Environmental Values

The concept of transformation has become a buzzword within the last few years. This has to do, first, with the ever broader recognition of the profound character of the environmental crisis, secondly, with increasingly obvious limits to existing forms of (global) environmental governance, thirdly, with the emergence of other dimensions of the crisis since 2008 and, fourthly, with intensified debates about required profound social change, especially of societal nature relations. However, the term transformation itself is contested. It largely depends on theoretical assumptions as well as the plausibility and applicability of the arguments which are made. In this paper, a historical-materialist approach to social-ecological transformation is outlined by referring to a theoretically sophisticated understanding of ‘subject(s)’ of transformation as well as the ‘object(s)’ of what is to be transformed. Theoretical concepts like the capitalist mode of production, regulation and hegemony, a critical understanding of the state and governance as well as the term societal nature relations are key. Such a perspective contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of the obstacles and requirements of real-world transformation. Finally, the argument has implications for visions and strategies, i.e., an emancipatory and democratic shaping of social relations and societal nature relations.

In the 1970s, deep ecologists developed a radical normative argument for ‘ecological consciousness’ to challenge environmental and human exploitation. Such consciousness would replace the Enlightenment dualist ‘illusion’ with a post-Enlightenment holism that ‘fully integrated’ humanity within the ecosphere. By the 2000s, deep ecology had fallen out of favour with many green scholars. And, in 2014, it was described as a ‘spent force’. However, this decline has coincided with calls by influential advocates of ‘corporate social and environmental responsibility’ (CSER) and ‘green growth’ (GG) that urge market actors to ensure voluntarily that social and environmental ‘problems are addressed holistically’. Given that CSER and GG have also been associated with rent seeking, privatisation and reducing incomes of the poor, could it be that some of deep ecology's once radical ideas today serve to legitimate forms of exploitation that they once decried? A critical realist perspective can problematise deep ecology's highly normative response to exploitation and alienation. By settling ontological questions in favour of holism and promoting moral voluntarism, deep ecology failed to address how actors with different interests might adopt green ideas. This blind spot can be cured by focusing instead on the active deployment of ethics, morality, values, beliefs, ideas and knowledges by political actors in historically specific contexts. Both critical normative and critical realist modes of engaging with environmental values are important; however, at a time when holism and voluntarism are gaining influence, critical realism offers helpful insight into the uses and abuses of such values.

The notion of sufficiency has recently gained some momentum in separate discourses on distributive justice (‘sufficientarianism') and the environment (‘eco-sufficiency'). An investigation of their relationship is warranted, as their scope overlaps in areas such as environmental justice and socio-economic policy. This paper argues that the two understandings of sufficiency are incompatible, because eco-sufficiency has adopted an extremely perfectionist view of the good life while sufficientarianism is committed to pluralism. A plausible explanation for this incompatibility relates to the two different meanings of the term sufficiency as a limit (eco-sufficiency) and as a minimum requirement (sufficientarianism).

Normally, during modernity, critical thinking and anti-systemic movements have countered the ruling institutions by envisaging not only new values and ideals, but mainly new ‘forms’ of social regulation. The current crisis reveals that, contrary to this tradition, the institutions in office and the antagonistic way of thinking now share the same basic ‘horizontal’ form. The degrowth project represents a paradigmatic example of this structural homology. The ecological and social crises, standing at the origins of the political engagement for degrowth, are not the outcome of execrable ‘values’ but mainly of the ‘horizontal’ form adopted by current institutions. In fact, the horizontal regime is uninterested in the promotion of specific values or ideas of justice. It only ensures that each singularity (the citizen and their networks) can freely play their game on the basis of their own values. This indifference is the basic reason for ecological, social and economic deregulation. The paradox of degrowth is that, on the one hand, it evokes the necessity of a return to ‘vertical’ regulation (i.e. collective sovereignty), while on the other, it is deeply subaltern to the paradigm of horizontalism (the same that frames the growth regime).

This article explores how the liberal tradition of political thought has dealt with the prospect of limits to economic growth and how it should approach this issue in the future. Using Andrew Moravcsik's explanatory liberal theory, it finds that the commitment of governments to growth stems primarily from the aggregation of societal preferences for the social goods that growth produces. The arguments of liberal thinkers who have grappled with the issue of growth are then examined to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of the relationship between liberal democracy and growth. These include John Stuart Mill, for whom a non-growing economy was essential for overcoming the tension between liberty and equality; Ronald Dworkin, who argues that growth is a derivative means to further more fundamental ends; and Marcel Wissenburg, who suggests that it is legitimate for liberal democracies to limit the preference for growth if it risks undermining liberal norms and institutions. Using these theoretical insights, it is argued that environmental degradation, which is partly driven by growth, now threatens the fundamental liberal commitments of many liberals, including some forms of state neutralism, utilitarianism, inalienable individual rights and above all human autonomy. Therefore, liberal democratic states not only can, but must move towards a post-growth economy to secure these objectives into the future.