Abstract
The mood was elevated last November at the inauguration of a Norwegian village at Andreeva Bay–Russias once-secret naval base, now a dangerously rundown nuclear waste storage site. Norways then-Secretary of State Elsbeth Tronstad called the new facility, which will provide a base for decontamination operations, a symbol of a bright future for international cooperation in the Andreeva Bay. The next speaker, Helen Leister of Britains Nuclear Industries Directorate, promised some $10 million as Britains share of a G-8 program, 10+10 over 10.
The ceremony signaled a breakthrough that was a long time coming. For 10 years, Norway and other European countries had pressed Russia for access to its radioactively contaminated former naval bases, pledging repeatedly to help clean them up. The path to the day when Russia finally granted access to the site had been a thorny one, an ongoing story of patience tried and promises broken.
The submarines of Russias Northern Fleet once sailed out from this bay on the Kola Peninsula to compete with U.S. subs for domination of the seas. Although those days are past, their mark remains. The Za-padnaya Litsa fjord, off the Barents Sea, is home to four of Russias naval facilities. Andreeva, on the fjords western coast, has become Russias largest nuclear waste storage site. It has also become a major environmental concern for neighboring Norway, whose northern border is only 20 miles from the site.
According to some, Andreeva Bays most striking feature is its rundown facilities.
More than 21,000 spent fuel rods are crammed into three deteriorating and overfilled concrete tanks and numerous dilapidated above-ground containers. Other solid and liquid radioactive materials are stored dangerously–some in open pools, others in unprotected, decrepit buildings. It is estimated that in the 1980s, about 3,000 cubic meters of radioactive water leaked from storage pools before repairs were made. And at least 32 of the smaller above-ground casks, which are left in the open air and brutal weather, have developed leaks. More are likely to leak as well. Such nuclear waste storage is well below the standards of both Russian and Western regulatory requirements.
In 1998, the Norwegian government granted Russia $1 million for a trench to prevent radioactive waste from washing out to sea, even though no one from Norway was allowed to visit Andreeva Bay during the work period. When a Norwegian official was finally allowed to visit the facility in 2001, this fence was constructed to block his view of the rest of the fjord.
Access, at last
The conditions at Andreeva Bay have worried countries near the site ever since they found out about them. But until recently, there was very little that could be done–access to Andreeva and efforts to clean it up were hampered by Russias seemingly innate secrecy, and perhaps by its embarrassment. In May 2001, Russia finally allowed a delegation of Norwegian experts to inspect Andreeva for the first time. It was the first hint of openness from Russia, and it represented a starting point for cooperative international remediation of the site.
Torbjrn Norendal, Norways ambassador for nuclear affairs, says that things are just now beginning to run more smoothly. There is an increasing understanding on the Russian side of the need for some level of transparency–and more importantly, with high-level acceptance of the need for access, he says.
Norway and Russia have begun planning projects together; broader European commitment to the cleanup will be more evident this summer, when a fund of 300 million euros set up by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) should become available for cleanup purposes. If the other G-8 countries follow up on their commitments to assist the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear subs as Britain has done, the bleak situation at Russias rundown northwest naval bases may turn brighter.
Many obstacles to remediation remain–including the problem of the still-strictly limited access to Andreeva.
Surmounting secrecy
Because Russias nuclear naval history is steeped in secrecy, international focus on Andreeva Bay has come slowly.
Before 1992, the Soviet Union (and later Russia) ignored international regulations and simply dumped its radioactive waste, spent fuel, and even whole submarine reactors into the sea. Fourteen reactors, seven of which held spent or damaged nuclear fuel, were tossed into the Kara Sea. Untreated solid and liquid low-level radioactive wastes were ditched in the Barents and Kara seas. It is estimated that the Soviet Union dumped at least twice as much radioactive waste at sea than did the 12 other ocean-dumping nations combined.
Russias first official acknowledgment of its sea disposal practices came in the 1993 Yablokov report, which mentioned the Barents and Kara seas but did not mention Andreeva Bay by name–the site did not make headlines until 1995.
That year, the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resource Protection of the Russian Federation issued a report on the environment. According to the report, The greatest danger in recent years is found in the radioactive waste repositories [located on the Kola Peninsula]. The repositories for spent nuclear fuel are … obsolete, are practically completely full, and could lead the navy to return to the practice of dumping liquid radioactive wastes into the sea. In 1995, the Norwegian watchdog group Bellona became the first Western organization to publicize the dangerous conditions at Andreeva.
