Abstract
As the fallout from the Florida presidential vote count settles, you, Mr. President, should heed another tally: the number of nuclear test explosions worldwide. At the end of the twentieth century that total stands at 2,050–the United States responsible for 1,030. Without renewed presidential leadership to secure U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), nuclear testing and attendant security risks could increase.
As commander-in-chief, you inherit a nuclear testing and nonproliferation policy in an unhealthy state of limbo. Nuclear testing is unnecessary to maintain the U.S. arsenal, there is no military need for new nuclear weapons, and according to a policy approved in 1992 by President George H. W. Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the United States has ruled out the testing of new warheads. But as long as the United States fails to ratify the CTBT, it denies itself the benefits of the treaty's provisions and robs itself of the authority necessary to discourage nations from nuclear testing. The logic that candidate George W. Bush applied to nuclear arms reductions during his campaign also applies to the CTBT: “The United States should be prepared to lead by example, because it is in our best interest and the best interest of the world.”
The 1999 CTBT vote illustrates the consequences of Senate inaction and partisanship on foreign policy. The razor-thin outcome of the presidential race and the nearly even balance in the Senate should compel the new administration and Senate leaders to pursue a more bipartisan approach to national security policy. The CTBT will present your administration with an opportunity to repair the damage from the 1999 Senate vote, rebuild a consensus on security policy, and reassure the international community that the United States will not abandon the multilateral nonproliferation regime.
There is broad-based support for reconsideration of the CTBT. On the eve of the treaty's defeat, 62 senators sought to postpone the issue until the new Congress, but uncompromising Republicans pushed for a vote before their colleagues were ready. Since the vote, President Bill Clinton's special adviser on the CTBT, retired Gen. John Shalikashvili, has met with dozens of senators and found that Democrats and many Republican moderates still believe the treaty benefits national security.
The new administration must be careful not to make a precarious situation worse. It must reassure U.S. citizens, Congress, and the international community that the United States will neither resume testing nor begin developing new types of “mininukes.” Mr. President, you should affirm support for the test moratorium and not allow your cabinet or Senate Republican hardliners to rule out ratification. To do otherwise would create a domestic and international storm of protest and set off a dangerous chain reaction involving Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. U.S. abandonment of the test ban would wreak havoc on the nonproliferation regime and strain ties with the Western allies, who are already uneasy about U.S. national missile defense plans.
You should re-evaluate the current stockpile stewardship strategy and consider shifting to proven, cost-effective alternatives. Direct the laboratories to avoid further nuclear warhead modifications, which are unnecessary and may compromise reliability. Before pressing ahead for Senate approval, assemble a high-level, expert team, including treaty supporters like retired Gen. Colin Powell, to iron out skeptics' concerns. Consider whether the chances for getting 67 votes for the CTBT will improve after 2002, when test ban nemesis Republican Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina will likely cede control of the Foreign Relations Committee.
You can ill afford to ignore, let alone renounce, the decades-long U.S. commitment to the test ban. When the countries that have already ratified the CTBT gather in New York in September for a conference on accelerating the treaty into force, the world will be watching you.
A DIFFERENT TAKE
“President Bush must redirect the nation's policy towards nuclear testing…. Nuclear testing is a necessary part of maintaining a credible American nuclear deterrent, not an evil to be curtailed.”
“Transition Brief: The United States Cannot Maintain a Safe, Reliable and Effective Nuclear Deterrent Without Nuclear Testing: The CTBT Must Be Formally Renounced,” The Center for Security Policy (November 29, 2000)