Abstract
Instead of being deterred by the new U.S. policy, enemies may respond by acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
Is the United States now willing to launch a preemptive–or even a preventive–nuclear war? There has been little real public discussion, but the Bush administration's most recent strategy documents could be interpreted as lowering the traditional U.S. barriers to the use of nuclear weapons. Considering how potentially dangerous the international reaction to such a radical policy shift could be, it behooves U.S. policymakers and Congress to take a critical look at the wisdom of treading down this path.
The administration released its classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress on December 31, 2001, and issued a new, more general, National Security Strategy on September 17, 2002. How radical is this policy shift? Neither document can be said to call explicitly for preemptive or preventive nuclear strikes. And, at the same time, the United States has never made a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. But when the NPR is read as an implementation strategy for the goals embodied in the National Security Strategy, the specter of a United States ever more ready to use nuclear weapons first against an adversary or even a suspected attacker–state or non-state, nuclear armed or not–emerges quite clearly.
As the strategy bluntly states, “Our enemies … are seeking weapons of mass destruction…. [and] America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” The document further asserts that classic deterrence is unlikely to work against terrorists or rogue states and warns that the United States “cannot let our enemies strike first.”
The National Security Strategy seeks to justify this new strategic posture by citing the recognized right under international law for a nation to defend itself by taking preemptive action against an “imminent attack.” However, the strategy's language clearly stretches the traditional definition of “imminent”–seemingly to include preventing a nation or non-state actor from obtaining even the capability to attack the United States, particularly with weapons of mass destruction.
For example, the strategy states: “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction–and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack…. The United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”
And how will the United States achieve its goals? The answer includes, according to the strategy, transformation of the U.S. military to “provide a wider range of military options.” This language echoes that of the NPR, which states that U.S. strategic forces must provide the president with “a range of options to defeat any aggressor,” and calls for a more “flexible” set of nuclear weapons that “vary in scale, scope, and purpose” to counter emerging threats such as terrorists, rogue states, and the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the NPR is the concept of a “New Triad,” mixing nuclear and non-nuclear offensive options with missile defense. In the past, nuclear strike capabilities have been considered largely separate from non-nuclear capabilities, doctrine, and strategy. On the one hand, this could be a positive development–as the growing capabilities of conventional weaponry could decrease the perceived need for nuclear weapons for a number of future missions. On the other hand, there is the danger that the NPR's language will blur the distinction between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons–perhaps lowering the nuclear first-strike threshold.
Most clearly, however, the potential for preemptive or preventive nuclear war may be seen in the NPR's discussion of using nuclear weapons to “defeat” hardened and deeply buried targets. The NPR details the need to consider new “nuclear weapons options,” including “possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth-penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hard and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage.”
Finally, the NPR names North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya as countries that could be involved in potential “contingencies” requiring nuclear weapons. This list is important in that it highlights the fact that non-nuclear countries are now considered potential nuclear targets–a policy directly counter to U.S. promises to eschew nuclear use against non-nuclear states, promises that crucially underpin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Whether by intent or not, the language in the new U.S. strategic posture portrays an image of an American military with a newly itchy nuclear trigger finger, or at least a bent for coercive nuclear diplomacy. At issue, then, is how other nations will respond. Is it reasonable to expect that, with the world's most preeminent military power asserting its renewed placement of value on nuclear weapons, others will continue on a path of nuclear restraint? Will U.S. enemies be deterred by the threat of a preemptive/preventive nuclear strike, or will they instead be spurred to take their own “use ‘em or lose ‘em” posture?
Unfortunately, these important questions have yet to be taken up in earnest in Washington. But one cannot help but believe they are being answered–likely with negative results for U.S. national and international security–elsewhere in the world.