The authors expand on research evaluating public school response to school choice policies by considering the particular influence of voucher programs for disabled students—a growing type of choice program that may have different implications for public school systems from those of more conventional choice programs. The authors provide a theoretical framework to show that special education vouchers could influence both school quality and the likelihood that a school will choose to identify the marginal child as disabled. Using a rich panel data set from Florida, the authors find some evidence that competition from a voucher program for disabled students decreased the likelihood that a student was diagnosed as having a mild disability and was positively related to academic achievement in the public schools.
AbowdJ.KramarzF.MargolisD. (1999). High-wage workers and high-wage firms. Econometrica, 67, 251–333.
2.
AndrewsM. J.SchankT.UpwardR. (2004). Practical estimation methods for linked employer-employee data. Discussion Papers 29, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
3.
BettingerE. P. (2005). The effect of charter schools on charter students and public schools. Economics of Education Review, 24, 133–147.
4.
BifulcoR.LaddH. F. (2006). The impact of charter schools on student achievement: Evidence from North Carolina. Journal of Education Finance and Policy, 1, 50–90.
5.
BookerK.GilpatricS. M.GronbergT.JansenD. (2008). The effect of charter schools on traditional public school students in Texas: Are children who stay behind left behind?Journal of Urban Economics, 64, 123–145.
6.
BuddinR.ZimmerR. (2004). Is charter school competition in California improving the performance of traditional public schools?Unpublished manuscript.
7.
CaucuttE. (2001). Peer group effects in applied general equilibrium. Economic Theory, 17, 25–51.
8.
ChakrabartiR. (2005). Impact of voucher design on public school performance: Evidence from Florida and Milwaukee voucher programs (Working paper). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
9.
CullenJ. B. (2001). The impact of fiscal incentives on student disability rates. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1557–1589.
10.
CullenJ. B.RebackR. (2002). Tinkering toward accolades: School gaming under a performance accountability system. Unpublished manuscript.
11.
DhueyE.LipscombS. (2008). The effects of fiscal incentives in special education: Evidence from finance reform. Unpublished manuscript.
12.
EppleD.RomanoR. (1998). Competition between public and private schools, vouchers and peer group effects. American Economic Review, 88, 33–62.
13.
EppleD.RomanoR. (2002, November). Educational vouchers and cream skimming (NBER Working Paper No. 9354). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
14.
FiglioD. N.GetzlerL. S. (2002). Accountability, ability, and disability: Gaming the system (Working Paper 9307). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
15.
FiglioD.RouseC. E. (2006). Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools?Journal of Public Economics, 90, 239–255.
Florida Department of Education, Bureau of Exceptional Education and Student Services. (n.d.). Students with disabilities enrollment, ages 6–21, 2008–09. Retrieved from http://www.fldoe.org/ese/pdf/b-621.pdf
18.
GillB.BookerK. (2008). School competition and student outcomes. In LaddH. F.FiskeE. B. (Eds.), Handbook of research in education finance and policy (pp. 183–202). New York, NY: Routledge.
19.
GreeneJ. P.ForsterG. (2002). Effects of funding incentives on special education enrollment. Manhattan Institute, Civic Report 32.
20.
GreeneJ. P.WintersM. A. (2003). When schools compete: The effects of vouchers on Florida public school achievement. Manhattan Institute.
21.
GreeneJ. P.WintersM. A. (2006). An evaluation of the effect of D.C.’s voucher program on public school achievement and racial integration after one year. Manhattan Institute.
22.
HoxbyC. M. (2002). School choice and school productivity (Or could school choice be a tide that lifts all boats?) (Working Paper 8873). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
23.
HsiehC.UrquiolaM. (2001, November). When schools compete, how do they compete? An assessment of Chile’s Nationwide School Voucher Program. Paper presented at the UCLA/RAND Joint Labor and Population Workshop, Santa Monica, CA.
24.
JacobB. (2005). Accountability, incentives and behavior: Evidence from school reform in Chicago. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 761–796.
25.
KwakS. (2008). The impact of intergovernmental incentives on disability rates and special education spending. Unpublished manuscript.
26.
MacmillanD. L.SipersteinG. N. (2001, August). Learning disabilities as operationally defined by schools. Paper presented at the 2001 LD Summit: Building a Foundation for the Future, Washington, DC.
27.
MahitivanichchaK.ParrishT. (2005). The implications of fiscal incentives on identification rates and placement in special education: Formulas for influencing best practice. Journal of Education Finance, 31, 1–22.
28.
McEwanP. J.CarnoyM. (2000). The effectiveness and efficiency of private schools in Chile’s voucher system. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 22, 213–239.
29.
NechybaT. (1999). School finance induced migration patterns: The impact of private school vouchers. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1, 5–50.
30.
NechybaT. (2000). Mobility, targeting and private school vouchers. American Economic Review, 90, 130–146.
31.
NechybaT. (2003). Introducing school choice into multidistrict public school systems. In HoxbyC. (Ed.), The economics of school choice (pp. 145–194). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
32.
SassT. R. (2005). Charter schools and student achievement in Florida. Unpublished manuscript.
33.
ShepardL. A.SmithM. L.VojirC. P. (1983). Characteristics of pupils identified as learning disabled. American Educational Research Journal, 20, 309–331.
34.
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2009). Table 50: Children 3 to 21 years old served under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Part B, by type of disabil0ity: Selected years, 1976–77 through 2007–08. In U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (Ed.), Digest of Education Statistics (2009 ed.). Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_050.asp
35.
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2009). Table 51: Percentage distribution of students 6 to 21 years old served under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Part B, by educational environment and type of disability: Selected years, fall 1989 through fall 2007. In U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (Ed.), Digest of Education Statistics (2009 ed.). Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_051.asp
36.
WestM. R.PetersonP. (2006). The efficacy of choice threats within school accountability systems: Results from legislatively induced experiments. Economic Journal, 116, C46–C62.
37.
YsseldykeJ.AlgozzineB.EppsS. (1983). A logical and empirical analysis of current practice in classifying students as handicapped. Exceptional Children, 50, 160–166.
38.
YsseldykeJ. E.AlgozzineB.ShinnM. R.McGueM. (1982). Similarities and differences between low achievers and students classified learning disabled. Journal of Special Education, 16, 73–85.
