Abstract
This study examined the effects of strategic teacher compensation on the retention of teachers in a voluntary participation plan, especially the participation of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers. The first research question conducted a one-way chi-square analysis to determine if the observed retention rates of highly effective teachers were significantly different compared to the retention rates of highly effective teachers who elected to remain compensated by the traditional salary schedule. The study found no significant difference in the retention of highly effective teachers who were compensated by the district’s new strategic compensation plan compared to the retention of highly effective teachers who elected to remain compensated by the traditional salary schedule. The second research question conducted a one-way chi-square analysis to examine strategic compensation plan favorability among hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers; it examined the voluntary strategic plan participation of hard-to-staff teachers compared to the voluntary strategic plan participation of non-hard-to-staff teachers. The study’s results revealed inconclusive findings between voluntary strategic compensation plan participation rates and hard-to-staff and non-hard-to-staff teachers, therefore concluding that the district’s strategic compensation plan was no more favorable to hard-to-staff teachers than to non-hard-to-staff teachers.
Introduction
This study was designed to determine the effects of strategic teacher compensation on the retention of teachers in a voluntary participation plan. The research examined the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System’s (TVAAS’s) single-year individual teacher index results within a small rural school district’s initial three-year implementation period of the Innovation Acceleration Fund grant. Springer and Gardner (2010) found that the design of incentive programs has the potential to lead to dramatic effects on teachers, administrators, and students, determining it essential that educators use the lessons learned from the experiences associated with strategic compensation initiatives to continue both to evaluate and refine such programs to maximize their effectiveness. Because only a few variations of different compensation models have been researched to date, performance pay for teachers is still a faith-based initiative rather than an educational practice (Gratz, 2011). Local district administrations, boards of education, and teachers’ associations could utilize the data from this study to compare traditional compensation policies to the new strategic compensation policies for effectiveness as well as sustainability. Ultimately, this study allowed a small rural school district to evaluate its strategic compensation plan for effectiveness in the areas of student learning, the retention of highly effective teachers, and the retention of hard-to-staff subject area teachers using value-added data. Although the study was limited to a small rural school district, the data from this study could benefit other school districts that desire to examine similar compensation reform.
The purpose of the study was to examine the role that incentives had on the retention of highly effective teachers as defined by the TVAAS. The retention rates of highly effective teachers were identified by using the small rural school district’s four-year TVAAS individual teacher effect results and longitudinal teacher retention data. The volunteer participation rates of hard-to-staff teachers were compared to the volunteer participation rates of non-hard-to-staff teachers in order to determine the teacher favorability that hard-to-staff incentives have on the small rural school district’s plan participation rates.
Two research questions guided this study. The first research question examines if there is a difference in the retention rates of highly effective teachers who participated in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan compared to highly effective teachers who did not participate in the school district’s strategic compensation plan. The second research question seeks to determine if there is a difference in the voluntary participation rates in the district’s strategic compensation plan of hard-to-staff teachers (e.g. special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers) compared to non-hard-to-staff teachers.
Most policies treat teachers like interchangeable widgets rather than acknowledging the striking differences in their effectiveness, specifically when it comes to compensation (Weisberg et al., 2009). Public education’s teacher compensation system is built to retain teachers, disappointingly, at all levels of effectiveness. The present compensation system exerts equal pull on effective and ineffective teachers alike because pay is not linked in any way to performance (Hassel and Hassel, 2010). This study sought to determine the impact that the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan had on the retention of highly effective teachers, specifically those identified in hard-to-staff positions associated with special education, high school mathematics, high school chemistry and physics, and high school foreign languages, including high school language arts. The results of this study will benefit other school district administrators who desire to explore similar strategic compensation initiatives.
