Abstract
“We busted the A. Q. Khan network,” President George W. Bush declared in 2004. Yet, two years later, most of Khan's accomplices remain free. And Henk Slebos, one of Khan's key European operatives, got off with a reduced sentence. The message is clear: Let the punishment fit the crime-unless the crime happens to be trafficking in nuclear technology.
The A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network was supposedly shut down in early 2004, after the disgraced scientist confessed on Pakistani television to selling nuclear components and materials to customers worldwide. Despite declarations from the Bush administration that same year that the network was “out of business” and that those responsible were being “brought to justice,” it remains far from clear that the network has ceased operations. 1 What is increasingly clear is that the individuals responsible for what has been termed “the single worst case of proliferation in the past 50 years” have largely escaped prosecution and, in most cases, remain at large, free to continue their activities. 2
Of the dozens of businessmen, agents, and scientists with alleged ties to the Khan network, only three have been both convicted and sent to prison for their misdeeds. 3 [See the authors' “Rogues' Gallery” on p. 29.] German judges terminated one ongoing trial in July 2006 on procedural grounds. Another case has been stymied, in part, because of the unwillingness of U.S. authorities to provide requested documents. And in May 2006, the Pakistani government released the last of 11 detained Khan aides, Mohammed Farooq–after which Islamabad announced that it had completed its investigation into the Khan network and that “the chapter is closed.” 4
To some extent, Islamabad's assessment is correct. The chapter on investigations and prosecutions has indeed closed in many cases. An examination of the extent to which law enforcement agencies around the globe have pursued investigations and prosecutions against alleged Khan network participants reveals that most suspects have suffered limited penalties, if any, for their part in providing assistance to the nuclear weapons programs of countries, including Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
Guilty as charged
To date, the only three individuals to be both found guilty of and imprisoned for crimes related to Khan network activities are Dutch businessman Henk Slebos and German businessmen Rainer Vollmerich and Ernst Piffl. German courts sentenced Piffl to three years and nine months in jail and gave Vollmerich a stiff seven-year, three-month sentence. The case against Slebos was weakened–and consequently his sentence was reduced–after the court ruled that Dutch authorities had acted improperly during a search of Slebos's offices in April 2004. Because the search warrant did not stipulate that domestic intelligence agents could accompany investigators from the Dutch Justice Ministry, the evidence collected in these searches was ruled inadmissible. 5 Courts convicted two other individuals, Abu Siddiqui, a London businessman of Bangladeshi origin, and Zoran Filipovic, a Slebos employee, but they did not serve jail time.
Still under investigation
Fourteen individuals in Germany, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey are known to be under investigation for their roles in Khan network activities. Nine of the fourteen are currently under arrest. In one of the more interesting cases, Swiss police arrested German engineer Gotthard Lerch in November 2004 and extradited him in 2005 to face charges of violating German export controls. The German court arraigned him in April 2006, only to end the trial four months later on procedural grounds. As of August 2006, Lerch and his lawyers were negotiating bond conditions with the German courts to secure his release. The trial may begin anew later this year. 6 A second high-profile trial, that of South African residents Gerhard Wisser and Daniel Geiges, is scheduled to begin in March 2007.
Free and clear
At least 19 individuals suspected of involvement in the Khan network have been cleared of wrongdoing, released from temporary detention, or, in the case of Khan himself, granted an official pardon. The majority of the individuals in this category are Khan laboratory officials or Pakistani military leaders who were questioned in early 2004 and detained without charge. Khan's right-hand man, B. S. A. Tahir, spent an unknown amount of time, possibly more than two years, in the custody of Malaysian police. As of August 2006, he was believed to be in Dubai. 7 Khan remains under house arrest in his villa outside of Islamabad. Pakistani authorities refuse to grant U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency investigators access to the 71-year-old national hero, who was diagnosed with prostate cancer in August 2006.
Hands-on involvement: A. Q. Khan at a 1998 press conference, showing five fingers to signify Pakistan's first five nuclear explosions.
