Diversionary foreign policy is a traditional means employed by governments with domestic political problems. This short article hints at the diversionary role of the Maastricht Treaty as an international commitment for domestic economic policy. Moreover, it emphasizes the crucial role of the European commitment imposed by the Treaty, reinforcing the political stabilization effect for the ruling elites. Empirical evidence for these two parts of the argument is given by demonstrating a structural break in fiscal policy and the significant part played by national support for European integration and the EU since 1992.
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