Abstract
Britain is preparing to extend its agreement to cooperate with the United States on nuclear weapons programs, despite increasing pressure on Tony Blair to distance himself from George Bush.
The British government is keen to get the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement renewed because it is considering the replacement of its Trident nuclear weapon system after the next general election, which must be held by June 2006. Any decision to replace Trident would be highly controversial, though, especially within Blair's own party. Many Labour Party members remain committed to the party's long-standing call for nuclear disarmament.
Officials are hoping to get the extension of the agreement ratified by Parliament later in the year, but they are trying to avoid a full debate in the House of Commons. The agreement must also be laid before the U.S. Congress for 60 days as part of the ratification process.
Britain is heavily dependent on the United States in the military sphere, and in the area of nuclear weapons in particular. In return it has delivered nearly automatic support for U.S. foreign policy over the last 30 years.
But with the war in Iraq and Blair's recent backing of the U.S.-endorsed Israeli plans for the Middle East, many in Britain now believe the special relationship has gone too far. Some think it may cost Blair his job as prime minister.
A “vitally important” agreement
Under the Mutual Defense Agreement, the United States and Britain exchange classified information with the objective of improving each party's “atomic weapon design, development, and fabrication capability.” The agreement allows cooperation on defense planning, delivery systems, training, some intelligence-sharing, and the development of military nuclear reactors. The agreement also provides for the transfer of “special nuclear material” (plutonium and highly enriched uranium), components, and other equipment between the two countries.
Britain's Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), which oversees the country's nuclear weapons program, describes the agreement as “vitally important” and a “cornerstone of life for our nuclear weapons community.” But, given the massive disparity in resources between AWE and the U.S. weapons labs, it is not an arrangement between equal partners. The best AWE can hope for is to maintain some status as “a valued collaborator.”
April 16: Blair and Bush in the Oval Office.
Secrecy and dependence
Although Britain claims it has retained a “minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident,” if it does decide to build a replacement, it will probably have to choose something closely based on a U.S. nuclear weapon system. It would be prohibitively expensive for Britain to develop a successor without U.S. assistance.
Britain would have been unable to develop and maintain Trident without extensive U.S. help, much of which was supplied under the 1958 agreement. Britain's four Trident submarines all carry Trident II D5 missiles from the U.S. missile pool, all manufactured, tested, and serviced in the United States. The missiles depend on U.S. satellites for targeting.
Britain's Trident warhead is believed to be closely based on the U.S. W76 warhead and was tested at the Nevada Test Site. The two countries cooperate closely on stockpile stewardship, with Britain participating in U.S. subcritical tests and hydrodynamic experiments.
Hundreds of “scientific exchanges” are conducted under the agreement. British personnel meet with counterparts from a long list of U.S. government agencies, including Strategic Command and the weapons laboratories, and with an assortment of U.S. corporations that includes Lockheed Martin, Bechtel Nevada, Titan, Mitre, and SAIC. Many of these “visits” involve large numbers of personnel and take place over long periods of time, but the British government refuses to disclose much information about them on national security grounds.
AWE also maintains high-level contacts with the U.S. weapons labs, U.S. corporations, and members of the Bush administration. AWE's former executive board members include senior figures from Sandia and Oak Ridge national laboratories, Lockheed Martin, and the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Commercial interests
Britain's decision to replace its Trident warheads would require a major investment, providing a windfall for a number of British and American companies. BAE Systems (which built Britain's Trident submarines) is already reportedly lobbying for a replacement. The U.S. weapons laboratories, which also conduct contract work for Britain's nuclear program, would benefit as well.
A decision to go ahead would also result in more work for AWE, which is now privately run by a consortium consisting of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., Lockheed Martin, and a facilities management company, Serco. The government has just signed a 25-year contract worth more than £5 billion with this consortium, which Serco describes on its Web site as “our largest ever business win.”
AWE is currently planning to upgrade its facilities at Aldermaston with, among other things, new laboratories, high-powered lasers, hydro-dynamic facilities, and supercomputers, laying the groundwork for potential new nuclear weapons development. The British taxpayer will foot the bill.
Non-compliance with the NPT?
The United States is now pursuing plans to close the loophole in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that has allowed countries such as Iran and North Korea to pursue enrichment and reprocessing programs and to acquire potential weapons materials under the cover of civilian programs, so long as they did not acquire an actual nuclear weapon. Britain and the United States have exploited a similar loophole in Article I to exchange nuclear weapons materials, components, and information, provided that no actual weapons were transferred. This has essentially enabled Britain to procure and maintain U.S. nuclear weapon systems since the 1960s.
Although the two countries claim that cooperation under the 1958 agreement is in “full compliance” with the treaty because no actual nuclear weapons have been transferred, other NPT parties have questioned how such extensive U.S. assistance to Britain's nuclear weapons programs can be compatible with the treaty's fundamental objective of nonproliferation.
Britain and the United States might have been able to argue that their cooperation in the nuclear field was acceptable in 1958, but it is no longer appropriate in the twenty-first century when NPT members believe there is a need for a strengthened and non-discriminatory treaty to address serious new concerns about proliferation.
A rosy future?
It is not clear what nuclear weapon system Britain will opt for if it does decide to replace Trident, but the close relationship between the Atomic Weapons Establishment and U.S. weapons laboratories should be a cause for concern in Britain, given the current direction of U.S. nuclear policy.
Many questions remain unanswered. Will Britain participate in controversial and potentially destabilizing programs such as bunker-busters and mini-nukes? Would Britain participate in or be able to access data from nuclear tests in the event that the United States resumed testing?
Many in Britain see the transatlantic relationship as essential to security, but as the two governments ask legislatures for ratification, questions should be asked. Is it appropriate for the United States to continue to prop up Britain's nuclear weapons program? Should Britain be working so closely with the Bush administration on nuclear developments? And are these cooperative activities really compatible with U.S. and British commitments under the NPT?