Building 5, the first fuel storage facility at Andreeva, was commissioned in 1962, with a capacity of approximately 3,000 fuel assemblies. It was expanded in 1973 to make room for approximately 12,000 more fuel assemblies. A dry storage facility was finished in 1987; it was filled by 1989, and probably contains spent fuel that was removed from Building 5 after water leaks were discovered and eventually repaired. The site has been filled to capacity since the early 1990s. More fuel elements were put in storage at Andreeva in 1993 and again in 1995, even after the poor conditions at the site had been reported in the international press several times.
Today the site is filled far beyond capacity. In addition to different forms of spent fuel, solid and liquid radioactive waste has piled up. Building 5, now close to collapse, holds several tons of radioactive sludge; radioactivity readings show hot spots on its exterior with dose rates close to 1 Sievert per hour. (Acceptable rates would be at levels of micro- or milli-Sieverts per hour.) There is no equipment to monitor the risk of a criticali-ty accident in the spent fuel storage areas. More than 4,000 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste have accumulated in storage at the bay.
Norway has tried for years to facilitate international cooperation in remediation at Andreeva and in other matters of nuclear waste management in Russia. In 1995, Norway co-financed with Sweden the founding of a group of experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Senior officials from nine countries make up the group, which is chaired by Ambassador Norendal. From its office in Vienna, the group has made progress on Andreeva and on other nuclear waste disposal issues. Thanks in large part to the groups work, the Russian government has revealed some important information on conditions.
Norways patience over cleanup has been most evident in its bilateral cooperation with Russia. In 1998, Russia and Norway signed a framework agreement that specifically included Andreeva Bay. Domestic political pressure in Norway to take action on cleaning up the bay had prompted Oslo to promise Russia funding for a lid on one of Andree-vas leaking storage tanks.
But the Russian regulatory authorities declined the project, citing the bays lack of adequate security and radiation protection equipment. So the Norwegian government agreed to spend $1 million to dig a trench to stop radioactive water from washing out to sea and severely contaminating the fjord. Norway financed that cleanup without ever having been given access to the site.
The bay as seen from above
Despite its interest in remediating Andreeva, Russia has been less than forthcoming when it comes to revealing details about the storage site. Satellite imagery provides the most up-to-date information available.
This Ikonos image, taken June 28, 2000, is at 1-meter resolution. Studying the image using collateral information, including a map of the same area from a recent Russian report on Andreeva, we identified many specific facilities and individual buildings at the site. Several features are not on the Russian map. Further investigation of these unknown structures may help to understand how the base functions, and how best to remediate it.
Some of the more important or interesting features of the image:
On Andreevas eastern shore is the main engineering pier (1), 130 meters long, with three perpendicular access roads, forming a backwards E. Just north of this pier, between two others, is a large ship (2) that appears to have capsized on its starboard side. The aft part of the ship appears submerged; when compared with satellite images from high tide, it is evident that the vessel is grounded.
A large rectangular vessel (3) is anchored north of the capsized ship–its purpose unknown. West along the coast is another grounded ship.
The sites liquid radioactive waste storage tanks (4) are two circular containers, both 21 meters in diameter. Directly to the left of these is a poorly defined feature of the same size–probably the remains of another container. Just west is a rectangular, fence-like structure with a small building in the center, which does not appear on the Russian map. Just south of this is the liquid waste treatment plant (5).
Building 5 (6) contains spent nuclear fuel. In 1982 it was the site of a radiation accident. As a result, some spent fuel was removed and stored in the liquid radioactive waste tanks. Spillage from the accident has remained at the bottom of two pools inside the building and has formed a layer of highly radioactive, silty sediments. The radiation levels inside and outside Building 5 are extremely dangerous. A small stream passes nearby, and partly under, Building 5. Until recently, it drained radioactive materials from the leaking structure, down its southern slope, and into the waters of the fjord. The bright white zigzag to the west of the building (7) is the trench Oslo paid Moscow to build in order to capture the contaminated water before it reached the fjord. Tests show that sediments across the bottom of the fjord, from Andreeva in the west to Bolshaya Lopatka in the east, are already radioactively polluted. But Building 5 is not the only source of the contamination. Radioactive material also washes into the fjord from the dilapidated bunkers containing solid radioactive waste (8). Just north of these structures are the open yards (9) where radioactive material–including large equipment, castings, empty transport containers, trucks, and other vehicles–has been stored in the open since the 1960s. Much of it is severely corroded.
