Abstract

NUCLEAR TERRORISM: Medical emergency
In the event of a nuclear terror attack, hospitals will be among the first casualties.
In Chicago, Northwestern Memorial Hospital occupies a 2-million-square-foot expanse a few blocks from the Magnificent Mile, a commercial and business hub that includes the John Hancock Center and Wrigley Building. The Illinois Medical District, a cluster of hospitals and health-care facilities on the city's Near West Side, is located about 3 miles from the same area. Together, they provide Chicago with more than 2,000 hospital beds and its most specialized medical services–exactly the problem if terrorists detonate a nuclear weapon anywhere near the city's center.
Such an attack would devastate both hospitals, leaving the third largest U.S. city without vital elements of its health-care system when tens of thousands of people might require medical attention. The public health infrastructures of other U.S. urban areas are no safer, according to Cham Dallas, director of the University of Georgia's Institute for Health Management in Mass Destruction Defense. When he and his colleagues simulated nuclear terror attacks in Chicago, New York City, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, they found that the destruction would include a significant number of hospitals–and their personnel–in each of the cities.
So while first responders and the medical community game-plan for potential bioterror attacks, Dallas believes they shouldn't discount the contemporary nuclear threat. “It's considered a ‘high-impact, low-likelihood event,’” he says. “But at some point, we need to change how we distribute health care because we're going to lose a substantial portion of our ability to respond. Subsequently, all health care will suffer dramatically.”
JOSH SCHOLLMEYER
Areas of concern
Only 1,500 burn beds, such as this one in New Jersey, exist in the United States.
RE: ENVIRONMENT: Ecology in flux
Scientists predict that climate change could threaten as many as one million plant and animal species with extinction, as rising temperatures, droughts, tropical storms, and flooding devastate natural habitats. But Chris Wilmers, a conservation ecologist at the University of California, Santa Cruz, offers a twist on this scenario: Some of the animal species most at risk could be those that live in places where an altered climate could change environmental conditions for the better, providing abundant food supplies that allow populations to thrive in exorbitant numbers.
For these animals, the good life can last only so long. “If you have a bad year, all of a sudden the population is so out of kilter with resources that everyone starves and dies,” Wilmers says. In some cases, the species might recover and thrive again, only to be hit with another poor year of weather. These “boom-and-bust” cycles can cause populations to fluctuate dramatically and with greater frequency, making them more vulnerable to disease and inbreeding. In an era of unpredictable ecological change, there may be no such thing as a safe haven.
Early warning: Scientists believe that climate change is reducing the number of Arctic fur seal pups.
GUEST: Lecture
After 12 years of Jacques Chirac's presidency, France will conduct a complete nuclear posture review, along with a general defense review. Defense policy–and nuclear policy in particular–are very much in the president's realm, and our last two nuclear policy reviews took place in 1996 and 2000. So this is something you would expect any new president to undertake.
Sarkozy has said that he wants a complete reexamination of the costs and benefits of all nuclear programs. His message here is that the nuclear budget should not be treated any differently than other parts of the defense budget. At some point, he might want to make a symbolic decision to place his mark on French nuclear policy–including perhaps a slight force reduction.
He also might be more explicit than Chirac about expanding French nuclear deterrence to vital European interests outside of France. His campaign statements indicate that he seems willing and ready to clearly say that the French nuclear force exists to protect the European Union as a whole.
Finally, he will be a bit more open than Chirac in terms of missile defense. Chirac was cautious about it, even though he said in 2006 that missile defense could “complement” nuclear deterrence. In general, Sarkozy will be more relaxed vis-á-vis cooperation with allies, including the United States.
By and large, though, Sarkozy's language on nuclear deterrence remains traditional, and he has refrained from using language that hints that he's willing to take French nuclear policy in a different direction. This is not surprising: Remaining conservative and reliable on nuclear issues is part of the French presidential aura.
So, on balance, expect more continuity than change.