Patterns of justice
With several investigations and prosecutions still pending and others possibly in the planning stage, it is too early to draw firm conclusions about attempts by states to investigate and prosecute Khan network operatives. Nonetheless, certain patterns appear to be emerging.
First, in Western Europe, prosecutions have had uneven success. Vollmerich's multiyear prison sentence imposed by a German court is substantial, but the light punishments meted out in the Netherlands to Slebos and Filipovic seem unlikely to deter would-be violators. It remains to be seen how Japanese, South African, Swiss, and Turkish courts will deal with individuals facing charges for nuclear export control violations in those countries.
Second, governments have confronted difficult choices between pursuing intelligence-gathering opportunities and bringing individuals to justice. A former Dutch prime minister, for example, claimed that in 1975 and 1986, the CIA requested that authorities not detain Khan so that his activities could be monitored and other elements of the network could be identified. 8 Another case, involving a Swiss father and his sons–Friedrich, Urs, and Marco Tinner–has been hobbled by the Bush administration's decision not to respond to Swiss requests for information on the case. Four appeals from Switzerland's federal prosecutor to the U.S. Justice Department and the State Department's undersecretary for arms control and international security have gone unanswered. 9 The unresponsiveness of the United States raises the possibility that the Tinners may have cooperated in a U.S. intelligence operation and thereby gained some degree of immunity to prosecution. Likewise, the reluctance of Liechtenstein, Malaysia, South Africa, and Switzerland to respond to Germany's request for judicial assistance in the Lerch case may also be related to concerns that intelligence-gathering opportunities may be compromised if certain information is provided.
Third, the Khan network coalesced along longstanding connections between friends, business partners, and even fathers and sons. It seems appropriate, then, to roll up this and other such networks along the same lines–by exploiting those relationships and ties. Striking immunity deals in exchange for information may shed light on ongoing illicit trafficking activities. Understanding the long-standing friendships between Khan, Lerch, Slebos, Tahir, the Tinners, and Wisser, and then exploring other individuals within each of their circles, may yield new prospects for investigation. While the arrests of Khan and other network operatives may have made it harder to provide one-stop shopping for would-be nuclear proliferators, it has not ended the trade in nuclear materials. The decentralized, rather than top-down, nature of the smuggling enterprise suggests that parts of the Khan network have yet to be uncovered. 10
Fourth, stopping the proliferation of WMD technology is difficult and can only be accomplished if countries dedicate adequate resources and political will to export controls and enforcement mechanisms. Tactics employed by Khan network operatives to circumvent regulations and policies–such as providing a false final destination, intentionally misstating the intended use, or exporting items that fall just below the control list specifications–exposed the vulnerabilities in Western European countries, generally seen as possessing effective export control systems. 11 Industry and government representatives must apply lessons learned from the Khan network to identify and fix weaknesses in their systems.
Finally, interested governments have yet to take action against the middlemen–remote air-freight services, traders, brokers, financial institutions–of Khan's nuclear smuggling operations. 12 Many of these parties likely did not know the truth about the transactions they were facilitating, but others may have been fully aware of the role they were playing and deserve to be pursued and prosecuted.
Despite the ongoing efforts to shut down the Khan network, smuggling in support of nuclear weapons programs continues. Iran may well have developed its own network to supply sensitive goods for its program. In May 2006 testimony to the U.S. House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Khan network expert Andrew Koch maintained, “Iran has rebuilt a network to supply prohibited goods for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, principally from European and Russian firms and has included some of the Khan middlemen in the process. Tehran's new network is exploiting many of the same weaknesses and loopholes of the system that Khan's associates used, and may be a response to fill the gap after Khan was removed as a primary supplier.” 13 Pakistan can be expected to continue to import sensitive goods for its nuclear deterrent. 14
Aggressive pursuit and prosecution of offenders and more substantial penalties for those convicted may help to deter future smuggling networks, but the inconsistent record to date, with its strong tilt toward < leniency, suggests that much remains to be done to 5 achieve such results.