South of the main pier, close to the shore, is a building (10) not on the Russian map, measuring 8 × 9 meters at its base. It may be an observation post; from this vantage point there is an excellent view of the entrance to the fjord, of the bay, and of the naval bases across the Zapad-naya Litsa–including the homeport of the Typhoon submarines.
The image shows an interesting cluster of grounded ships in a small shallow bay on the southern coast (11). These are probably auxiliary ships that became so heavily radioactive after transporting spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste that they were permanently grounded. Clearly, this is an additional environmental problem.
Several structures that appear in the satellite image–storage buildings, bunkers, and areas in various stages of dilapidation–do not appear at all on the Russian map. Much of the material stored here is radioactive.
It wasnt until May 2001, after several years of a bureaucratic tug of war with Russia, that the first official foreign delegation ever was allowed at the storage site at Andreeva Bay. Espen Barth Eide, Norways then secretary of state, traveled in the bed of a Russian truck, finally on his way to examine conditions at the bay. But a wooden fence that blocked the view of the rest of the Zapadnaya Litsa fjord had been built especially for the visit.
The Nordic countries–Norway, Finland, and Sweden–naturally fear radioactive contamination of their Arctic resources and fisheries from Andreeva and the other Russian naval bases. A criticality accident at Andreeva, although low in probability, would spell disastrous consequences for the region. And the threat that terrorists might pose to the site, or whether the radioactive spent fuel and other waste could be stolen for use in a dirty bomb, has never been assessed. Oslo has traditionally had a stronger focus on environmental hazards than on nuclear security dangers.
The Norwegian delegates discovered through their Russian counterparts that the enrichment levels of the uranium at Andreeva were between 3070 percent, including unknown quantities of spent fuel from nuclear icebreakers or metal-cooled reactors.
Because of the shoddy storage practices, at the moment nobody–perhaps not even the Russians themselves–knows exactly what kind of material is being stored at Andreeva and other sites. But for the cleanup to be successful, it is essential that Russia share more data on the spent fuel, storage conditions, and infrastructure at the bay. Whether or not Russia shares what it does know could be the ultimate test of its desire to increase transparency and its willingness to advance an international cleanup.
A bumpy road ahead
Norways years of patient negotiations are finally paying off. In June 2002, Russia and Norway signed contracts to improve nuclear safety at Andreeva step by step. The first stages concern improving the bases infrastructure and living conditions for workers. But vast challenges will remain even after new roads, electricity, and housing are established. Later stages of the initiative will focus on physical protection, radiation protection, and dosimetry.
The EBRD has, in response to continued interest in environmental remediation and radioactive waste cleanup, decided to finance continued support to Russia. The bank has set up two funds, one nuclear and one environmental, that include grants and soft loans. Finland, Sweden, and Norway have each promised 10 million euros for these funds; the European Union has pledged 50 million euros. Even Russia will contribute–which it needed to do before several of the other countries would make further resources available.
But there are still obstacles. For three years, the United States and several European countries have been trying without success to reach an umbrella agreement, the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in Russia (MNEPR), that would establish a legal framework for continued remediation assistance. Despite substantive financial pledges, the agreement remains in limbo because the Russian government has yet to promise legal protections to donors. Although Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov did promise tax exemptions at a high-level meeting in Norway this January, the fate of MNEPR is still uncertain.
Andreeva might be just the first in a line of naval sites that need decontamination. On October 2, 2002, a Russian ship carried Norwegian officials along the Kola Peninsula to Gremikha, another former Russian naval base. With no road connection to Murmansk, the Russian and Norwegian officials spent 15 hours in stormy weather each way to view the Gremikha base. Like Andreeva, there is no current military activity there. But Gremikha served as the base for Russias nuclear subs with metal-cooled reactors. Six of these reactors are there, three of them remaining in vessels with the fuel stuck inside the hardened coolant. In total, the Norwegian delegation found 17 abandoned submarines at Gremikha, in addition to some 1,800 fuel assemblies with spent fuel–probably enriched to 90 percent.
The result of newfound Russian openness may be the largest-ever European-dominated cleanup of Cold War nuclear leftovers. But a critical time is on the horizon, and the international community must meet the challenge of balancing Russian security concerns with the need for constant international cash flow, project progress, and sufficient access to sensitive sites. A lot of money–and donor states–are needed. Conservative estimates indicate cleanup costs are in the range of $120 million for Andreeva Bay alone.