Abstract
Russia reduced its total nuclear weapon stockpile by about 1,000 warheads during the last year; however, it still has the largest arsenal in the world. As of early 2008, we estimate that Russia has approximately 5,200 nuclear warheads in its operational stockpile and 8,800 in reserve or awaiting dismantlement, for a total of 14,000 nuclear weapons. 1 Other nuclear-related developments in Russia include a resurgence of the importance of nuclear weapons in its security posture, an increase in force exercises and missile test-launches, and an upgrade to Moscow's air defenses.
Snapshot
U.S. plans for building missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic provoked nuclear threats from the Russian military. Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, chief of Russia's Strategic Missile Command (SMC), repeatedly stated that such a system would be a potential target for Russian nuclear weapons. 4 “We have to take appropriate measures to prevent the weakening of Russia's nuclear deterrence under any circumstances. And I do not rule out that… some intercontinental ballistic missiles could be aimed at these Polish and Czech facilities,” he said in December 2007. 5 Putin echoed this attitude in February 2008, warning that if Ukraine joined NATO and decided to host missile defense sites, “Russia will have to point its warheads at Ukrainian territory.” 6
However, Solovtsov hinted in December that Moscow's opposition could be softened if the United States limited the system's size. “If the Americans signed a treaty with us that they would only deploy 10 antimissile rockets in Poland and one radar in the Czech Republic and will never put anything else there, then we could deal with this,” he said. 7
Russia has intensified both the visibility and magnitude of its military exercises. Russian strategic bombers resumed long-range exercises in the North Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific, and Black Sea, conducting more than 70 flights and 217 test-launches of air-launched missiles between August and December 2007. 8 For the first time in 15 years, a Russian naval task force journeyed to the Mediterranean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean, headed by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. The nuclear-capable naval strike force conducted a two-month cruise that included the Slava-class guided-missile cruiser Moskva, launching nuclear-capable SS-N-12 cruise missiles and SA-N-6 surface-to-air missiles against simulated targets. The Russian Navy said the ships carried a full combat ammunition load; however, we do not believe this included nuclear weapons. The goal of the sorties was “to ensure a naval presence in tactically important regions of the world ocean,” said Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. 9 Navy Commander-in-Chief Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said Russia plans to carry out similar naval exercises every six months and “to do all we can to build up our presence where Russia has strategic interests.” 10
As the naval force made its way back to Russia in January 2008, more than 40 aircraft, including an unknown number of Tu-160 Blackjacks, six Tu-95 MS Bears, and eight Tu-22 M3 Backfires conducted simulated strikes against it in the Bay of Biscay.
On February 8, 2008, in the western Pacific south of Japan, a Tu-95 MS6 Bear bomber buzzed the U.S. carrier Nimitz twice, flying over it at the low altitude of about 2,000 feet as another bomber circled in the distance; both Russian aircraft were “escorted” by U.S. F/A-18 fighters. It was a type of action not uncommon during the Cold War, and U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead said, “I do not consider it to be provocative.” “What we are seeing is a Russian military or Russian Navy that is emerging and, in the case of the navy, desiring to emerge as a global navy,” he said. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright called the operations a “return to a Cold War mind-set” and said the Pentagon was assessing “what message was intended by this overflight.” 11 Between August and December 2007, more than 120 NATO planes intercepted Russian aircraft. 12
THE RUSSIAN ARSENAL
O ne Pacific-based Delta III has been converted to missile test-launch platform.
As a Skiff replacement, the Sineva probably carries four MIRVs, but U.S. intelligence sets the capability at up to 10 warheads per missile.
A sixteenth Tu-160 is undergoing trials.
Two Gorgon launch sites may no longer be operational, in which case 84, not 100, ABM warheads remain.
An additional 8,808 intact warheads are estimated to be in reserve or awaiting dismantlement, making the total stockpile approximately 14,000 weapons.
ABM: Antiballistic missile
ACM: Advanced cruise missile
ALCM: Air-launched cruise missile
ASM: Air-to-surface missile
ASW: Antisubmarine weapon
DB: Depth bomb
ICBM: I ntercontinental ballistic missile
MIRV: Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
SAM: Surface-to-air missile
SLBM: Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM: Sea-launched cruise missile
SRAM: Short-range attack missile
Despite the Russian government's nuclear rhetoric and posturing, an independent 2007 poll conducted for the University of Maryland found that 63 percent of Russians support elimination of nuclear weapons and that 59 percent support the removal of Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons from high alert. 13
The total number of Russian ICBMs dropped by 63 compared with a year ago; Russia now deploys approximately 1,600 nuclear warheads on 430 ICBMs of five types. The number of silo-based Topol-M ICBMs reached 48 across five regiments; deployment will be completed in 2010 with a total of 50 missiles. 16 Slow deployment of the mobile Topol-M missiles continued at the 54th missile regiment in Teykovo northeast of Moscow, with a total of six operational single-warhead missiles. By 2015, the Russian government plans an operational force of 34 mobile Topol-Ms, which will require the yearly deployment (on average) of four missiles. 17
Russia announced in 2007 that it would begin deploying a new ICBM with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in a few years. It conducted two flight-tests of MIRVed Topol-Ms in 2007. In order to avoid violating START, which prohibits increasing the number of warheads on existing missiles but not building new missiles, Russia calls the modified Topol-M the “RS-24,” instead of RS-12M1 or RS-12M2, its respective names for the mobile-and silo-based Topol-Ms. The MIRVed Topol-M is scheduled to become operational in 2009.