Literature review
Springer and Gardner (2010) found it hard not to hear conversations about teacher pay for performance—sometimes called merit pay, alternative compensation, or strategic compensation—among those who monitor the direction of the USA’s schools and national Race to the Top programs. In the last decade, over 4000 news stories have been reported on teacher pay based on performance (Weingarton, 2007). Although policymakers and the media paid more attention to strategic teacher compensation, Podgursky and Springer (2007b) stated that the concept itself is not new. The concept of teacher pay based on performance dates back to the 1800s when schools were one-room buildings (Protsik, 1996). Protsik (1996) noted that many teachers, most of whom were women, were quite young and only had an elementary education themselves. Teaching was considered temporary until the women married and were then expected to dedicate themselves to motherhood and housekeeping. Their salary consisted of a room-and-board compensation model, which meant that teachers were housed by rotating residence among student homes during the school year (Springer and Gardner, 2010).
As the nation’s economy shifted from agriculture to industry, the purpose or role of schools shifted (Protsik, 1996). Multiroom buildings where students were separated by age and ability slowly replaced the one-room schoolhouses, and the teacher compensation model changed to a grade-based model (Protsik, 1996). Springer and Gardner (2010) stated that the grade-based model was intended to reflect the differences in the skill level needed to educate children in a particular grade. The grade-based model became increasingly unpopular with teachers as compensation was usually negotiated between the individual teacher and the local school board. Kershaw and McKean (1962) found that the grade-based model was far from fair as high school teachers were usually paid more because it was believed that elementary students were easier to educate. Kershaw and McKean also stated that women were typically assigned to elementary schools, where they usually earned around half as much as their male counterparts. After World War II, school districts began to implement single-salary schedules, the current norm of today (Podgursky, 2008).
Springer and Gardner (2010) stated that the single-salary or traditional salary schedule was based on the criteria of degrees obtained and years of teaching experience, and that these were both deemed to be most important during the time period. Podgursky’s (2008) study revealed that nearly 96% of the public school districts account for nearly 100% of the use of the traditional salary schedule to compensate teachers today. Podgursky noted that the distinguishing characteristic of the traditional salary schedule is that the salary class to which the classroom teacher is assigned depends on the professional qualifications of the teacher rather than the school level or teaching assignment. Kershaw and McKean (1962) stated that the traditional salary schedule was regarded as bringing a feeling of contentment and professionalism into teaching. Podgursky (2008) stated that a teacher would no longer be an elementary teacher, but a teacher on an equal footing in the profession that included all teachers.
By 1951, 98% of all urban school districts used the traditional salary schedule (Kershaw and McKean, 1962). Murphy (1990) concluded that the traditional salary schedule was seen by some commentators of the time as an important victory for the feminist struggles for equal pay, since most elementary school teachers were women and most high school teachers were men. Podgursky (2008) concluded that the unification of elementary and secondary salaries for schoolteachers was embraced by the National Education Association as well as the American Federation of Teachers, both of which remain strong proponents of the traditional salary schedule. Springer and Gardner (2010) discovered that the traditional salary schedule was widely accepted by most school districts across the USA and that the traditional salary schedule had received criticism from many reformers of teacher compensation, such as Hanushek et al. (1999) and Podgursky and Springer (2007a). Reform efforts of teacher compensation systems (e.g. career ladders, knowledge-and-skills-based pay, and merit pay systems) were implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s. These attempts to reform teacher pay were unsuccessful because of the inability to accurately and adequately measure the output of teachers or provide performance monitoring (Podgursky and Springer, 2007a). Springer and Gardner (2010) identified the lack of efficient performance monitoring and the complexities of measuring student learning as two of the reasons why pay for performance failed.
As more researchers, such as Bryan Hassel, Dan Katzir, Jane Hannaway, Adam Urbanske, and Brad Jupp (Hassel, 2002), began to realize the importance of preparing all students for higher academic success in the USA’s rapidly changing global economy as a national imperative, policymakers, businesses, and philanthropic organizations have fervently researched, proposed, implemented, and shared educational improvement strategies, among which strategic compensation continues to surface as a solution. Hassel (2002) and Battelle for Kids (2010a) stated that educational policymakers have an unprecedented understanding that great teachers and leaders make great schools. Educational policymakers understand that effective policy is essential to determine effective ways to recruit, retain, recognize, and reward the most effective teachers and leaders. Therefore, the people who school districts recruit into teaching, and how policies affect teacher attrition, will be strategically important for maximizing student growth and achievement for the future (Battelle for Kids, 2010b).
