The move to deregulate natural gas field markets is likely to stimulate changes in the way the downstream segments of the industry are regulated. In particular, because the uncertainty endemic to freer upstream markets will emerge for the first time in the contemporary gas industry, the relative merits of having pipelines perform different economic functions will be altered. Producers and distributors will also, in varying degrees, face greater price uncertainty than before. This will lead to changes in the desired allocation of risk and incentives associated with activities traditionally carried out by transmission companies.
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3.
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