THREAT ASSESSMENT: Trafficking terrorists
THREAT: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
Chavez infuriates U.S. officials by blatantly forging political and economic alliances with Washington adversaries such as Cuba, Iran, and Syria. The Bush administration and members of Congress have responded by singling out Venezuela among terrorist threats in Latin America, most notably for allegedly providing false identity documents to foreign nationals, including those originating from countries known to harbor terrorists such as Pakistan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. In an oft-cited 2006 report, “A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border,” the House Committee on Homeland Security stated, “Venezuela is providing support–including identity documents–that could prove useful to radical Islamic groups.” Is Chavez providing financial and political support for terrorists looking to gain entry into the United States?
EXPERT: Fred Burton
A former State Department counterterrorism agent and current vice president of counterterrorism and corporate security at Stratfor, a private intelligence firm, Burton has followed the alien smuggling and illegal document industry for decades.
“Could these channels be used to facilitate jihadists through criminal networks? Sure. But you don't have a choreographed effort on the part of the Venezuelan intelligence service to facilitate it
JULY/AUGUST 2007 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
Something's killing off honeybee colonies around the world, and entomologists at
The entomologists treat the bees by feeding them a spearmint and lemon grass tonic to boost their mmunity, followed by fumigation with formic acid to kill the mites. In Florida, this treatment has killed 93 percent of the mites within 24 hours…. It's good to be green–and small. A report from the
Researchers are also looking at how nanoparticles can improve efficiencies in ongoing environmental projects such as water filtration…. Survivors of avian influenza may be the best source for finding a cure for the pandemic-in-waiting.
[ON TOPIC] MISSILE DEFENSE
A ground-based interceptor missile at Fort Greely, Alaska.
Computer errors
When the Defense Department failed to shoot down a simulated ballistic missile strike in December 2004, it didn't surprise Rebecca Slayton. A historian of science and technology at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, Slayton studies how the computing establishment has affected the decades-long missile defense debate. And for more than 50 years, computer scientists have provided a consistent analysis: Missile defense can't be trusted. “Even if components of a hardware-software system are successfully tested, the software that coordinates the system as a whole could never be tested operationally until an actual attack,” Slayton explains.
In the 1960s, the objections of computer scientists were largely ignored, but their influence grew substantially by the 1980s, as they provided incisive criticism of the Reagan administration's Star Wars program. Today, the Pentagon and Bush administration maintain that a new development process can overcome missile defense's limitations. While many contest this point, it's not computer scientists making the argument. “Some computer scientists have spoken up,” Slayton says. “But they mostly speak to their peers and seem to be fairly irrelevant to the mainstream debate.”
Some of this dissent also stays hidden behind classified doors, according to Peter Neumann, a principal scientist with the SRI International Computer Science Lab who has worked on numerous defense projects. Moreover, many computer scientists concluded long ago that the problems inherent in the complex systems needed for a missile shield are so basic that they're insurmountable.
So Neumann and his colleagues are attacking the broader cultural assumption that technology answers all of society's ills, whether it's electronic voting machines to solve election problems, biometric programs to identify terrorists, or building a missile shield to stop a nuclear attack. “We're facing a political situation where if you believe technology will solve the world's problems then you invest in it,” Neumann says. “[But] the idea of a computer system that solves all of these problems is ludicrous.”
BRENDAN MCKENNA
Col. Cindy R. Jebb
The security environment seen from the individual level gives you a more comprehensive and empathetic perspective. If we're trying to shore up legitimate and functioning states, we need societies whose needs are being addressed and who view their state as having legitimacy.
“If the United States is trying to shore up legitimate and functioning states, we need societies whose needs are being addressed and who view their state as having legitimacy.”
Professor and deputy head in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, Col. Cindy R. Jebb teaches courses in comparative politics, international security, cultural anthropology, and counterterrorism. Her latest book is The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy Versus Terrorism (Praeger).
JOHN REZEK