An international expert on education finance and teacher compensation, and the author of Design performance measures to award the most valued school goals and objectives. Award and measure performance improvement by assessment instruments to ensure performance improvement. Identify performance measures that are clear and transparent. Establish stretch goals and objectives that are obtainable yet produce identified improvements to student outcomes. Implement school-based performance incentives rather than individual teacher-focused incentives. Provide annual performance incentives for improving student outcomes. Create the bonus size to be large enough to garner teachers’ attention, but not too high as to deter teachers from striving to achieve important but unrewarded goals of the school. Clarify participation and eligibility ground rules. Design the funding mechanism to withstand variations in resource availability over time.
Although Odden suggested that school districts explore establishing fixed-bonus pools to combat a lack of constant funding, Hanushek et al. (1999) warned against the use of such rank-order tournaments that exhaust the pool of money based on the number of schools and teachers who earn the bonus. Hanushek et al. stated that most states and districts have been reluctant to implement rank-order tournaments and zero-sum games in part because of union opposition. Odden (2008) also claimed that such rank tournaments undercut teacher motivation by developing distrust in the district in future years.
Ballou and Podgursky (1993) found that the majority of teachers opposed merit pay in principle, but identified strong evidence that teachers did not seem demoralized or hostile toward merit pay in the districts where it existed. Ballou and Podgursky noted that teachers’ first-hand experience with merit pay was not negative while teachers of low-achieving students generally supported merit pay. Murnane and Cohen (1986) concluded that the relationship between teacher quality and pay must be examined. Research by Hanushek et al. (1999) identified a lack of teacher quality to be a known determinant of student achievement, while research by Hanushek and Rivkin (2004) stated that attention to teacher quality was warranted to improve student outcomes.
Hanushek and Rivkin (2004) observed a large number of teachers exiting the teaching profession within the first few years. Research by Hanushek et al. (1999) observed that over 25% of teachers who teach students in the bottom achievement quartile of schools leave teaching each year. However, the same research showed that teachers who teach students in the upper achievement quartile are less likely to exit public schools. Overall, analysis of Hanushek et al.’s research suggested that current employment policies do not appear to offer much promise for improvement in student performance, and recommended that school districts focus on other ways to improve the quality of teaching and achievement. Although the empirical evidence provided by Hanushek et al. raised mixed doubts over the link between teacher quality and pay, Podgursky (2008) concluded that such a position may be changing, as public concern for school performance and teacher quality is creating pressure to reform aspects of the teacher compensation system. Whether schools can effectively buy better teachers is an important question for education policy (Hanushek et al., 1999). Podgursky and Springer (2007a) stated that more studies are needed; however, the studies that have been conducted are generally positive and provide a strong case for further policy experimentation in the area of strategic compensation by states and school districts.
Method
This ex-post-facto research study contributes to the professional literature concerning the effect of strategic compensation on teacher retention by utilizing a quantitative quasi-experimental-method approach that investigated the retention rates of highly effective teachers and the participation rates of hard-to-staff teachers as a result of the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan. Ex-post-facto research is appropriate when the independent variables are active and unable to be manipulated by the researcher. Quasi-experimental designs are necessary to examine intact groups that are already complete (Ary et al., 2010). The purpose of the study was to examine the role that incentives play in the retention of highly effective teachers as defined by the TVAAS. The retention rates of highly effective teachers were identified by using the small rural school district’s four-year TVAAS individual teacher effect results and longitudinal teacher retention data during the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. The volunteer participation rates of hard-to-staff teachers, which comprised 69% of the population of teachers in the small rural school district, were compared to the volunteer participation rates of non-hard-to-staff teachers in order to determine the favorability that hard-to-staff incentives had on the small rural school district’s plan participation rates. For the purpose of this study, hard-to-staff teachers were defined as those teaching in special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school languages. Non-hard-to-staff teachers were all the other teachers teaching in areas not mentioned above.
