Abstract
An election year is the last time one would expect a rational consensus on policy to emerge from Washington's fiercely partisan cadres of officials, ex-officials, politicians, pundits, and experts. But in the looking glass logic of nuclear weapons, it is somehow fitting that from the heat of a presidential election, there is light across the political spectrum on a fundamental issue: the urgent need for the incoming administration to take an in-depth look at nuclear policy, doctrine, strategy, and posture.
There already is a growing consensus that the review must look at:
• slashing the current arsenal of 10,000 strategic and tactical warheads; and
• de-alerting the 2,400 air- and sea-launched missiles poised for near-immediate launch.
Surprisingly, both presidential candidates–Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. Bush–endorsed the idea of a nuclear review during their campaigns, and raised, albeit vaguely, the possibility of deep cuts in the arsenal. The Bush camp went further by agreeing with the arms control community that the hair-trigger alert status of U.S. missiles ought to be reconsidered.
That said, it doesn't really matter what view the incoming president holds about the policy review–the fiscal year 2001 defense authorization bill, passed by the House and Senate this fall, mandates it: “In order to clarify United States nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the near term, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years. The Secretary shall conduct the review in consultation with the Secretary of Energy.”
There is one simple reason for the strange alignment of Washington's stars in support of a new look at nuclear weapons: There has been no sweeping review since President Bill Clinton's Nuclear Posture Review of 1994, which many maintain was simply a Pentagon-led effort to justify the status quo arsenal while complying with the limit of 3,500 deployed warheads agreed to under the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Neither the size of the arsenal nor nuclear doctrine has changed much since then.
“What we urgently need is not a posture review, but a policy review. We have not had a meaningful policy review since 1982. Posture flows from policy, not vice versa,” Gen. Lee Butler (ret.), former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, wrote in August.
Others are more outspokenly critical of the failure of the 1994 review. “What nuclear policy? There hasn't been one under the Clinton administration,” one U.S. government expert on nuclear proliferation told me in an interview.
The problem, according to experts in widely different political camps, is that the mismatch between today's foreign and security policy agenda and Cold War-based nuclear doctrine is becoming increasingly apparent, not only to U.S. policy-makers, but also to the international community at large.
For example, the United States has promised countries forsaking nuclear weapons that they will not be targeted by U.S. nuclear warheads. Yet a classified presidential guidance (pdd-60, signed in 1997) reportedly leaves open the possibility of retaliation–or even a first strike–against an attack or threat by chemical or biological weapons. Air force doctrine based on this guidance states, “Because the United States lacks the ability for an in-kind response to chemical and biological weapons, it must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent against all forms of wmd [weapons of mass destruction].”
This is a “‘don't ask, don't tell’ nuclear doctrine,” says the government proliferation expert.
The questions being raised in the domestic debate refleet the fundamental nature of the problem. Is nuclear deterrence dead? Or is it alive in some places (Russia) and dead in others (North Korea)? Is National Missile Defense necessary in a world of proliferating capabilities, or is it instead more likely to hasten proliferation? Is counterforce the right approach to nuclear targeting? Or is maintaining enough warheads to obliterate 2,000-plus “military and leadership” targets in Russia “overkill,” and “silly,” as Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information, said in August?
The politics are even more labyrinthine than the substantive issues, tangling traditional political lines. As Stephen Hadley, a top Bush adviser on nuclear policy and former Pentagon official, explained to the New York Times in May, “traditional arms control is dead.” A number of nuclear hawks and abolitionists agree, even though their policy prescriptions are as radically different as one would expect.
There is very little agreement on what exact changes ought to result from a policy/posture review. For example, there is broad consensus that a smaller arsenal is desirable, but how small continues to be controversial.
Given the vastly differtng views about why a new policy is needed, what should the new review actually review? Obviously, that depends on who answers the question. But a few ground rules are necessary–and, hopefully, not too controversial.
