elite decision making.

Over time, the changing nature of federal and state relations has resulted in much of the responsibility for economic development to be centered at the state level. In attempts to foster potential economic growth, the states have engaged in high-priced games of luring foreign firms with incentive packages, business climates, and recruitment strategies. While both the in tensity and scope of their efforts has increased over time, relatively little is known about how political conditions, such as governmental institu tions, political parties, and policy instruments influence foreign firm loca tion decisions. Using a regional and time effects Poisson analysis this study seeks to explore how state political conditions influence firm location deci sions over time. The findings indicate that labor market conditions, the ex istence of agglomeration economies, access to markets, taxes, governmental institutions, policy instruments, and the national context are significant factors in determining firm location decisions and that the factors influenc ing firm location decisions vary over time.

Political scientists have long sought to understand the representation of mass publics by their political leaders. Empirical research has primarily focused on patterns of representation in industrial democracies with es tablished democratic traditions. Post-communist countries like Russia, by contrast, provide the opportunity to examine patterns of and attitudes toward representation in a society in which the electoral institutions and the attitudes are newly emerging. We employ survey data from coordinated samples of Russian elites and the mass public carried out in 1992 to address the following questions: Who are the elites in today's Russia? Are their views different from those of the public? In particular, where are the critical pressures for change in Russian politics and society coming from and who is resisting change-those at the top or the bottom of the political hierarchy? How do cleavages among different elite groups relate to the atti tudinal cleavages among the general public? To what extent did the first competitive elections in Russia produce attitudinal correspondence be tween Russian citizens and their representatives in the legislature? We ana lyze elite and mass outlooks on key political and economic dimensions, first for the country as a whole, then within different districts. We show that Russian elites differ in social background from the mass public in the same manner as Western elites differ from the public. Russian elites also differ attitudinally from the Russian populace by being, on average, more reformist (politically and economically). The correspondence, or con gruence, between Russian elite and mass views-overall and region by region-is only moderate but of roughly the same magnitude as that found in Western democracies.

The bulk of the literature on group mobilization focuses on why individu als join groups and virtually ignores the group leader (entrepreneur). Thus, we argue that there is a gap in the literature on group development: while entrepreneurs are critical in the process of group mobilization, little is known about what they do and why and how they do it. Studies of group mobilization continue to focus on group supporters-the patrons and members who provide groups with the resources they need. We take a different approach. We examine the process of group mobilization from the perspective of the entrepreneur. Utilizing data from a survey of public interest group founders we test the effectiveness of three theories of group formation. Our analysis leads to four basic conclusions: (1) We should reject any strong version of Jack Walker's argument about the importance of patrons in group mobilization. While many public interest groups do form at the behest of patrons, most do not. (2) Most public interest groups form because aggressive, independent entrepreneurs form them. The large number of groups which cannot trace their origins to patrons or distur bances attests to the importance of entrepreneurs in group formation. (3) Many public interest group founders form groups in response to specific and easily identifiable events or series of events. Disturbances may not spur individuals to join groups, but they play an important role in stimulating entrepreneurial activity. (4) The "free-rider" problem is not operative for most groups "just starting out." Our data suggest that individuals-especially entrepreneurs and their friends-are the driving force behind public interest group formation.

This article explores the basis of opinion formation and public attitudes toward recent Supreme Court nominees. The high salience of several re cent Court nominations has transformed the selection process from an elite affair to one with a popular dimension. We develop a model of opinion-holding in response to the Rehnquist, Bork, Souter, and Thomas nominations. We find that education and having an opinion about the president are strongly associated with opinion-holding about the nomi nees. We also find that presidential approval, party identification and ideology are all highly related to approval of the nominees. The influence of age, race, and gender on opinion-holding and evaluation tends to vary with the nomination. Of particular interest is the strong link we find be tween presidential evaluation and nominee evaluation. Presidents serve as important cues for those who have opinions about Court nominees.

Committee membership is valuable to members of Congress for many reasons, not the least of which is the ability to exercise disproportionate influence over policies falling within the committee's jurisdiction. Yet at times these jurisdictions are violated. Given that a member values distinct committee jurisdictions, will he or she be more likely to oppose a bill brought to a vote by a violation of jurisdictional norms? In this article, I un dertake an investigation of the politics surrounding the Senate's extension of Daylight-Saving Time in order to shed light on this question. The empirical analysis shows that while members of the committee that lost jurisdiction are affected by the jurisdictional violation, other members are not.

The study of urban politics was once central to the political science dis cipline in the United States. As central cities have lost their dominant posi tion in the metropolis, however, political science's urbanists have remained fixated on the conflicts and crises of the urban core, while largely ignoring urban politics that occurs outside the city limits. This focus has resulted in a skewed understanding of urban America, and may limit the analytical contributions of the field as well. We review the development of the urban politics literature and offer some explanations for its preoccupation with big cities. We argue that work in this field would be better integrated if urban politics were reconceptualized as the politics of urbanization. We sug gest some new theoretical and substantive contributions that such an ap proach would permit, and emphasize that the politics of urbanization cannot be fully understood in city-bound analysis.