Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Both group agents (for group agency theorists) and individual agents (for enactivists) are themselves constituted by agents. This raises a similar challenge for both group agency and enactivism, namely to explain the constitutive relationship between sub-agential agents and the agents themselves. In this paper, I propose an enactivist account of what constitutes collective action. I conclude that non-human processes—both natural and artificial—may be constitutive of group agents typically recognized as human. In particular, I argue that machine learning recommendation algorithms should be recognized as constitutive of certain group agents on an enactivist account of what constitutes collective action.

Two recent practice-based conceptions of linguistic communication challenge the dominant “content-delivery” models. Beaver and Stanley’s The Politics of Language (2023) and Rouse’s Social Practices as Biological Niche Construction (2023) have different aims. Beaver and Stanley develop an account of linguistic meaning as affective and politically engaged. Rouse starts from evolutionary accounts of human ways of life to situate language within a more general, naturalistic account of social practices as forms of biological niche construction. Despite their different orientations, the two books can work together as a more compelling challenge to standard accounts of linguistic meaning and communication.

In this paper I argue that a Bio-Social conception of “race” is a socially salient conception within the United States. This conception is “socially salient” in the sense that is demonstrative of public understanding and public use of the race concept within context of the United States and its member institutions. This conception is “Bio-Social” in the sense that a set of biological and social properties form the necessary conditions for “race” and “racial group membership.” I explain that these biological and social properties are the social interpretation of ancestral relations to geographically and culturally specified groups.

This paper challenges the view that race is a reliable scientific variable or kind for the purpose of inductive inference within the social sciences. I characterize stability in terms of Extended Conditional Independence (ECI) and show that the heterogeneity and instability of racial categories across different background circumstances undermines their ability to support robust inductive inference and explanatory power. I claim this, in turn, undermines racial categories' status as real scientific variables or kinds. Race, has local stability within restricted sets of target systems and thus, its reality is limited to those domains. I argue for a restricted form of racial realism, a view I call Restricted Racial Realism (RRR).