Abstract
Area specialists have observed that one way elite decision processes can vary is in the proportion of the decision-making group seen as necessary to support group action: decision-makers can aim for consensus, or they can aim for less inclusive support. Is this distinction of theoretical sig nificance ? I argue that it is through an examination of three sources: (1) rational-choice analyses of unanimity and majority rules; (2) social psy chological studies of the effects of these rules in the laboratory; and (3) descriptions of dispute resolution processes as these appear in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and American fiction. These sources indicate that con sensual decision processes tend either to inhibit collective action, induce cognitive effort and commitment, or promote particular definitions of issues depending on the motivational orientation of decision-makers-on whether they are interest-maximizers, information-processors, or social beings. This conclusion, I argue, has broad implications for the study of elite decision making.
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