Rogues' gallery
The legal status of suspected A. Q. Khan network members worldwide. 1a
Managing director of the Dubai-based SMB Group. Alleged to be A. Q. Khan's right-hand man. Principal actor in setting up SCOPE, a subsidiary of the SCOMI Group BHD in Malaysia, to manufacture at Shah Alam an array of aluminum components for P-2 centrifuges, including casings, end caps, and baffles meant for the Libyan centrifuge program. 2a Facilitated the manufacture and delivery of centrifuge components to Libya. 3a
Close friend of Khan and president of CETEC, a Swiss firm specializing in vacuum technology. Believed to have configured machining tools for the production line at SCOPE in liaison with his son, Urs. Also believed to have been responsible for the production of specific centrifuge components, including safety valves, that were manufactured in Europe for delivery to Libya via Dubai. 6a
Served as a technical consultant, supplying diagrams and drawings to SCOPE on Tahir's recommendation. 9a Consulted and was aided by his father Friedrich of CETEC and brother Marco of Traco Co. to set up a production line at SCOPE. 10a
Brother of Urs, son of Friedrich, and owner of Traco Co.; he facilitated the import and delivery of flow- and lathe-forming equipment and other specialized equipment to SCOPE in Malaysia. 13a
(full name withheld by German authorities)
German businessman suspected of selling plutonium-separating equipment to an unnamed country as part of the Khan network.
German engineer, formerly worked for Leybold Heraeus, a German company that is alleged to have produced vacuum technology equipment. 18a Lerch is alleged to have tried to obtain supplies of pipes in connection with the machine shop “Project 1001” in Libya by sourcing from South Africa. 19a
Dutch businessman who studied with Khan at Delft Technical University in the Netherlands and was responsible for procuring numerous items for the Khan network for more than two decades, including critical centrifuge bearing parts.
Slebos's employee. Transported various controlled items meant for Khan from the Netherlands to countries in the Balkans in order to evade Dutch export-licensing requirements.
Director of ETI Elektroteknik, a Turkish electronics firm. Hired by Khan to provide Libya with centrifuge dynamos/motors, aluminum castings, and, possibly, ring magnets. 25a
President of Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri (EKA), a Turkish firm specializing in electronics. Alleged to have supplied Libya with electrical cabinets, 95 “frequency converters,” and, possibly, ring magnets–all key components in the operation of gas centrifuges. 28a
British engineer and former owner of the Dubai-based Gulf Technical Industries, presently managed by his son, Paul. 31a Tahir alleged that Griffin assisted Pakistan in its efforts to obtain machine tools and other equipment. Tahir also alleged that Griffin was the principal who supplied the layout plan for the machine shop in Libya, code-named “Project 1001,” to enable Libya to produce centrifuges. 32a
British businessman of Bangladeshi origin. Between 1995 and 1999, his shipments to KRL reportedly included computer equipment, a 12-ton heat treatment furnace, sophisticated measuring devices, and high-quality aluminum bars. 34a
German engineer and classmate of Khan; Tahir alleged that Mebus participated in discussions of centrifuge designs with Khan and Iranian officials in the 1980s. 36a
According to German prosecutors, Vollmerich worked as a middleman procuring items for nuclear laboratories in Pakistan. Falsified licensing documentation, purposely misstating the end use of certain items and falsely reporting South Africa as the final destination on many shipments. 38a
Founder of South Africa-based Trade Fin Engineering. Alleged to have played a role as middleman in the Khan network, with alleged ties to Tahir. 40a Attempted to supply Libya with gas centrifuge feed and piping systems, vacuum pumps, and a flow-forming machine used to produce steel rotor tubes for uranium enrichment. 41a
German businessman and friend of Khan for about two decades. Between 1988 and 1993, he exported gas centrifuge parts (aluminium tubes) to Pakistan.