Instrumentation
The first research question used the TVAAS single-year individual teacher index results from the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. The TVAAS measures the impact that schools and teachers have on their students’ academic progress, not whether the student is proficient in the state assessment (Tennessee Department of Education, n.d.). The TVAAS furnishes each Tennessee school district with value-added information for Grades 3–8 in reading/English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies by using the scale scores from the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program. The TVAAS also covers subject-matter-specific comparable data for Grades 9–12. Individual teacher effect data, which reports the rate of student learning, is reported to the teacher, appropriate administrators, and school board members, but not to the public (McLean and Sanders, 1984).
Research Question 1 was as follows: Is there a difference in the retention rates of the highly effective teachers—those identified as Level 4 or Level 5 in their individual teacher effect (value-added) results—who participated in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan compared to the highly effective teachers who did not participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan? The TVAAS single-year individual teacher index results from the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years were examined in conjunction with the small rural school district’s teacher retention data in order to determine the retention rates of highly effective teachers. Teachers without TVAAS single-year individual teacher index results and/or those teachers below a Level 4 designation from the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years were eliminated for Research Question 2.
Research Question 2 was as follows: Is there a difference in the voluntary participation rates of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers compared to non-hard-to-staff teachers as a result of the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan? Research Question 2 was also quantitative in nature and sought to determine the favorability of hard-to-staff bonuses by examining the small rural school district’s volunteer teacher participation rates of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers compared to non-hard-to-staff teachers during the 2012–2013 school year. The 2012–2013 school year represented the initial year when current teachers continuously employed by the small rural school district declared permanent enrollment with the existing state salary schedule or declared transfer of enrollment to the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan. Hard-to-staff bonuses were intended to encourage the retention of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers.
Participants
The potential participants for the study included 134 teachers employed by the small rural school district during the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. The gender composition of the teachers in the study consisted of a majority of females (76.9%), as indicated in Table 1.
Percentage of male and female teachers.
All of the teachers employed during the 2011–2012 school year were eligible to voluntarily pilot the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan with the option of returning to the original state salary schedule prior to the 2012–2013 school year without loss of salary or benefits. The teachers employed during the 2012–2013 school year permanently returned to the traditional salary schedule or permanently enrolled in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan by affidavit prior to the beginning of the 2012–2013 school year. All new teachers employed during the 2012–2013 school year or beyond were required to enroll in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan on initial employment. Research Question 1 included 42.5% of the total population of both participant and non-participant teachers who had annual TVAAS single-year individual teacher index results for reading/English language arts and mathematics in Grades 3–5 and reading/English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies in Grades 6–12 during any of the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. Those teachers who were determined not to have individual teacher effect results during any of the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years were eliminated for Research Question 1.
The teacher participants for Research Question 1 included all highly effective teachers who were both strategic plan participant and non-strategic plan participant teachers of reading/English language arts and mathematics in Grades 3–5 and reading/English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies in Grades 6–12 during any of the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. Teachers without a TVAAS highly effective designation of a Level 4 or Level 5 during any of the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years were eliminated for Research Question 2.
The teacher participants for Research Question 2 included the entire population of 93 teachers employed by the small rural school district during the 2012–2013 school year. The participants included both hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers and those teachers not considered to have a hard-to-staff assignment. The 2012–2013 school year represented the initial year that teachers voluntarily declared permanent enrollment in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan either by transfer of salary schedules or by accepting initial employment with the small rural school district. Therefore, the 2012–2013 school year represented the first year of the small rural school district’s favorability among its 28% of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers.
