Teacher performance pay programs are theorized to improve student achievement by incentivizing teachers, but opponents counter that teachers are not motivated by money. We used regression discontinuity techniques and data on a census of the students, teachers, and schools in a large urban minority-majority school district to show receipt of a financial award did not consistently relate to higher mean student test score gains or teachers’ likelihood of retention. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the effects of award receipt rather than award eligibility, differentiating by award amount, and using data from a large district serving predominantly disadvantaged students.
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