Global watch: The state of biological investigations

Abstract

International capabilities must be supported and improved to respond to alleged uses of biological agents.

THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOgies to fight disease and hunger, and to create new carbon-neutral fuel sources, has enormous potential to improve quality of life and mitigate climate change. Some biotechnologies, however, could also potentially be used to create biological weapons designed to incapacitate or kill people or spread livestock and crop diseases. Today, the world lacks effective verification and enforcement mechanisms against the production of biological weapons, which are particularly difficult to detect in part because the relevant materials and manufacturing equipment often have peaceful and medicinal uses. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) includes specific measures for verifying compliance with the chemical weapons ban. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), though it bans countries from acquiring or retaining biological weapons, does not contain comparable verification measures.

This gap highlights the need to strengthen and streamline the detection and investigation of biological attacks once they have occurred. At the request of any U.N. member state, the U.N. secretary-general has the authority to rapidly deploy a team of experts to an attack site and conduct an investigation of the alleged use of biological and toxin weapons, as well as chemical ones, thereby addressing violations of international norms. In the past year, U.N. member states, U.N. bodies, and other international organizations, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO), have provided specific technical advice necessary to refine and strengthen the secretary-general's role. WHO experts cannot participate directly in a U.N. field investigation of alleged biological weapons use. However, the WHO's experience in responding to outbreaks over several years has played an important role in updating the investigation procedures. 1

WMD threats. As early as its first session in 1946, the U.N. General Assembly addressed the problem of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 2 More recently, in 1992 and 1995, the U.N. Security Council confirmed that the proliferation of WMD is a threat to international peace and security. 3 The Security Council also confirmed the need for all U.N. member states to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation of all forms of WMD, often defined as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Responding to increased concerns that non-state actors may acquire and use WMD, the Security Council adopted, in April 2004, Resolution 1540, which obliges all states to enact national measures to counter efforts by non-state actors to develop, acquire, or use WMD.

Many countries over the past decade have expressed increased concerns about biological weapons threats. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the Organization for American States, and other regional organizations have made it clear that nonproliferation and countering biological weapons threats are key priorities. 4 A 2008 report by the U.S. bipartisan Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism focused on nuclear and biological weapons as particularly significant challenges and further pointed out that “terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.” 5 The 2009 U.S. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, while acknowledging this danger, called for expanding the international dialogue on biological threats and stated, in part: “The ongoing revolution in the life sciences is already a global endeavor…. Efforts to restrict or control the enabling materials and knowledge, while helpful in specific contexts, must be carefully defined and targeted.” 6

The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war or armed conflict. 7 In addition, two multilateral treaties, the 1972 BWC and the 1993 CWC, prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, and other acquisition of these weapons. 8 The CWC includes an explicit ban on the use of chemical weapons, while the BWC implicitly bans the use of biological weapons through its prohibitions on acquisition and possession. The CWC also contains an elaborate verification regime with detailed provisions for mandatory declarations and on-site inspections of chemical weapons sites and relevant chemical industry facilities, and a process for investigating the alleged use of chemical weapons.

However, the BWC lacks such structures. In 1995, state parties to the BWC started negotiations on a compliance protocol including on-site inspections to bolster the convention, but the talks collapsed in 2001 when the United States withdrew its support. The failure of the BWC protocol negotiation has heightened the importance of the secretary-general's mechanism related to the investigation of alleged biological weapons use.

today, the world lacks effective verification and enforcement mechanisms against the production of biological weapons, which are particularly difficult to detect in part because the relevant materials and manufacturing equipment often have peaceful and medicinal uses.

Building the secretary-general's investigative capabilities. The investigative role of the secretary-general was defined in a 1982 General Assembly resolution. 9 In response to this resolution, the secretary-general created a roster of qualified international experts and laboratories to devise procedures for conducting and supporting urgent investigations of the alleged use of chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. The secretary-general's new power was soon put to the test. During the Iran-Iraq war, the secretary-general investigated 10 accusations of chemical weapons use between 1984 and 1988. Prompted by allegations of the continued use of chemical weapons during the war—and enforced by broader acceptance of international on-site investigations by U.N. member states—the General Assembly, in 1987, requested that the secretary-general update its procedures. 10 The U.N. revised the field inspection manual, and the report was presented in 1989 to the General Assembly, which unanimously endorsed the updated procedures. 11 Importantly, the revised guidelines affirmed that member states should grant rapid access to U.N. investigating teams.

