Abstract
What about China?
Paul Webster's account of Russian nuclear force planning (“Just Like Old Times,” July/August Bulletin) presents what may be an unparalleled account of the details emerging from the Ministry of Defense's recent activities. Unfortunately, his explanation of the rationale behind Russian decision-making is less sophisticated and needs to be refined.
U.S. strategic plans play an undeniable role in Moscow's thinking, but developments in China are equally important. In a world in which Russia's ability to maintain a robust and deep nuclear force deteriorates, planners in Beijing, with their ascendant economy, easily believe that they will have a chance of winning the race to be nuclear power number two. Russia can tolerate not being number one in nuclear-weapons capabilities, but the prospect of being number three is an unacceptable blow to its national prestige.
If analysts of nuclear strategy do not account for the difficult balancing act Russia plays in having a nuclear neighbor like China, in addition to a powerful nuclear rival like the United States, a balanced intellectual case against greater proliferation is unlikely to emerge.
Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), Washington, D.C.
Paul Webster responds:
Thanks very much to Michael Roston for his praise for my assessment of recent nuclear rearmament reports from Russian sources. While the Kremlin no doubt keeps an eye on the Chinese nuclear arsenal, I have seen no Russian reports suggesting an arms race has emerged between China and Russia.
Russia is heavily involved in a race to sell China nuclear-capable warplanes, though, as well as oil and other natural resources. I am curious to know whether Roston bases his suggestion that I have overlooked evidence of a Russian arms race with China on any actual Russian documentation. He mentions none.
Who in the Russian government has said Chinese arms are equally important to U.S. arms? Who in the Russian government has said there is a prospect of being number three in nuclear arms, or that this is an unacceptable blow to national prestige? I could be mistaken, but I haven't seen any Russian reports on the arms race he suggests in the last year in RANSAC's Nuclear News bulletin. Nor is any Russian evidence of the arms race Roston supposes to exist provided on the RANSAC Web site. Unsophisticated though Roston may consider me, I'm sticking with the reported evidence here in Russia.
Right on the mark
Congratulations to Linda Rothstein on the July/August Editor's Note and the “Calendar of Errors” piece.
And to think I once thought we had reached bottom with Nixon.
San Francisco, California
When it concerns the life-and-death issue of war, the news media in any democracy does its citizens an egregious disservice whenever it supplants honest investigative reporting with patriotic pabulum. That is why the Bulletin's July/August Editor's Note, “Loyal to a Fault”–with its scorching critique of America's news media for its obsequious coverage of the Bush administration's fabricated “Iraq crisis”–is right on the mark.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Your fine July/August editorial correctly identifies a horde of neocons as one of the main driving forces behind the lies promoting the attack on Iraq, and notes that they are now moving on to Iran.
It is important to investigate and expose their motive, which is obvious and extremely important–to destroy any and all opposition to the permanent Israeli occupation of much of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The Bulletin needs to give this matter intense attention.
Bethesda, Maryland
Editor's note:
Not all of the responses to the July/August editorial were positive. Unfortunately, an incomplete address prevented the necessary authentification of the author of a negative response. It began: “I'm disgusted by your moronic editor L. Rothstein and other leftist loons on the staff. Your reasoning is similar to that of a gang of gutter-crawling drunks….”
Choosing Australia
John Clearwater and David O'Brien tell an interesting Cold War story about plans for a British nuclear test in Canada (“O Lucky Canada,” July/August Bulletin).
There was more to Britain's decision not to test in Canada than a disagreeable climate, however. As Brian Cathcart relates in his book Test of Greatness, the British wanted to explore the possible effects of an atomic bomb carried in the hold of a Soviet or neutral merchant ship and detonated in one of Britain's crowded ports. In February 1951, when the decision on a test site was taken, a key factor was the existence in the Monte Bello Islands, off Australia, of a deep-water channel close to shore in which a “target” vessel could be anchored and used in the test.
Nor was the comfort of British scientists the only issue when climate was considered: In fact, the Monte Bello Islands were also most inhospitable, and there was no fresh water. The pattern of prevailing winds was more important, and British planners took great care to manage the risk of fallout over any inhabited area. They even showed concern for wildlife protection, which was mentioned in letters to the London Times. Certainly early nuclear testers–in all countries–showed what seems today a cavalier attitude to health and environmental issues, but we should not imagine they were altogether negligent.
Incidentally, there are a couple of inaccuracies in the article's description of the first-generation British atomic bomb, the Blue Danube. A deliverable stockpile of 58 Blue Danubes was built up by 1958, using plutonium cores only, as papers in several London Public Record Office files confirm. Also, Britain's Chiefs of Staff chose to limit the weapon's nominal yield to 14 kilotons in order to conserve fissile material, although the planners considered the yields mentioned in the article, intended to be achieved using composite cores, at one stage.
Winchcombe, Gloucestershire, Great Britain
Co-author John Clearwater responds:
The original plans for the Churchill tests included a ship-burst trial. William G. (Lord) Penney and C. P. McNamara thought the area near Churchill ideal for the test, as “currents in Hudson Bay are suitable for the dissipation of contaminants.” Their major concern voiced in the record seemed to be not to interfere with the shipping route from Churchill to Europe.
WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU
Send them to:
Letters to the Editor
The Bulletin
6042 South Kimbark
Chicago, IL 60637
fax: 773-702-0725
e-mail:
Be sure to include your mailing address and phone number.
Update
After more than two decades, deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have resumed at the import terminal at Cove Point, Maryland, on Chesapeake Bay.
On July 25, the Norwegian tanker Norman Lady delivered more than 22 million gallons of LNG to Cove Point, now one of four operating import terminals in the United States. Delivery to the terminal, only a few miles from the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant, was carried out under extensive security that included Coast Guard escorts and a 500-yard safety zone around the tanker. There were no reported problems.
Earlier in July, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan urged an expansion of LNG terminals nationwide. “LNG is the ultimate safety valve, even if we don't use it,” Greenspan said. “Without the flexibility such [LNG] facilities will impart, imbalances in supply and demand must inevitably engender price volatility” (Reuters, July 11).
But how safe would such a “safety valve” be?
In “Terrorism: Ready to Blow?” (July/August 2003 Bulletin), Jerry Havens reported on the dangers associated with LNG, which include flammable vapor clouds, vapor cloud explosions, and fires.
The reactivation of the Maryland terminal got Havens thinking more about safety issues. “When I look at the pictures of the Norman Lady arriving at Cove Point, I can't help remembering that it was this same ship that the U.S.S. Oklahoma City surfaced under–collided with–near Gibraltar,” he wrote to us. “As far as I know, no one has dared to consider the implications of such a collision–which could cause a huge, intense fire. The Oklahoma City is a nuclear submarine–I think this warrants consideration.”
While the current Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston professes concern for the environment, a situation brought about by later legislation, there is no evidence in the documentation that the Arctic region was considered on a par with more temperate environments. There is absolutely no discussion, or even mention, of long-term radioactive contamination of the Arctic.
I disagree that there were inaccuracies in the article with regard to yield. The records clearly show that the Blue Danubes tested in Australia ranged from a low of 1.5 kiloton to a high of 200 kilotons with modified physics packages. The first test alone yielded 25 kilotons. The deployed Blue Danubes had the smaller plutonium core in order to conserve the stockpile, and that is what allowed the force to be stretched to 58 weapons. We were wrong as to the number deployed, but stand by the yield estimates based on test results.
The greatest mystery for us remains the identity of the Canadian author, C. P. McNamara of the Defence Research Board of Canada. There are no records of this man: no publications, no biographical references, no archival files. We would be grateful to anyone who could provide information about him.