Abstract
Since the end of the second world war, britain has sought to retain a special relationship with the United States by being its most dependable backer in NATO and for all things military. U.S.-operated bases and facilities in Britain grew from a handful in the late 1940s to 102 by 1983, including deployment sites for nuclear weapons. In 1986, when some NATO members refused the United States their airspace, Britain provided bases from which FB-111s flew to bomb Libyan targets. And only Britain joins the United States in continuing air strikes in Iraq, despite concerns expressed by other allies and members of the U.N. Security Council. It thus comes as no surprise that after sitting on the fence over U.S. missile defense plans (NMD) for some time, Tony Blair's Labour government began signaling its likely backing soon after being reelected in June 2001.
British support for U.S. missile defense plans, dubbed “Son of Star Wars” by much of the media, is vital for practical as well as political reasons. Although the Bush administration is still fuzzy on the details, NMD plans being discussed would almost certainly require upgrading the early warning system at Fylingdales, in Yorkshire, with deployment of high-resolution, phased-array X-band radars. All but the most basic NMD would also be likely to incorporate advanced space-based infrared satellites, requiring an upgrade to another Yorkshire facility, Menwith Hill, better known for its electronic monitoring of communications on behalf of the U.S. National Security Agency.
Before the British election, 281 members of Parliament expressed opposition to missile defense, particularly if it meant abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Many others, including defense and foreign ministry officials and senior officers in the armed services, are skeptical that missile defense–even if it could be made to work–would contribute much to American security or British interests. Opponents do not deny that the acquisition and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose serious threats.
Their skepticism centers on U.S. threat assessments that place high-tech missiles and missile defense center stage. In an influential report issued on July 25, 2000, the allparty Foreign Affairs Select Committee expressed concern about U.S. plans for missile defense, emphasizing that this concern “does not stem from opposition to, or even indifference to, our closest ally's desire to protect itself: The question is whether the additional security that NMD might offer outweighs the negative impact of its deployment on strategic arms control.” Elsewhere, after discussing alternative means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the committee concluded that NMD would not eliminate the threat: “We are concerned that a decision to implement NMD may provide the [United States] with an illusion of security whilst increasing the risks for many other countries by undermining strategic stability.”
Fearing a repeat of the 1980s, when divisions over nuclear policy were perceived as contributing to electoral defeat, the government wanted to avoid debate, decision, or confrontation on this issue until reelection was safely in the bag. Questioned by fellow members of Parliament (MPs) on the government's position in June 2000, then-Foreign Secretary Robin Cook resorted to obfuscation, saying that a debate over Britain's response would be premature, “since at the moment there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question.”
During the May 2001 general elections, missile defense was virtually off the agenda. William Hague declared the Conservative Party's willingness to cooperate with U.S. plans in every way, but in view of popular unease did not push the point. Labour's election managers desired to avoid confrontation over anything to do with defense policy, on which it had been burned in the past.
After the elections, the prime minister unexpectedly replaced Robin Cook with former-Home Secretary Jack Straw. Straw had little or no background in international affairs, but was known to be a much closer ally of the prime minister than Cook. Blair also tried to replace Donald Anderson, the highly respected, independent-minded chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, with a nominee of his own choice. After unexpected rebellion from backbenchers, concerned that an overly controlling prime minister was usurping Parliament's legitimate role of scrutinizing government operations and actions, Blair was forced to back down, enabling Anderson to continue as chair.
Though all sides avoided the issue in the election, the gloves came off soon after. In a June 14 letter to The Guardian, the leaders of 17 of Britain's most powerful trade unions expressed alarm at U.S. missile defense plans. The letter said that U.S. proposals would “do immense damage to international treaties covering weapons of mass destruction [and] undermine international confidence in treaties as a system of resolving problems, if the United States is to set them aside when it feels it is expedient to do so.” The union leaders, whose membership traditionally bankrolls the Labour party, regarded British involvement in missile defense as “wholly inappropriate.”
A week later, Malcolm Savidge, Labour MP for Aberdeen North and convenor of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation, sponsored a parliamentary petition, known as an “early day motion,” which read: “That this House expresses concern at President Bush's intention to move beyond the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in developing missile defense; and endorses the unanimous conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which recommended that the Government voice the grave doubts about NMD in Britain, questioned whether U.S. plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community and recommended that the Government encourage the [United States] to explore all ways of reducing the threat it perceives.”
