Abstract
The article is devoted to critical reconsideration of the logic of modern brain-mind studies. The classical distinction between two experimental approaches should be kept in mind: (1) the psychophysiological approach, in which mind and behavior represent a set of independent variables, and brain represents a set of dependent variables; and (2) the biopsychological approach, in which, to the contrary, the brain represents a set of independent variables, and mind, that of dependent variables. For studying neurophysiological basis of mind and consciousness, the use of the former approach alone can frequently lead to absurd conclusions. The same is true for the modern functional neuroimaging (FNI) because it follows the same experimental logic, in which it regards the pattern of brain activation as the dependent variable and the experimental task as the independent variable. Only the second approch may permit correct conclusion regarding brain mechanisms of mental activity. The belief that the high precision of FNI allows to overcome this limitation is an illusion, because the limitation is of logical nature and not caused by insufficient precision of a measurement technique. In contrast, FNI is extremely useful in elucidating psychological problems in the proper sense and in exploring important issues of psychological theory. Therefore, psychologists, rather than neurophysiologists, should be the main beneficiaries of FNI.
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