Russia continued to downsize its SS-25 ICBM force in 2007, withdrawing about 40 missiles from service and leaving approximately 200 deployed. The weapon may remain in operation till 2015. Russia conducted two SS-25 service life extension flight-tests in 2007, on October 18 and December 8, as well as an SS-19 test-launch late in the year.
In March 2006, U.S. intelligence reported that Russia was developing a new ICBM that has not been test-launched but could be deployed in both land- and sea-based versions. 18 In December 2007, an SMC spokesman said that the forces “may adopt a new, more advanced [than the Topol-M] ballistic missile system” for possible deployment by 2017. 19
Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Nikolai Makarov declared in December 2007 that after more than a decade under construction, the first Borey-class SSBN, Yuri Dol-goruki, will finally become operational in 2008. “At the moment, routine tests are under way, they are finishing,” he said. 20 Russia aims to someday have six Borey-class SSBNs, but the second one will probably not be ready until 2010.
Each Borey-class submarine will be equipped with 16 Bulava SLBMs, which are not operational but will have a range of 8,000-9,000 kilometers (5,000-5,600 miles) and are declared by Russia under START to carry six warheads.
In early 2008, the Bryansk, a Delta IV sub, completed a six-year upgrade to the Sineva SLBM, which is a modernized version of the SS-N-23 Skiff. The Sineva first became operational in July 2007 on the Delta IV sub Tula, which later test-launched two Sinevas on December 17 and 25, 2007. All Delta IVs will be upgraded to carry the Sineva.
According to Defense News, in late 2007 Norwegian military intelligence saw “an increase in submarine activity” out of Russia's Northern Fleet base in Murmansk. 21 But new information that we obtained from U.S. naval intelligence under the Freedom of Information Act shows that Russia's general-purpose submarine patrols increased only slightly, from four in 2006 to seven in 2007–significantly fewer than the average of twelve patrols conducted each year during the 1990s. 22 The same information indicates that SSBN patrols decreased to only three in 2007, down from five in 2006 (and none at all in 2002), suggesting that Russia does not maintain continuous SSBN patrols like the United States, Britain, and France, but rather occasionally deploys a few SSBNs for training purposes.
In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin committed to significant reductions in Russia's nonstrategic nuclear arsenal. In October 2007, a Ministry of Defense spokesman provided an update, stating that 100 percent of ground forces warheads (tactical missiles, artillery shells, mines) had been eliminated, as had 60 percent of missile defense warheads (10 percent more than Yeltsin pledged), 50 percent of air force warheads, and 30 percent of naval warheads.
Russia's nonstrategic warhead stockpile, in mid-1991, was approximately 15,00ï. 27 Using this number as a baseline, if the Yeltsin initiative was implemented as the ministry spokesman outlined, Russia would have an estimated 5,390 warheads in its nonstrategic arsenal today. Of these, we estimate that about 2,080 are operational for delivery by antiballistic missiles, air-defense missiles, tactical aircraft, or naval cruise missiles and torpedoes. 28 The remaining 3,310 weapons are in reserve or awaiting dismantlement.
Of the approximately 2,000 nonstrategic warheads for delivery by aircraft, we estimate that roughly 650 are operational. This includes air-to-surface missiles and bombs for delivery by Tu-22 M3 Backfire bombers, and bombs for delivery by Su-24 Fencer fighter-bombers and possibly other tactical aircraft.
Unlike other nuclear weapon states, Russia retains a relatively large inventory of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for delivery by naval vessels and land-based maritime aircraft. We estimate that approximately 698 of 2,270 naval warheads are operational for delivery by approximately 280 submarines, major surface ships, and naval aircraft. The warheads arm cruise missiles, antisubmarine rockets, anti-air missiles, torpedoes, and depth bombs. The number of nuclear-capable ships and submarines has declined from approximately 400 in the 1990s to slightly more than 100 today. We no longer believe that surface ships are assigned nuclear torpedoes, and tactical naval nuclear weapons are not thought to be carried onboard ships and submarines under normal circumstances.
We estimate that Russia has about 1,120 warheads under the “missile defense” category, for use with its A-135 antiballistic missile system surrounding Moscow and the SA-10 Grumble (S-300) air-defense system; however, only about 730 of these warheads are estimated to be operational. Uncertainty abounds about the operational status of parts of the A-135 system; rumors persist that at least two of four Gorgon missile launch sites are no longer operational. All five Gazelle launch sites appear operational, however, and test-launches of the Gazelle, an interceptor missile with a range of 80 kilometers (50 miles), were conducted in 2006 and 2007.