Altogether 279 MPs have signed, including Parliamentary Labour Party Chair Clive Soley, the Liberal Democrat defense and foreign affairs spokesperson, Menzies Campbell, and 219 of 272 Labour backbenchers. (The Parliamentary Labour Party has 411 members, but by tradition government ministers do not sign early day motions regardless of how sympathetic they may be.) Compared with other such motions, this support is extraordinarily high.
The prime minister, however, had decided to cooperate with U.S. plans for missile defense, whatever they turned out to be. In late July, his new foreign secretary began trying to win support from Labour MPs. In his article “Countdown to a Sensible Defense,” published in the left-leaning Tribune, Jack Straw recalled the Nazi V1 and V2 bombs and rockets that rained down on Britain in 1944-45, declaring that “this country's experience, as the first victim of missile attacks, should underline the necessity for nations to consider and where appropriate put in place missile defenses.”
At the same time, the foreign secretary's office issued a confidential briefing to all Labour MPs, outlining the government's case for supporting missile defense. The briefing borrowed heavily on information provided from the Bush administration on the “growing missile threat,” “rogue states,” and U.S. consultations with its allies and Russia, which the British government welcomed. It emphasized the importance of Britain's “long-standing relationship” with the United States, and warned that the United States would be “far more likely to stay engaged internationally if it feels safe from attack from missiles.”
In deciding to back “Son of Star Wars,” the Labour government had begun to gear up for the greatest clash over defense policy and U.S.-British relations since the 1980s. Newspapers evoked the struggles over Greenham Common, the U.S. cruise missile base 60 miles from London, which was “besieged by women peace protesters through the 1980s.” One government minister openly warned that the struggles over Greenham would “look easy by comparison” with what could be expected if Fylingdales and Menwith Hill were to be incorporated into a U.S. missile defense system. Both facilities have already become the focus of a growing number of demonstrations. Women's peace camps have been set up for months at a time, often accompanied by nonviolent incursions and damage to sensitive equipment. Planning applications are being challenged locally and in the courts. Several women have been imprisoned following their protests against Menwith Hill and Fylingdales, generating more attention and support.
On July 3, Greenpeace hit the headlines and television news with a high-profile demonstration at Menwith Hill in which areas of the base, including a tower adjacent to the radomes, were occupied for several hours by a large number of protesters. On July 12, a Mori poll conducted on behalf of a group of British non-governmental organizations, found that 70 percent of those polled believed that a planned U.S. missile defense system would start a new arms race. A further 72 percent feared that using British facilities in such a system could make Britain a nuclear target. However, 58 percent also worried that relations between Britain and the United States would suffer if Britain did not cooperate in the U.S. missile defense system.
It is too early to gauge the impact of the horrifying September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on British attitudes towards missile defense. In the immediate aftermath, few felt inclined to score points, though some journalists and letter writers pointed out that no amount of dollars poured into high-tech missile defense would have prevented passenger airplanes from being used as bombs.
It had been widely expected that the government would be given a rough ride on a number of issues, including missile defense, at the annual conferences of trades unions and the Labour Party in September and October. Following September 11, that has not happened. Blair's speech to the Labour Party Conference rallied the troops for battle against terrorism, underlining the need for internationalism, but ignoring the contradictions of missile defense. Just three years after completing its meant-to-be-strategic defense review, Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon has announced that the Ministry of Defence will undertake a new strategic defense review to take into account the changed situation.
From peace-movement radicals to conservative pundits, British people across the political spectrum have expressed genuine sorrow and solidarity with the American people for the suffering and loss of life. In the short term, opposition to missile defense has been muted. Some fear that the British government may capitalize on this to push decisions on Fylingdales and Menwith Hill through quickly. Others argue that missile defense has been exposed as the wrong answer to a deadly serious problem, and should be put on a back burner.
Though the emphasis is on unity, differences are appearing between those who would back the United States unconditionally, and those who fear that military retaliation without addressing the wider causes and contexts would fail to root out terrorism and could make national and international security much worse, resulting in high civilian deaths or the further destabilization of regional relations in South Asia and the Middle East. NATO countries are still divided over missile defense. The long term effect of September 11 on this and other foreign policy questions will depend on how the United States and its allies handle their response to the challenges of terrorism and the imperatives of collective security.