Abstract
When three indian warships sailed into Israel's Red Sea port of Eilat last March, it wasn't a signal of increasing tensions, but of friendship and evolving ties between the two countries. The frigate, tanker, and destroyer were on India's second naval goodwill mission to Israel.
An Indian air force pilot checks out a Russian Su-30.
But is the warmth genuine? India and Israel share enough common ground to merit cooperation. Both are dealing with domestic terrorism and vocal separatist movements, and both have de facto nuclear status. But what really draws them together is that each has something the other wants. India is determined to modernize its armed forces, and Israel is ready to jump at such a lucrative market–worth upwards of $2 billion, according to defense sources quoted in Israel's Ha'aretz newspaper.
By embracing Israel as a merchant of defense equipment, India will not only reduce dependence on its economically troubled suppliers in Russia, but also benefit from the high quality of Israeli defense goods. Such cooperation is also important because the United States put sanctions on defense exports to India after its 1998 nuclear tests.
Indo-Israeli defense ties predate diplomatic relations, which were formalized in the early 1990s. According to a paper published by P. R. ^^ Kumaraswamy, during India's war with China in 1962 and during conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, New Delhi received small arms and ammunition from Israel. Normalizing ties led to official cooperation, and some theorists argue that the desire to expand security cooperation was a key motive behind diplomacy.
Indo-Israeli collaboration started with aerospace technologies. In August 1992, representatives from Israel Aircraft Industries' Malat subsidiary visited India, reportedly offering cruise missile expertise. Three years later, Israel's air force chief visited India, which returned the gesture in 1996. That April, an air force officer was dispatched to Israel as India's first defense attaché.
Israel has aided India with airborne electronic warfare and avionics research. In 1995, Israeli air force Commander Herzl Bodinger offered India expertise in airborne early warning control, anti-radar systems, and fly-by-wire technology. Israel also clinched an $80 million deal to supply electronic warfare systems for India's MiG-21bis Fishbed. This package, India's first significant purchase from Israel, included air combat maneuvering instrumentation systems, which improve flight performance. Another sale may include upgrades for Sepecat Jaguar, MiG-27MH “Bahadur” (Valiant), and Su-30MKI aircraft, according to India Today. Israel might offer upgrades to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, India's licensed producer of the MiG-21bis, before the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft enters service, according to Kumaraswamy. India also wants help reducing the number of aircraft it loses to bird strikes.
India's T-72 tanks and howitzers might also benefit from Israeli technology, and the army considered buying Israeli unmanned air vehicles, including 16 hunter and seekers at $1.6 million each, according to 1994 reports. A year later, the two countries signed a $50 million deal for Harpy reconnaissance drones. India is considering Haron and Hermes vehicles for border operations, according to the Deccan Herald.
India wants Israeli maritime communications to augment its major surface vessels, according to the Indian Express. It also has its eyes on the Barak missile system, allegedly capable of destroying anti-shipping missiles and aircraft, which would be carried aboard the Viraat, India's only aircraft carrier.
India enjoys good relations with Iran, Israel's adversary, as well as with other Middle Eastern countries that have frosty feelings toward Israel.
Israel and India also cooperate in counterterrorism efforts. In 1994, India requested equipment to guard the de facto Indo-Pakistan Kashmiri border. New Delhi was interested in Israeli fences, which use electronic sensors to track human movements. During Indian Home Minister L. K. Advani's trip in June 2000 to Israel for security talks, he planned to visit similar systems guarding the Israeli-Lebanese border, according to the BBC. Last year, Indian and Israeli Foreign Ministers Jas-want Singh and David Levy agreed to establish a joint commission on terrorism that will meet twice yearly–once in each country.
Despite deepening Indo-Israeli relations, each country faces challenges. India's Muslim community may distrust the relationship with Israel, and some Indian politicians might worry about dealing too closely with Israel, a major client of the United States. This anxiety could crystallize if Israel and the United States sign a defense pact. New Delhi's relationship with Washington was tempestuous throughout the Cold War.
New Delhi admires Israel's high-tech, motionsensing border fences like the one shown above.
India also has financial concerns. Israeli defense equipment is costly, and it is doubtful whether New Delhi will be offered the generous financing terms it enjoys with Russia. Israel's defense industry, which has financial concerns of its own, might be unable to offer such benefits.
Finally, there are the foreign policy concerns. Israel assists Chinese defense projects such as the F-10 fighter, which may upset hawks in New Delhi who fear China. India also enjoys good relations with Iran, Israel's adversary, as well as several other Middle Eastern countries that have frosty relations with Israel. New Delhi will be reticent to risk these old, financially beneficial friendships. It also has to consider its solidarity with the Palestinians, as seen in Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh's visit to the Palestinian National Authority in July 2000, during which he expressed a desire for more cooperation.
Israel faces a final obstacle in dealing with India–it has to avoid offending Washington. After its 1998 nuclear tests, India joined the U.S. “countries of concern” list. Washington could wince at Israel supplying defense equipment and assistance to a shadowy nuclear power. And Israel's financial dependence on the United States could give Washington de facto veto power over Israeli defense exports to countries deemed inappropriate.