Moreover, in early 2008 the Russian military announced that at sites in northwest Russia, the SA-10 Grumble will soon be replaced by the SA-21 Growler (S-400), which has a range of 400 kilometers (250 miles) and a reported antiballistic missile capability. 29 One Growler regiment is already deployed outside Moscow, with a second to become operational in 2008. Each SA-21 system has about eight launchers, 32 missiles, and a command center; Russia wants at least 18 systems to form the core of its anti-air and missile defenses through at least 2020. 30
Based on these statements, it is possible to make a best estimate of the likely evolution of Russia's strategic nuclear forces over the next 12 years (with the caveat that such projections are fraught with uncertainties). We estimate that in 2015, Russia will have a total of 2,490 strategic nuclear weapons, a 20 percent decrease from today. This comprises 844 ICBM warheads (depending on future warhead loadings), which is a 47 percent reduction; 896 SLBM warheads, a 23 percent increase; and 878 warheads on the bomber force, a slight decrease.
Supplementary Material
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States
Supplementary Material
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat
Footnotes
1.
Essential resources for tracking Russian nuclear forces include: START
memorandums of understanding; the website of Russia's Ministry of
Defense (www.mil.ru/eng/); the U.S. Open Source Center, Russian news
articles; Pavel Podvig's website (www.russianforces.org);
and the database on “Russia: General Nuclear Weapons
Developments,” maintained by the Monterey Institute's
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (
).
2.
“Russia Has Right to ‘Preventative’ Nuclear Strike: General,” Agence France Presse (AFP), January 19,2008.
3.
Dmitry Solovyov, “Russia Says It Must Have Nuclear Parity with U.S.,” Reuters, December 7, 2007.
4.
The organization maintaining the Russian ICBM force is widely known as the Strategic Rocket Forces, but the Russian Ministry of Defense refers to it as the Strategic Missile Command.
5.
“Russia to Double ICBM Launches after 2009–Commander,” RIA Novosti, December 17, 2007.
6.
“Russia Could ‘Point Warheads’ at Ukraine,” Der Spiegel Online, February 13, 2008.
7.
“Russian General Says Missiles Could Target U.S. Shield: Report,” AFP, December 17,2007.
8.
“At Least 120 NATO Interceptor Aircraft Had Escorted Russian Bombers,” Russian Ministry of Defense, press release, December 5,2007.
9.
“Russian Navy to Start Sorties in Atlantic–Tass,” Reuters, December 5,2007.
10.
“Russia to Build up Presence in Global Ocean–Navy Commander,” RIA Novosti, February 2, 2008.
11.
Richard Cowan, “U.S. Military Weighing If Russia in Cold War Pose,” Reuters, February 12, 2008.
12.
“At Least 120 NATO Interceptor Aircraft Had Escorted Russian Bombers,” Russian Ministry of Defense press release, December 5, 2007.
13.
14.
“Putin Hails Newest Missiles as ‘Holiday Fireworks’,” Reuters, December 26,2007.
15.
“Russia to Double ICBM Launches after 2009–Commander,” RIA Novosti, December 17,2007.
16.
“Russia to Deploy Fixed-Site Topol-M ICBMs by 2010–SMF Cmdr.,” RIA Novosti, May 8,2007.
17.
“Russia's Defense Minister Lays Out Ambitious Plans for New Weapons Purchases,” Associated Press, February 7,2007.
18.
19.
“Russia May Deploy New-Generation Ballistic Missiles by 2017,” RIA Novosti, December 14,2007.
20.
“Russia to Put New Nuke Submarine in Service in 2008,” Interfax, December 22,2007.
21.
Gerard O'Dwyer, “Norway Notes Raised Russian Submarine, Air Activity,” Defense News, November 28,2007.
22.
U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, personal e-mail message to Hans M. Kristensen, January 4,2008.
24.
Simon Saradzhyan, “Putin Promises New Nuclear Missiles,” Moscow Times, October 19,2007.
25.
“Russia Determined to Keep Tactical Nuclear Arms for Potential Aggressors,” Pravda, October 31,2007.
26.
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” prepared statement for the record before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee, 110th Cong., ist sess., January 11, 2007, p. 14.
27.
Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Notebook: Estimated Soviet Nuclear Stockpile (July 1991),” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1991, p. 48.
28.
Our estimate for nonstrategic warheads is 250 warheads fewer than last year, reflecting a recount of platforms rather than an actual decrease in warheads.
29.
“Russia to Deploy Second S-400 Regiment Near Moscow in 2008,” RIA Novosti, January 21, 2008; “Moscow to Deploy S-400 Ar Defense Systems in Northwest Russia,” RIA Novosti, February 7,2008.
30.
Ibid.