Cooperation and Conflict

The article focuses on game-theoretic explanations of some special features of East- West trade. In particular, the fact that there is a rather low level of economic cooperation between the parties, even though a higher level would undoubtedly benefit both, is discussed in the light of the Edgeworth Box and elementary games. The games utilized in the explanation and analysis are 2 x 2 games of non-zero-sum variety. Moreover, we discuss the role of threats and 'envy' as determinants of the outcomes. We argue that the rather simple apparatus we use goes a long way towards explaining why there is some cooperation between East and West and, on the other hand, why its level is low.

The primary aim of this article is to present an inventory of the propositions that have been made concerning the ways in which small states can exercise influence over Great Powers. The paradox of relatively resourceless states sometimes being able to exercise substantial influence in international relations received some attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The weak state — powerful state relations have, however, also been dealt with in a number of more recent studies, some of which have discussed the 'paradox of weak state power'.

In this article we revisit the subject area and take stock of the work by presenting the factors which have been mentioned as conceivable explanations to the phenom enon. The factors are divided into two groups, with four and three subcategories, respectively. The first group consists of the propositions which focus on 'power bases' and statements about the effects of various basic conditions in the international system. The second group contain the propositions which discuss more 'direct' conceivable causes, such as certain strategies and tactics open to the smaller states.

It is often asserted that instabilities in world markets are transmitted into and exert destabilizing effects upon the national economies and domestic socio-political systems of LDCs. Yet our knowledge of these linkages is scant, owing partly to the unintegrated state of prior theory and empirical research. This paper draws together the disparate literature on international economic and domestic political instabilities, specifies types of linkage between them, and formulates a framework to organize empirical research. Two broad categories of linkage are identified: (1) those issuing from exposure to volatilities in world markets for the goods and commodities that LDCs export and import; and (2) those stemming from participation in markets for capital, technology, and other factors of production. The second category is partitioned into two subtypes: transnational corporations and international financial institutions. Conceptual and methodological problems attendant to the modeling and testing of these relationships are also discussed.