Wisser, a German citizen and South African resident, is owner of Krisch Engineering, a firm specializing in repairing leak detectors and vacuum pumps. 45a German and South African courts allege that Wisser has ties to Tahir and Meyer, and has served as an important conduit for procurement and manufacturing operations in South Africa. South African authorities allege that Krisch Engineering attempted to provide Libya with vacuum pumps and other gas centrifuge-related components and technology. 46a Geiges, a German engineer, is Wisser's employee.
Khan's personal staff officer. 49a
KRL director-general of science and technology. 51a
KRL security director. 53a
Head of KRL's centrifuge-design office. 55a
KRL departmental director and metallurgist. 57a
KRL director-general of foreign procurement. 59a
Head of KRL missile manufacturing. 62a
Singapore-based subsidiary of German company Bikar Metalle. According to Tahir, Bikar provided 300 tons of aluminum bars and tubing to SCOPE that were used to construct centrifuge components in Malaysia. 65a
German company that provided 5 tons of specialty steel rods to SCOPE that were used to construct centrifuges in Malaysia. 67a
South Korean company that manufactured balancing machines that were to be used in constructing Libya's centrifuges. 69a
South Korean company that purchased balancing machines from Hanbando Inc. and exported them to Libya.
Japanese company that exported three-dimensional measuring machines to other Japanese companies in China and Thailand in violation of Japanese export laws. These machines were allegedly found by IAEA inspectors in Libyan labs. 73a
Supplementary Material
The A. Q. Khan Network: Case Closed?: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations
Supplementary Material
Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options
Footnotes
1.
President George W. Bush told an audience at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, “Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the Khan network and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A. Q. Khan has confessed his crimes, and his top associates are out of business.” At the Third Asia Security Conference in Singapore on June 5, 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he was confident that “the network had been dismantled.” Then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told CNN on October 3, 2004, “The A. Q. Khan network is out of business, and people are being brought to justice.”
2.
3.
This article focuses on those individuals closely linked to Khan network transactions. Individuals indicted or charged with trafficking in illicit goods intended for Pakistan's own nuclear weapons program–but who were not directly affiliated with the Khan network–include Humayun Khan (no relation to A. Q. Khan), a Pakistani businessman and owner of an Islamabad-based firm called Pakland who was indicted by the United States for his involvement in the illegal shipment of nuclear triggers, and Asher Kami, an Israeli businessman and South African resident currently serving a three-year sentence for illegally selling U.S.-origin nuclear components to Pakistan.
4.
“Pakistan Says Nuclear Proliferation Chapter Is Closed,” Agence France Presse, May 3, 2006.
5.
Uitspraak, Rechtbank Alkmaar, Parketnummer: 14.038041-04 (Verdict, Court of Alkmaar, Case Number: 14.038041-04), December 16, 2005, zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/zoeken/dtluitspraak.asp?searchtype=ljn&ljn=AU8250&u_ljn=AU8250.
6.
Mark Hibbs, “Malaysian Testimony Rejected in Lerch Trial Halted by Court,” Nucleonics Week, August 3,2006.
7.
Ibid.
8.
“CIA Asked Us to Let Nuclear Spy Go, Ruud Lubbers Claims,” Netherlands National News Agency, August 9, 2005.
9.
Joby Warrick, “U.S. Silence Impeding Swiss in Nuclear Case; Expert Says Calls Have Been Ignored,” Washington Post, May 26, 2006, p. A16.
10.
11.
Stephanie Lieggi, “Disclosures of Illicit Supply Networks Expose Weaknesses in European Export Control Systems,” International Export Control Observer, December 2005/January 2006, pp. 14-18.
12.
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) is known to have come to the attention
of investigators for its possible role in financing illegal nuclear transactions. See
“The BCCI Affair: Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate” by Sen. John Kerry and Sen. Hank Brown, December 1992. Appendix
“Matters for Further Investigation,” 
. BCCI has since gone out of business after
being banned in seven countries.
13.
Koch testimony, House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, May 25, 2006.
14.
Iftikhar Ali, “Banned N-Tech Went to Pakistan, India: U.S.,” The Nation (Pakistan), April 10, 2005. See also: Lara Jakes Jordan, “Pakistani Charged With Export of Devices With Nuclear Uses,” Associated Press, April 9, 2005.
