This paper examines key crisis management provisions of the IEA Agreement in relation to the interests of member countries in energy security cooperation' and considers ways these interests might be further served by altering the agreement. Two observations underlie both the motivation and thrust of this investigation. The first is that the potential benefits to members of energy security cooperation are likely to be substantial.' Thus, it may be assumed that TEA members have an incentive to find methods inside or outside the agreement for reaping at least part of these gains. Given these incentives, it is important to consider how potential gains from cooperation can be achieved in practice.
BadgerD.BelgraveR. (1982). Oil Supply and Price: What Went Right in 1980? Energy Paper No. 2 (London, Policy Studies Institute and the Royal Institute of International Affairs).
2.
BohiD. R. (1983). “What Causes Oil Price Shocks?” Discussion Paper D-82S. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
3.
BohiD. R.MontgomeryW. D. (1982). Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Import Policy. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
4.
BohiD. R.QuandtW. B. (1984). Energy Security in the 1980s: Economic and Political Perspectives. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
5.
CanzoneriM.GrayJ. (1983). “Two Essays on Monetary Policy in an Interdependent World.” International Finance Discussion Paper 219. Washington, D C.: Federal Reserve Board.
6.
ChaoH.PeckS. (1982). “Coordination of OECD Oil Import Policies: A Gaming Approach.” Energy—the International Journal, 7: 213-20.
7.
DevarajanS.HubbardR. G.WeinerR. (1983). “The Coordination of Worldwide Stockpiles of Oil.” Energy and Environmental Policy Center. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy and Managment, Philadelphia.
8.
General Accounting Office (1983). Assessment of U.S. Participation in the International Energy Agency's Fourth Test of the Emergency Sharing Allocation System. Washington, D.C.: GAO.
9.
HardinR. (1982). Collective Action. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
10.
HoganW. (1983). “Oil Stockpiling: Help Thy Neighbor.” The Energy Journal4: 49-72.
11.
Inside Energy/with Federal Lands (1984a). “Pearlman, Wendt Parley in France Over Use of Oil Stocks in an Emergency.” Washington, D.C.: McGraw-Hill.
12.
Inside Energy/ith Federal Lands (1984b). “U.S. Allies Disagree on Use of Oil Stocks.” Washington, D.C.:McGraw-Hill
13.
ManneA. S. (1982). “The Potential Gains from Joint Action by Oil Importing Nations.” Energy Vulnerability, J. Plummer, ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
14.
OlsonM.ZeckhauserR. (1966). “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics40: 266-79.
15.
RowenH.WeyantJ. (1982). “Reducing the Economic Impacts of Oil Supply Interruptions: An International Perspective,” The Energy Journal3: 1-34.
16.
RungeC. F. (1981). “Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics63: 595-606.
17.
SchellingT. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
18.
VerlegerP.Jr. (1982). Oil Markets in Turmoil. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
19.
WendtE. A. (1984). “International Energy Security: The Continuing Challenge.” Current Policy Paper no. 612. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.
20.
WillrichM.ConantM. A. (1977). “The International Energy Agency: An Interpretation and Assessment.” The American Journal of International Law71: 199-223.
