Abstract
In Search of Human Nature By Mary E. Clark, Routledge, 2002 496 pages; $31.95
In discussions of peace, democracy, cooperation, and conflict resolution, the great conversation stopper is “human nature.” Many claim that humans are by nature aggressive, greedy, or competitive, citing pseudo-historical evidence that humans have always fought wars and always oppressed one another. Lately, evolutionary psychologists have leant scientific respectability to this argument, claiming that aggressive traits are favored in the struggle for survival. In her book In Search of Human Nature, Mary E. Clark mobilizes scientific evidence and theory to refute these claims.
With a sophisticated understanding of evolution research, Clark presents an alternative picture of primates and humans as social animals with traits selected for peaceful coexistence. Reports of aggression among chimpanzees and other ape species are dependent on context, she argues. Moving from biological to social evolution, she refutes interpretations of archeological and anthropological evidence that purport to show constant violence among humans by citing examples of peaceful societies–prehistoric agrarian settlements and hunter-gatherer tribes.
One senses that Clark has long dwelt with this material. She achieves a straightforward and pleasing expository style, enlivened by an occasional anecdote or personal reflection, without compromising the integrity of her scientific and historical argument. The result is a book ideally suited for the general reader.
Step by step, Clark argues against the “selfish gene” and “single gene” theories. She maintains that there are not distinct, single genes for aggressive and cooperative behaviors, that selection pressures do not act solely on individual genes and single organisms, and that aggressive behaviors (and cooperative behavior toward kin) are not the sole ways to increase an organism's chance for survival in subsequent generations. In fact, she argues, single genes influence multiple traits, multiple genes influence single traits, and traits are expressed because of gene-environment-experience interactions. Selective pressure on a given trait does not reduce to selection for or against a single gene. What is more, selective pressures may act on a genome, as when conflict among genes causes an organism to die. Finally, individual reproductive success among primates depends on group activity for nurturing and protecting the young. Where capacity for group bonding is lacking, the group will die out, no matter how splendidly fit and dominant an individual may be. Selection at the group level favors capacities for social living. Clark offers both examples and citations to support the case for group selection.
It is not sufficient to cite evidence against the selfish-gene theory, Clark writes; instead, one must understand the faulty science behind it. She devotes the first chapter to critiquing the “billiard ball” model of nature and its underlying realist epistemology. Clark offers a more complex understanding of the workings of science, using beliefs about science to illustrate a major attribute of human nature–the need for meaning, for belief systems.
Clark concludes that selection for social animals, including humans, involves three principle traits: bonding, autonomy, and the need for meaning. Bonding–affection, loyalty–is the glue that holds social groups together, and on occasion causes an individual to sacrifice for the sake of the group. Autonomy is necessary in human groups because complex social interaction requires judgment and initiative, which can't be provided for by hardwired responses or rigid cultural patterns. Shared beliefs also contribute to bonding, and provide the groundwork for the communication needed to coordinate action. Clark does not ignore human aggression, but she sees it as a propensity that is evoked by environment and experience, not something that is required for increasing reproductive fitness. In some primate groups, for example, access to females is favored by gradual affectionate bonding, not displays of aggression. It is not an appetitive drive. Clark leans heavily on ethnological and physiological evidence that links aggression to stress. When their habitat shrank because of human settlement, for example, groups of chimpanzees that previously handled territorial conflict by migration resorted to violence.
Clark argues that humans are capable of handling conflict by such means as increasing productivity and distributing goods fairly. But material conflicts inevitably clash with the need for autonomy and bonding, and between groups with different belief systems. This, she says, is what accounts for so much human conflict and violence. Violence, although not inevitable, depends on how cultural systems manage these tensions and how effectively they keep the peace. Recent research on primate behavior shows that peacemaking behaviors are a prominent feature of ape societies, Clark writes, a feature often overlooked because of the cultural propensity to identify competition and aggression.
Clark includes impressive, often little-known examples of human capacities for peacemaking, reconciliation, cooperation, and education, reporting on her own site visits and interviews. A high point of the book is her sober account of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the post-apartheid hearings that sought to determine the truth (without punishment) behind past racial violence, balancing its remarkable achievements with the immense difficulties of that undertaking.
Overall, Clark offers readers a scientifically rooted and richly developed theory that provides grounds for hope and action.
NRDC Nuclear Notebook
The Bulletin's “Nuclear Notebook” feature has been replaced this month by “The Protection Paradox,” by NRDC authors Hans M. Kristensen, Matthew G. McKinzie, and Robert S. Norris. “Nuclear Notebook” will return in its usual format in the May/June 2004 issue.