1a.
Information for this table was taken from open press sources and unclassified government documents and is presented on an as-reported basis. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies cannot vouch for the accuracy or veracity of these reports. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Nilsu Goren, who conducted research in support of this article and table.
2a.
Sammy Salama and Lydia Hanseil, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Issue Brief, March 2005; “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia, February 20, 2004.
3a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components.”
4a.
“Malaysia Arrests Senior Figure: Sri Lankan Tied to Pakistani Khan's Network,” MSNBC, May 28, 2004.
5a.
Mark Hibbs, “Malaysian Testimony Rejected in Lerch Trial Halted by Court,” Nucleonics Week, August 3, 2006.
6a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components”; “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
7a.
Joby Warrick, “U.S. Silence Impeding Swiss in Nuclear Case; Expert Says Calls Have Been Ignored,” Washington Post, May 26, 2006; “Swiss Engineer in Libya Nuclear Probe to be Extradited from Germany,” Swiss Info in English, May 13, 2005. Available from FBIS, document identification number EUP20050513950109.
8a.
Warrick, “U.S. Silence Impeding Swiss in Nuclear Case; Expert Says Calls Have Been Ignored.”
9a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components.”
10a.
“Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 111-128.
11a.
Warrick, “U.S. Silence Impeding Swiss in Nuclear Case; Expert Says Calls Have Been Ignored.”
12a.
Ibid.
13a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components”; “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
14a.
Warrick, “U.S. Silence Impeding Swiss in Nuclear Case; Expert Says Calls Have Been Ignored.”
15a.
Ibid.
16a.
“Turkey a Transit Country in Smuggling Nuclear Parts into Libya,” Ankara Turkish Press in English, December 8, 2005. Available from FBIS, document identification number GMP20051212025001.
17a.
Craig Whitlock, “3rd German Arrested in Probe into Arms Trade,” Washington Post, September 24, 2004.
18a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components”; Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks.”
19a.
“Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
20a.
“Dutch Businessman Sentenced for Nuclear Smuggling,” December 19, 2005, Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative.
21a.
Hibbs, “Malaysian Testimony Rejected in Lerch Trial Halted by Court.”
22a.
“Disclosure of Illicit Supply Networks Expose Weaknesses in European Export Control Systems,” International Export Control Observer 3, December 2005/January 2006, pp. 14-18.
23a.
Ibid. See also “Dutch Businessman Jailed for Nuclear Exports to Pakistan,” Agence France Presse, December 16, 2005.
24a.
Ibid; “Disclosure of Illicit Supply Networks Expose Weaknesses in European Export Control Systems, “ International Export Control Observer 3.
25a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components”; “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
26a.
27a.
Stephen Fidler and Mark Huband, “Turks and South Africans ‘Helped Libya's Secret Nuclear Arms Project,’” Financial Times, June 10, 2004.
28a.
“Two Turks Alleged to Nuclear Trafficking,” Sabah; Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components”; “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
29a.
“They Have Sold Materials Enough for 7 Nuclear Weapons,” Milliyet, December 8, 2005; Public Affairs Office of U.S. Embassy Ankara, “Ankara Turkish Press Summary 08 Dec 05.” Available from FBIS, document identification number GMP20051212025001.
30a.
“They Have Sold Materials Enough for 7 Nuclear Weapons,” Milliyet.
31a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components.”
32a.
Ibid; “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
33a.
Jan Colley, “Libel Damages for Engineer,” Press Association, May 3, 2005.
34a.
35a.
“Western Intelligence Agencies Missed Link to A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Proliferation Network,” Report of the Public Education Center.
36a.
“Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
37a.
“Indian Article Examines Pakistani Military Involvement in Khan's Activities,” Nodia Force, March 22, 2004. Available from FBIS, document identification number SAP20040322000117.
38a.
“Disclosure of Illicit Supply Networks Expose Weaknesses in European Export Control Systems,” International Export Control Observer 3.
