Abstract
The senate's defeat of the comprehensive test Ban Treaty was an unmitigated disaster. Treaty proponents miscalculated, the administration's ratification campaign came too late, and both were brushed aside by Republican partisanship. The one glimmer of encouragement: the vote may serve as a wake-up call to those working to reduce and eventually eliminate the world's reliance on nuclear weapons.
The last deep valley in nuclear arms control occurred in 1980, when President Jimmy Carter was forced to shelve the SALT II agreement in the face of Senate opposition and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1981, Ronald Reagan took office, promising a buildup of military might and suggesting he might abandon arms control. Some of his top officials—and Reagan himself—were given to loose talk about using nuclear weapons.
Yet out of those depths came a reinvigorated nuclear freeze movement that quickly mushroomed in strength, attracted widespread national and media attention, and in a few years, changed the terms of the debate. The freeze crusade, in turn, helped lead to major progress by the end of the 1980s, first under the leadership of the once sabre-rattling Ronald Reagan, and then under his successor, George Bush.
Today's would-be turnaround artists of arms control need to focus on four major areas:
• First, the movement must use the recent disaster to increase its numbers. In the past decade, the ranks of activists have shrunk and organizations have disappeared or turned to other issues. This trend is the direct result of the end of the Cold War, which to most people has meant the end of the nuclear threat.
Yet, in the weeks after the treaty's defeat, a lot of anecdotal evidence suggested that many individuals who had not been active for years were shocked and upset, and it may be possible to re-engage them. These are people who should be asked to rejoin organizations, to contribute money, and to become active in the districts and states.
• Second, the movement needs to remake the fundamental case for international agreements that help to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, reduce nuclear arsenals, and make the world a safer place.
For the past decade, many in the arms control movement have believed the value of arms control was self-evident and did not require constant reiteration. But as it turned out in October, too few senators agree.
Many people—President Clinton and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger includ-ed—have labeled the Senate vote a sign of resurgent isolationism. Instead, it is more accurate to understand the vote as part of the growth of U.S. unilateralism—the rise in the ranks of those who feel the United States can go it alone. These new American cowboys feel that as the world's strongest military and economic power, the United States can do whatever it pleases—ignore its international obligations, deploy missile defenses, retain an enormous nuclear weapons stockpile, and take unilateral action.
To counter these new-right theorists, those who advocate reductions in nuclear weapons need to engage in a massive campaign aimed not only at the public but also at opinion elites—the media, opinion writers, foreign policy experts—stressing the value of international cooperation as well as the disasters that await if the United States goes it alone.
Such an argument should find a receptive audience in one segment of the Republican Party—the internationalist wing that includes Senators Richard Lugar of Indiana, Ted Stevens of Alaska, Pete Domenici of New Mexico, John Warner of Virginia, and Chuck Hagel of Nebraska. These senators voted against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but wanted to postpone the vote. All appeared uncomfortable with the highly partisan nature of the vote and the damage caused to the American position abroad.
In the weeks since the vote, several of these senators have joined with Democrats to rebuild dialogue and cooperation across party lines on international as well as domestic issues. Lugar and Carl Levin of Michigan organized one effort; Hagel and Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut worked together on a second. Warner suggested that a commission could be established to “improve” the test ban treaty.
• Third, the movement needs to flex its political muscle. The fundamental way that other movements—gun control and abortion, to name two—have demonstrated their political clout is by being widely seen as having contributed to the defeat of one or more political candidates.
If the arms control movement were widely perceived in November 2000 to have contributed to the defeat of Michigan Republican Sen. Spencer Abraham, for instance, it would certainly help efforts in 2001 and beyond. And if nuclear activists put Missouri Republican Sen. John Ashcroft on the defensive during his reelection campaign, that would yield dividends as well.
At the same time, those taking the political route have to be aware of the risks of hardening Republican positions against the test ban treaty.
• Fourth, those toiling in the vineyards must be prepared to fight several rear-guard actions this year to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. With elections in Russia and the United States, it's difficult to expect much progress. And there may be further disasters ahead if the Clinton administration opts for a National Missile Defense system this summer, crippling or destroying the ABM Treaty in the process. Most signs now point to a decision to deploy.
Those opposing National Missile Defense need to construct a careful political and substantive case for postponing the president's decision. This campaign needs to stress the foreign relations disasters a deployment decision will lead to—immediate crises with Russian and China, for example—as well as the fact that a decision is scheduled to be made after only three of 19 tests of the hardware have been completed.
Republicans this year may also attempt to cut back the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which works to reduce nuclear dangers in the former Soviet Union. Senators could try to block the U.S.-North Korean nuclear accord, cut funding for test ban verification, and undercut the legal basis for continuing to adhere to the test ban treaty.
Those who are promoting further steps— abolition, de-alerting, or other far-reaching decisions—should be asked to focus this year on the immediate decisions that can either improve or undermine their future efforts.
The work in all four areas—reinvigorating the base, reconstructing the basic message, building political clout, and focusing on missile defense and the abm Treaty—is aimed at 2001. But the seeds need to be planted in the next months if they are expected to flourish by early 2001 when a new president and Congress take office.
It is possible, of course, that Democrats will retake the House and make gains in the Senate, providing a somewhat more favorable environment for nuclear issues. And all four of the major presidential contenders at the end of 1999—Bush, McCain, Gore, and Bradley— come from the internationalist wings of their parties. It is possible—but not guaranteed— that any of the four, if elected, would resurrect the test ban treaty.
It is also important to note that George W. Bush took a carefully balanced position, opposing the test ban treaty but calling for a continued moratorium on nuclear testing. It is also useful to remember that Republican presidents have a much easier time achieving arms control successes.
Then again, these may just be crumbs in a mosaic of failure. Still, past disasters have sown the seeds of future victories.