Data collection and statistical method
The TVAAS individual teacher effect data was collected by the small rural school district’s testing coordinator to ensure confidentiality and to eliminate potential researcher bias. The researcher collected the small rural school district’s strategic compensation participation rates from the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. Research Question 1 only analyzed the TVAAS single-year individual teacher index results of highly effective teachers—those identified as a Level 4 or Level 5 as determined by the TVAAS from the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. Research Question 1 analyzed single-year individual teacher index results for all teachers with TVAAS data for reading/English language arts and mathematics in Grades 3–5 and reading/English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies in Grades 6–12. The teachers’ names were collected in non-identifiable form, and the data-collection spreadsheets were destroyed after the SPSS analysis.
For Research Question 1, a one-variable chi-square analysis was used to analyze the hypothesized statistical relationship between the retention frequencies of highly effective teachers who participated in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan compared to highly effective teachers who did not participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan. The chi-square test determined if the observed retention frequencies of highly effective teachers who had elected to remain employed with the small rural school district were a good fit with the actual retention frequencies of all teachers employed by the small rural school district during any of the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years.
For Research Question 2, the researcher collected the participation rates of all hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers employed in the small rural school district during the 2012–2013 school year. A comparison of the voluntary participation rates of hard-to-staff participants and the non-voluntary participant rates of hard-to-staff participants was made to determine teacher favorability of the small rural school district’s strategic plan’s hard-to-staff component. The teachers’ names were collected in non-identifiable form, and the data-collection spreadsheets were destroyed after the SPSS analysis.
A one-variable chi-square analysis was used to analyze a hypothesized statistical relationship between the participation frequencies of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers who voluntarily elected to participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan during the 2012–2013 school year compared to the participation frequencies of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers who elected not to participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan during the 2012–2013 school year. The chi-square test determined if the observed participation frequencies of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers who voluntarily elected to participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan during the 2012–2013 school year were a good fit with the participation frequencies of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers who elected not to participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan during the 2012–2013 school year. SPSS was used for the analysis.
Limitations
The results from this study are not generalizable to other school districts. Results can only be summarized for the population used within a study. The variety of strategic compensation plans among different districts and states prevents the study from being widely generalizable to other school districts. Additionally, the small sample size of 134 teachers, of whom only 42.5% had individual teacher effect (value-added) data, in a district of less than 1300 students also inhibits the results from this study being generalizable to larger school districts and teacher populations.
The quantitative design of this study did not account for qualitative factors that influence teacher quality and, in turn, student learning, therefore minimizing the strength of the conclusions that the researcher interpreted. Because the quasi-experimental design did not provide for full manipulation of the independent variables, the reader should consider the internal and external threats to validity.
Results
The participants in this study consisted of the entire population of 134 teachers employed by the small rural school district during the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years. All of the teachers employed during these school years were eligible to voluntarily participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan either by transfer from the original traditional salary schedule or by accepting initial employment beginning in the 2011–2012 school year. Table 2 provides an overview of the percentage of strategic compensation plan participants and non-participant teachers who voluntarily selected the new strategic compensation plan or the existing traditional salary schedule.
Participation of teachers in the strategic compensation plan.
Overall, during the 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, and 2014–2015 school years, 69% of the teachers voluntarily elected to join the new strategic compensation plan.
For Research Question 1, is there a difference in the retention rates of the highly effective teachers who participated in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan compared to the highly effective teachers who did not participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan? A one-way chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if the observed frequencies and expected frequencies were equal for each category. The retention of highly effective teachers who participated in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan did not differ significantly compared to the highly effective teachers who did not participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan: χ2(1,
Research Question 2 examined the difference in the voluntary participation rates of hard-to-staff teachers compared to non-hard-to-staff teachers using a one-way chi-square analysis. The analysis was conducted to determine if the observed frequencies and expected frequencies were equal for each category. The voluntary participation rates of the hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan did not differ significantly compared to the non-hard-to-staff teachers: χ2(1,
Discussion and conclusions
The overall results of this study were inconclusive. The results for Research Question 1 were not significant when examining the difference in the retention rates of highly effective teachers who did and did not participate in the small rural school district’s strategic compensation plan. Eighty-eight percent (
Similar inconclusive results were found for Research Question 2. Sixty-nine percent (
Each year, this small rural school district struggles to find enough qualified special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers, while fielding an endless supply of elementary applicants (Assistant Director of Schools, personal communication, 6 November 2011). Although research by Hanushek and Rivkin (2004) and Podgursky (2008) repetitively referenced the traditional salary schedule as a major reason why there are continuous shortages of mathematics and science teachers, who discover better earning opportunities in careers outside teaching because the traditional salary schedule fails to address the pay differentials by teaching certifications, this study was statistically unable to substantiate such claims. A goal of this study was to examine the volunteer participation rates of hard-to-staff special education, high school mathematics, high school science, and high school language teachers compared to non-hard-to-staff teachers in order to determine possible favorability that annual incentives have on the hard-to-staff component of the district’s strategic compensation plan.