First, the review must be conducted by an inter-agency body, not just the Defense and Energy departments. Those departments have significant vested interests (especially the nuclear labs whose existence depends on nukes). The National Security Council should lead the effort. Just as important, the nuclear debate must go public–and outside experts, on a bipartisan basis, from Congress and non-governmental organizations must be consulted.
A broad-based approach is required because nuclear weapons policy should not be decided in a vacuum. It must be considered as part and parcel of overarching U.S. foreign and security policy. That means fundamental questions must be raised. Who is the arsenal aimed at, and what does that say about its current and future composition? Is the threat of a U.S. nuclear attack, under any circumstances, credible either politically or militarily? How does nuclear policy affect U.S. relations with allies (as well as enemies) on the global stage? What are the security and foreign policy benefits, risks, and costs?
Further, input from the military–not just the politicized Defense Department–is necessary. What do the regional commanders and the Joint Chiefs believe they need from a nuclear arsenal, today and 20 years from now? The answers might be surprising. According to Hadley, “We've been keeping a large inventory of nuclear weapons that we don't need and that the military doesn't want.”
Second, Pentagon participation should be undertaken in tandem with the Quadrennial Defense Review launched in September. Strategic nuclear policy cannot be examined without linking it to conventional defense policy, strategy, and force structure.
In fact, one crucial factor in reconsidering nuclear numbers and targeting requirements is the vast improvement over the past decade in the range, stealth, and accuracy of conventional strike weapons. Blair and other experts argue that, with today's technology, there are few missions nuclear weapons can accomplish that conventional weapons cannot.
A DIFFERENT TAKE
“The Pentagon has been working for months on position papers, options, and analyses intended to present your new administration with available choices. Left on ‘autopilot,’ this process is quite capable of building a program and carrying it out without direction by you or your new defense team.”
“Taking Charge, Bipartisan Panel Offers National Security Action Plan for the President-Elect,” Rand Corporation report
The question of spending priorities also must be examined: Is the $25 billion per year spent on the U.S. nuclear weapons complex justified, or should some of that spending be shifted to conventional defense needs?
Third, the interplay of U.S. nuclear policy and posture on international nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament efforts must be fully taken into account. Decisions about issues such as downsizing the arsenal (including submarine-launched ballistic missiles), National Missile Defense, and adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must be considered with the larger arms control impact in mind.
In particular, the review must acknowledge that the United States is committed to pursuing nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt), originally signed in 1968. The U.S. government reiterated and enhanced its commitment to the treaty's ultimate goal in May, signing onto a package of practical measures aimed at incremental implementation and agreeing to “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.”
At least in public, however, there has never been a U.S. government blueprint developed for reaching that goal; no agency or bureaucracy is even responsible for doing so. There is no Joint Vision 2020, 2030, or even 2050 for how the U.S. military could achieve disarmament and still protect national security. Instead, there are many in the U.S. nuclear bureaucracy and on Capitol Hill calling for modernization of the nuclear arsenal, and even the development of new, “more user-friendly” weapons of smaller yield. The contradiction is apparent.
The new review should compare U.S. commitments under the npt process in detail, with current and planned policy, doctrine, and posture–and align them. If the president instead decides that certain treaty requirements run counter to national security needs, then he owes the American people and the international community a detailed explanation. Today's schizophrenic policy–saying one thing in international arms control circles but another in official U.S. political/military guidance–is neither sustainable on the world stage nor acceptable to any side of the domestic political equation.
The bottom line is that U.S. nuclear policy is broken. If it is to be fixed, the next president must face the fundamental questions–the who, what, how, where, and why–of nuclear weapons. And he must be prepared to defend his answers to the U.S. public and the rest of the world.
Failure to take on the issue is not an option. The result of an ostrich-like position on the part of the new administration surely will be a further deterioration of U.S. standing as a global leader. Superpowers can ill afford a reputation for waffle and/or deceit.