39a.
Ibid.
40a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components”; Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks.”
41a.
“South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Press Release,” September 7, 2004, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South
Africa, ; Dafna Linzer and Craig Timberg,
“S. African's Arrest Seen as Key to Nuclear Black Market,”
Washington Post, September 4, 2004.
42a.
Ibid.
43a.
Manoah Esipisu, “South Africa Seizes Uranium Enrichment Materials,” Reuters, September 8,2004.
44a.
“South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Press Release,” Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa; “South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Press Release,” September 10, 2004, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa; Tiziana Cauli, “Charges Dropped Against South African Accused of Trafficking in Nuclear Equipment,” Associated Press, September 8, 2004; Tiziana Cauli, “Two More Arrested in South Africa in Investigation into Nuclear Arms Equipment Trafficking,” Associated Press, September 9, 2004.
45a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components”; Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks.”
46a.
Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, “The Man Who Sold the Bomb,” Time, February 14, 2005, as cited in Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components.”
48a.
Ibid.
49a.
“Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” Congressional Research Service, May 24,2005, p. 12.
50a.
“Pakistan Releases Three Men Detained for Questioning in Nuclear Smuggling Investigation,” Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 26, 2004.
51a.
“Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” Congressional Research Service.
52a.
Ibid.
53a.
“Pakistan Releases Three Men Detained for Questioning in Nuclear Smuggling Investigation,” Global Security Newswire.
54a.
Ibid.
55a.
“Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” Congressional Research Service.
56a.
“Pakistani Web Site Critical of Nuclear Scientists' Arrest,”
Tanzeem-i-Islami, January 23, 2003. Available from FBIS, document
identification number SAP20040127000082. See also “Arbitrary Arrest of Pakistani
Officials of the Nuclear Research Laboratory in Kahuta,” Amnesty International,
February 3, 2004, .
57a.
“Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” Congressional Research Service; “KRL Director Detained for Questioning,” Daily Times, December 10, 2003.
58a.
“Detained KRL Scientist Chohan Freed, Dr. Farooq to Be Released Shortly,” Nawa-i-Waqt, December 12, 2003. Available from FBIS, document identification number SAP20031213000038. See also “Arbitrary Arrest of Pakistani Officials of the Nuclear Research Laboratory in Kahuta,” February 3,2004.
59a.
“Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” Congressional Research Service; “KRL Director Detained for Questioning,” Daily Times.
60a.
“Report Lists KRL Officials Alleged for Violating Official Secrets Act,” Karachi Herald, March 3,2004. Available from FBIS, document identification number SAP20040303000015.
61a.
“Pakistan Press Ummat 20 Jan 05,” Karachi Ommat, January 20, 2005. Available from FBIS, document identification number SAP20050121000071; “Senior Pakistani Scientist Released From Custody,” Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 1,2006.
62a.
“Shared Information with Iran, Libya, and N. Korea, Says Dr. Qadeer,” Jang, February 2, 2004.
63a.
Ibid.; “Pak Govt. Releases Three Nuke Scam Accused,” Asian News International, April 11,2004.
64a.
Ibid.
65a.
“Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,” Polis Diraja Malaysia.
66a.
“German Firms Unwittingly Involved in Nuclear Deals with Libya, Pakistan,” Handelsblatt, March 25, 2004. Available from FBIS, document identification number EUP20040325000341; David Crawford and Steve Stecklow, “How A Nuclear Ring Skirted Export Laws,” Asian Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2004.
67a.
Ibid.
68a.
Ibid.
69a.
Salama and Hansell, “Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components.”
70a.
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interview with confidential South Korean government official, February 23, 2005.
71a.
Ibid.
72a.
Ibid.
73a.
Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japanese Firm Raided in Nuclear Probe,” Washington Post, February 13, 2006.
74a.
Martin Fackler, “Five Executives Are Arrested in Japan,” New York Times, August 25, 2006. “Mitutoyo Used Software to Mask Accuracy of Nuke-Related Gear,” Japan Times, August 29, 2006.