European Journal of International Relations

How can we account for the variance in the level of implementation of and compliance with international agreements? Noting that answers to this question have been sought by pursuing at least three different paths of research, the author outlines three basic models and briefly discusses some of the main propositions and policy implications that can be derived from these models. The first model explicates the calculations that a unitary rational actor would perform in deciding whether or not to honour its commitments. The second examines the domestic politics of implementation, while the third focuses on the ideational basis of compliance, highlighting processes of learning and policy diffusion.

Theories of deterrence and compellence incorporate behavioral and political assumptions. The behavioral assumptions place unreasonable informational and analytical requirements on policy-makers. The political assumptions misconstrue the process of risk assessment, exaggerate the ability of leaders to estimate the risks inherent in their threats and shape adversarial estimates of their resolve. These problems may help explain why deterrence and compellence often fail when practiced by rational and attentive actors against equally rational and attentive targets. Some of the political and behavioral assumptions of deterrence and compellence are unique, but most are shared with other rational theories of bargaining. My critique has implications for these theories, and they are spelled out in the conclusion. I illustrate my argument with examples from American and Soviet decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis.

Scholars of foreign policy-making have concentrated on how the most powerful domestic actors influence foreign policy and have largely ignored the influence of less powerful, minority actors. This article argues that bureaucratic minorities — subordinates and less powerful departments — can and do influence foreign policy. Despite the extensive scholarship on bureaucratic politics and the central importance of `power' in the theory, we know little about the nature and effects of asymmetrical power relations. Drawing from various research, this article proposes that bureaucratic minorities can adopt strategies based on rewards and costs, manipulation of decision procedures, and information to bypass or exploit their status to influence policy. The choice and effectiveness of these strategies may depend on whether or not the actor is a vertical minority (a subordinate influencing a superior) or a horizontal minority (a representative from a less powerful department influencing other departments). Further investigations of the conditions under which minority players have influence can be part of a much needed revival of the bureaucratic politics perspective on foreign policy-making.

[The five permanent members of the Security Council] noted the threats to peace and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles, and undertook to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well as a regional basis. (Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council, 1991)

The end of the Cold War creates an important moment both politically and analytically.... But if it turns out that despite the dissolution of the blocs, strategic practices remain largely intact, then this suggests another character to the nature of international life. It may turn out that the interpretive and discursive resources that animated the Cold War are more persistent and less amenable to restructuring than celebrants of a new world order might claim. (Klein, 1994: 121-2)

Diversionary foreign policy is a traditional means employed by governments with domestic political problems. This short article hints at the diversionary role of the Maastricht Treaty as an international commitment for domestic economic policy. Moreover, it emphasizes the crucial role of the European commitment imposed by the Treaty, reinforcing the political stabilization effect for the ruling elites. Empirical evidence for these two parts of the argument is given by demonstrating a structural break in fiscal policy and the significant part played by national support for European integration and the EU since 1992.