
Letter
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There is evidence that the increasing rates of suicide can be linked to the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. Factors such as suicide contagion and the increasing positive media reporting on such suicides are also relevant and have led to different standards of treatment for suicidal people who claim the right to have their suicides medically assisted.

This study evaluates the effects that short-term, foreign, Catholic medical mission trips had on the religiosity of the United States-based participants. The subjects of this study participated in Catholic medical missions to Chiapas State, Mexico, in 2014 and 2015. Twenty-two of forty-two participants responded to a survey to assess for any changes in their religiosity and associated attitudes and behaviors. The results revealed that participation in the medical mission was associated with a significant increase in non-organizational religious activity, intrinsic religiosity, concern for health disparities and the burden of illness in the developing world, the promotion of further missions, the provision of service and/or monetary aid to the poor in the missionary's local community, and an increased likelihood to discuss the Christian faith in conversations with others. There was no statistically significant association with organizational religious activity or local participation in evangelization activities.
This article reports on the changes seen in the religious attitudes and charitable works performed following participation in a short-term medical mission. After serving on a mission trip to Mexico, we found that United States-based missionaries had an increase in their private religious activities, felt closer to God, were more likely to help the poor in their own neighborhoods, and were more likely to discuss their Christian faith than prior to the mission trip. We discuss possible reasons for these changes.
The fields of biology, medicine, and embryology have described the developmental milestones of humans throughout gestation in great detail. It is less clear as to when humans are recognized as people, persons, or beings with rights that are protected by legislation. The practice of law is irrevocably intertwined with that of ethical conduct; and the time at which a human life is considered a person has implications that extend to health care, legislation on abortion, and autonomy of individuals. This article reviews the economical position that fertilization is the moment that personhood of the conceptus begins. Alternate positions proposing that personhood begins at other possible times after fertilization are presented and contrasted to the economical hypothesis.
This article is an original work critically analyzing the various arguments for human personhood at fertilization and thereafter. The various positions on human personhood are compared and contrasted herein. The time of the human lifespan at which personhood is conferred has important implications for health care, legislation, and personal autonomy.
Defenders of human, embryonic, destructive stem-cell research and early abortion typically argue for their position by showing that you and I do not come into existence at conception but rather at some point after. Eugene Mills has provided an ingenious argument that you and I could not have come into existence at conception. I argue against Mills's argument on two counts: first, his argument depends upon a cursory limning of human conception, and when fuller details are considered, a premise in his argument is undercut. Second, Mills's argument invites us to ask questions about how to identify individual organisms. Given a fuller description of human conception and some plausible metaphysical principles, I argue that Mills should hold instead that you and I do in fact come into being at conception.
One way to argue that early abortions are permissible is to argue against the view that you and I come into existence at conception. Most abortion rights defenders argue for this conclusion by noting that in order for you and I to exist, there must be developed psychological capacities. Eugene Mills takes a different route and argues that you and I could not come into existence at conception because that would mean being identical to an egg – which he rightly notes we cannot be. I argue against Mills in this article.
The introduction of the “brain death” criterion constitutes a significant paradigm shift in the determination of death. The perception of the public at large is that the Catholic Church has formally endorsed this neurological standard. However, a critical reading of the only magisterial document on this subject, Pope John Paul II's 2000 address, shows that the pope's acceptance of the neurological criterion is conditional in that it entails a twofold requirement. It requires that certain medical presuppositions of the neurological standard are fulfilled, and that its philosophical premise coheres with the Church's teaching on the body-soul union. This article demonstrates that the medical presuppositions are not fulfilled, and that the doctrine of the brain as the central somatic integrator of the body does not cohere either with the current holistic understanding of the human organism or with the Church's Thomistic doctrine of the soul as the form of the body.
The concept of “brain death” (the neurological basis for legally declaring a person dead) has caused much controversy since its inception. In this regard, it has been generally perceived that the Catholic Church has officially affirmed the “brain death” criterion. The address of Pope John Paul II in 2000 shows, however, that he only gave it a conditional acceptance, one which requires that several medical and philosophical presuppositions of the “brain death” standard be fulfilled. This article demonstrates, taking into consideration both the empirical evidence and the Church's Thomistic anthropology, that the presuppositions have not been fulfilled.

