Abstract
In its own way, China is actually trying to influence North Korea.
As North Korea continues to taunt the United States with the prospect of testing a nuclear weapon, the Bush administration has begun lashing out at China. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the administration's lead negotiator in the multilateral talks to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program, recently complained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Beijing “has been reluctant to use the full range of leverage that we believe China has.” Part of the problem, Hill speculated, is that the Chinese have a different threat perception than that of the United States and are “less concerned” about the potential of North Korea selling nuclear materials on the black market.
“It's called a lever and fulcrum. Let's hope we never have to use it.”
“Beijing's perceived reluctance to crack down on Pyongyang is not a product of indifference. The sooner
To be sure, China–as North Korea's ally for more than 50 years and the provider of most of its fuel and food aid–is not without clout in dealing with the regime of Kim Jong Il. But Beijing's perceived reluctance to crack down on Pyongyang is not a product of indifference. As far as China is concerned, the sooner North Korea dismantles its nuclear program, the better. The Chinese fear that a nuclear North Korea would stimulate a regional nuclear arms race–or worse, spark an all-out war between North Korea and the United States. Rather than dragging its feet, Beijing hopes that by helping resolve the current crisis it can solidify its improved relations with Washington and burnish its reputation as a responsible major power in the region and the world. Yet, Beijing believes that the key to resolving this crisis is held by America itself.
What North Korea wants most is to obtain a reliable security assurance from the United States, including its highest priority of “regime survival.” The only leverage that Kim Jong Il possesses is his threat to go nuclear, and Beijing understands that Pyongyang will continue to escalate the crisis until it obtains Washington's cooperation.
As such, China has been resistant to the Bush administration's exhortations to put more diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang or to cut off supplies of food and fuel. Based on its own experience in the 1950s–during which time the United States and its allies imposed economic sanctions against China–Beijing does not believe North Korea would yield to similar tactics. Poverty would not change the behavior of its political leadership, but would only worsen social conditions. Beijing also worries that if it participated in sanctions against Pyongyang, it would lose influence with Kim Jong Il's regime, or even incur its hostility.
In short, China is reluctant to get tough with Pyongyang for precisely the same underlying reason that it wants to see North Korea abandon its nuclear program–maintaining regional stability. That means avoiding a war on the peninsula and preventing the abrupt collapse of Kim Jong Il's regime. An imploding North Korean economy would create a massive flow of refugees across China's border. A U.S. military strike on North Korea would incur a full-scale war that would disrupt China's strong economic ties with the region's key partners–especially South Korea, which has emerged as a major trading partner and a significant direct investor. A U.S. attack on North Korea would also force Beijing into an awkward position with Washington, because of the 1961 China-Korean Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation, which obliges China to provide military aid in the event of war (although Chinese leaders have made clear since the 1990s that North Korea should not expect China to automatically intervene on its behalf). What's more, the fall of Kim Jong Il could lead to sudden Korean unification and an uncertain geopolitical realignment, including the prospect of U.S. troops at China's border.
Rather than provoking Pyongyang or siding against the Bush administration, China is positioning itself as an impartial arbiter. In Beijing's view, Washington should make clear that it has no hostile intentions toward Pyongyang and that it is not seeking regime change. In return for its denuclearization, North Korea should be offered robust security guarantees, normalization of relations, and economic aid. Beijing is ready, willing, and able to press Kim Jong Il to abandon his nuclear program–all that's needed is for the United States to put a serious offer on the table.