The structure of taxes and fiscal contracts between host countries and foreign companies has major implications for the success of oil development projects. This is because of several key characteristics of such projects: large investment outlays, long lead times to project completion, and long periods of project output and payout. These characteristics usually are coupled with an incomplete sharing of information and technology, and significant differences in the ability of the various parties to bear the risks involved. These characteristics often lead to unstable contracts and, in many cases, to the failure to develop projects that are economically attractive in aggregate terms but unattractive to one or both parties because of uncertainties over sharing project risks and returns.
AgmonTamirDonald R.LessardJames L.Paddock (1981). “Financing Petroleum Development in Developing Countries,” M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Working Paper No. MIT-EL 81-059 WP, September 1981, revised and updated version forthcoming in July 1984 The Energy Journal.
2.
BardhanPranab K.SrinivasanT. N. (1971). “Crop Sharing Tenancy in Agriculture: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” American Economic Review, March. (1982).
3.
BatesonRichard F. (1982). “Problems of Evaluation of Large Projects in an International Setting from a Financial and Game Theoretical Perspective.” Unpublished Master’s thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School.
4.
BellClivePinhasZusman (1976). “A Bargaining Theoretic Approach to Cropsharing Contracts.” American Economic Review, September.
5.
BravermanAvishayJoseph E.Stiglitz (1982). “Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets.” American Economic Review, September.
6.
BrealeyRichardStewartMyers (1982). Principles of Corporate Finance. New York: McGraw Hill.
7.
CavoulacosPanayotis E. (1982). “Financial Evaluation of Oil and Gas Exploration and Development in Greece.” Unpublished Master’s thesis, M. I.T. Sloan School.
8.
ConradRobert F. (1982). “A Financial Analysis of the Proposed Ecuadorian Service Contract System.” Harvard Institute for International Development, June.
9.
EssexLeonard R. “Tax Considerations for Financing International Projects: The Case of Exploration and Development in Ecuador.” Unpublished Masters thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School.
10.
FamaEugene F. (1980). “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy88, 21.
11.
GillisMalcolm,Taxation and Mining: Nonfuel Minerals in Bolivia mid Other Countries. Cambridge: Ballinger.
12.
HerlihyJohn (1982). “Risk Sharing in Oil Exploration Contracts: A Comparative Analysis.” Unpublished Master’s thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School.
13.
JacobyHenry D.PaddockJames L. (1983). “World Oil Prices and Economic Growth in the 1980s.” The Energy Journal, April.
14.
JensenMichael C.iMeckiingWilliam H. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics3,4 (Oct.): 305-60.
15.
LelandHayne (1977). “Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources with Applications to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS.” Working Paper No. 38, Graduate School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
16.
MathiasMartinsen P. (1982). “Capital Budgeting in Petroleum Extraction.” Unpublished Master’s thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School.
17.
Nevvbery DavidM.G. (1977). “Risk Sharing, Sharecropping and Uncertain Labor Markets.” Review of Econom ic Studies, October.
18.
PaddockJames L. (1982). “Oil Price Forecasts Through 2000.” Unpublished memorandum, M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, March.
19.
PetscheckJay R.SiegelBarbara A. (1982). “The Toll Contract as an Altema-tive Form of Project Financing: Ecuador-A Case Study.” Unpublished Master’s thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School.
20.
DavidSmithWellsLouis (1975). “M ineral Aereements in Develouinina Countries: Structure and Substance.” American Journal of International Law, July.
21.
SmithJames L.PaddockJames L. (1984). “Regional Modellingof Oil Discovery and Production.” Energy Economic, January.
22.
TompldnsJames D. (1982). “Petroleum Exploration and Development Contracts.” Unpublished Master’s thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School.