Today, any member state can trigger the launch of an investigation of alleged use by making a request to the secretary-general. In response, the secretary-general may decide to dispatch a fact-finding team to the scene of the alleged attack, collect relevant evidence in a scientific manner (including environmental and biomedical samples, medical examination of victims, and eyewitness interviews), and report its objective findings to all U.N. member states. The importance of the secretary-general's role was acknowledged in the final document of the 2006 BWC Sixth Review Conference. The 2006 U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy encouraged the secretary-general to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures—something that had not been comprehensively done since 1989. 12 The U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) coordinated the activities to strengthen the secretary-general's capabilities, emphasizing the need for strengthening the biological area. Since then, UNODA has assisted member states in training experts, built a network of supporting international organizations, and developed additional training materials. These efforts by UNODA have resulted in a significantly expanded roster of experts and laboratories. The current roster comprises 237 biological and chemical experts and 42 laboratories, all nominated by 41 U.N. member states. 13 The updated information allows for rapid and targeted selection of appropriate experts and laboratories.

Last year the Swedish government hosted the first training course, which was supported by UNODA, for experts from the roster. Through classes, workshops, and field training, participants gained detailed knowledge on procedural matters, including interviewing witnesses, victims, and medical personnel in hospitals; collecting information from medical records; conducting biological sampling and analysis; and documenting their findings and writing reports. In addition, representatives from the WHO, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and Interpol explained their procedures for carrying out field investigations.

The training course culminated in a four-day practical exercise that involved a realistic scenario: an alleged use of biological weapons during a military conflict that resulted in a tularemia (rabbit fever) outbreak. The participants, divided into two teams, were expected to assess information received on the alleged use and the resulting disease outbreak, prepare mission plans, obtain clarifications and additional information, prepare plans for activities at hospitals and sites of alleged use, compile and evaluate facts, and report findings. Experts from 14 U.N. member states completed the training course.

Partnerships with international organizations. Past allegations of chemical or biological weapons use have been associated with armed conflicts between nations. Now that threat also comes from terrorists. Fact-finding requires the highest level of integrity and credibility. The most appropriate places to find scientific and operational expertise to support the secretary-general are the relevant specialized U.N. agencies and other organizations with recognized expertise and authority in human, animal, and plant diseases. In this regard, UNODA, the WHO, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are important partners. UNODA has established a close collaboration with the WHO, and has maintained a close relationship with both the OIE and FAO. An agreement between the United Nations and OPCW, which implements the CWC, has been in force since 2001. 14 This agreement stipulates that the OPCW shall cooperate closely with the secretary-general in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons involving a state not party to the CWC or in a territory not controlled by a state party, and if requested, that the OPCW shall in such cases place its resources at the disposal of the secretary-general.

Past allegations of chemical or biological weapons use have been associated with armed conflicts between nations. NOW that threat also comes from terrorists. Fact-finding requires the highest level of integrity and credibility.

The intentional dispersal of biological agents might be detected initially as an outbreak of infectious disease. In such a case, the WHO might already be in the country contributing to a public health response before an allegation of weapons use even arises. The WHO operates under the legal and operational framework of the 2005 revision of the International Health Regulations for activities regarding prevention and control of the international spread of infectious diseases. 15 Among other things, the WHO develops capacities for outbreak detection and response in its 193 member states. Furthermore, specialized networks such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), coordinated by the WHO, are very active in responding to public health emergencies worldwide. Since 2000, the WHO and GOARN have responded to more than 50 events worldwide with more than 400 experts providing field support to 40 countries. 16

The experience gathered from the WHO's work could be of relevance in a fact-finding mission of the secretary-general. A work plan between the WHO and UNODA for developing closer technical collaboration was prepared in January 2009 and includes contribution to the review process of the secretary-general's investigation manuals and procedures and development of a process for sharing information (such as baseline public health data). The WHO has expressed its intention to provide technical support to the secretary-general if he initiates an investigation. The WHO has also instructed its Global Alert and Response Department to develop mechanisms aimed at providing relevant support—for example, by sharing necessary equipment, field experience, and lessons learned—to an investigation. The proposed approach would ensure that during an investigation, the WHO would focus solely on its public health mandate and public health interventions, while avoiding politically more sensitive determinations concerning biological weapons use. A formal agreement between the WHO and UNODA is under consideration.