The differences in the voluntary participation rates of hard-to-staff and non-hard-to-staff teachers during the 2011–2012 school year, when the teachers were required to make permanent selections to remain on the traditional salary schedule or join the new strategic compensation schedule, were not statistically significant. The researcher can conclude that the annual bonus incentives provided to hard-to-staff teachers did not have a negative effect on the voluntary participation rates of hard-to-staff teachers.
Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that during the four-year duration of this study, the small rural school district received numerous academic accolades. These included being named an Exemplary School District by the State Department of Education, twice awarded School District of the Year by the state’s leading philanthropic organization, named a Reward School three times, and being named a National Blue Ribbon high school for closing achievement gaps for economically disadvantaged, racial minority, and special education students. This study provides additional research to the body of literature that examines the relationship between teacher compensation and teacher quality as determined by value-added measures.
Recommendations for future studies
The results of this study can be referred to by other researchers in the field when assessing the benefits of alternative salary schedules compared to those of traditional salary schedules. It is recommended that school district leaders utilize the results from this study to guide self-examinations into the effectiveness that their own teacher compensation plans provide for student growth as determined by value-added results when strategically and purposefully aligning limited fiscal resources with student learning outcomes in an ever-increasing accountability landscape. Since this study did not identify a statistically significant relationship between the small rural school district’s compensation plan and the retention of highly effective teachers, or favorability among hard-to-staff teachers over non-hard-to-staff teachers, additional research into the retention rates of highly effective teachers—particularly those in hard-to-staff areas such as mathematics, foreign languages, science, and special education—is warranted.
Summary
The findings from this study can aid both future researchers and school district leaders in examining baseline salary schedules for effectiveness in student learning, as well as redesigning antiquated models in the absence of federal oversight.
The proponents of strategic compensation understand that the concept is not universally accepted, but state that conversation should be more about systemic change in improving teacher quality than about pay, for which teacher compensation is a critical ingredient (Battelle for Kids, 2010b). Our schools have amazingly powerful teachers, as well as woefully inadequate ones (Hassel and Hassel, 2010), who are merely responding to incentives that are currently imposed on them by the traditional salary schedule (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2004). The traditional salary schedule exerts an equal pull on effective and ineffective teachers alike because pay is not linked in any way to their performance (Hassel and Hassel, 2010), and a failure to account for these differences explains why many studies fail to identify the true relationship between student achievement and teacher compensation (Hanushek et al., 2002). Sadly, principals rarely counsel out or dismiss low-performing teachers. In fact, two out of three low-performing teachers believe that they are above average or even exceptional at their job (Jacob et al., 2012).
To date, only a few variations of different compensation models have been researched, and performance pay for teachers is still a faith-based initiative rather than an educational practice (Gratz, 2011). Encouragingly, Chetty et al. (2011) have identified policies that are raising the quality of teaching by the use of value-added measures. Changes in salary structure and teacher training are likely to yield substantial economic and social benefits to communities in the long run. School districts and their leaders should consider designing effective strategic compensation systems in order to provide meaningful improvements to teacher quality and the retention of those high-performing teachers.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/orpublication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.