Abstract
The Place: Muridke (Lahore, Pakistan). The date: November 5, 1999. The occasion: the annual convention of Lashkar-e-Toiba, a militant Islamic organization fighting for an independent Kashmir.
October 29, 1999: Pakistanis in Lahore dance in front of a portrait of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who overthrew the government of Nawaz Sharif.
According to news reports, more than 350,000 men gathered in open tents to spew venom on the Indian government, the United States, Israel, and other “enemies of Islam.” Kashmiris were supplemented by Afghanis, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Saudis, Iraqis, Sudanese, and Algerians. It was the largest gathering ever of Islamic militants in Pakistan. The struggle for Kashmir had indeed become pan-Islamic.
General Pervez Musharraf's October 12 coup against an elected Pakistani government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has done wonders for the enthusiasm of Islamic militants in Pakistan. Musharraf, after all, has been their mentor and trainer. “The blood of infidels will flow,” shouted Hafiz Saeed, the Lashkar's leader. “Amen,” screamed his bearded and skull-capped followers as they raised their Kalash-nikovs to toast this call to war.
A day after the Muridke meeting, militants attacked a heavily fortified camp in Srinagar, the capital of Indian Kashmir, killing an army public relations officer and his staff of six. Days later, U.S. and U.N. property in Islamabad was attacked with rockets; two Pakistanis were killed.
Elsewhere in Kashmir, rocket attacks, land mines, and grenades exploded as the militants went about the business of harassing Indians, apparently confident that they had better support now than under Nawaz Sharif.
Under Musharraf, Pakistan's hard-line stance against India has become more rigid. The general's appointment of Abdus Sattar as foreign minister, an anti-India hawk, may have set the tone for what Indian-Pakistani relations will be like in the coming months.
Sattar lost no time in setting the “agenda” for cross-border dialogue. “Kashmir will be on top of any discussion with India,” he declared. More ominously, perhaps, he described the Lahore peace process—which Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and former Pakistani Prime Minster Sharif had signed—as “insignificant.”
India is reciprocating. It used its considerable influence in the 54-nation British Commonwealth to suspend Pakistan from the Commonwealth “until democracy is restored.” It also arm-twisted Sri Lanka into postponing a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Colombo. “The atmosphere was not right,” said Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.
Some observers suggest that India's Bharatiya Janata Party-led government should be grateful to Pakistan's new strongman. Musharraf led a military goof-up in Kargil last summer that helped the bjp win an even more dominant position in the September parliamentary elections. And by seizing power in October, the general gave the bjp a tool to further consolidate its position at home while improving its image abroad.
“We are a secular democracy,” Vittal C. Rao, an Indian Foreign Ministry official who has served in Pakistan, told me. “We invited the Pope on a state visit. Would they [Pakistan] have done that?”
The BJP-led government has decided not to talk officially to the Musharraf regime. But is this hardline policy on both sides good for the region?
“Certainly not,” says I. K. Gujral, India's prime minister from 1997 to 1998. “Both sides have to see the light at some time and return to the negotiation table.”
Gujral, who preceded Vajpayee in office, had favored a constructive dialogue with Pakistan, something the present administration in New Delhi does not want to indulge in as long as that means dealing with Musharraf.
“That could be a mistake,” said Guj-ral. “Like it or not, Musharraf appears to be popular in Pakistan. Since seizing power, there have been no anti-military demonstrations and reports of military repression or human rights abuses. He is widely regarded in Pakistan as a breath of fresh air after Sharif.”
Reports from Pakistan suggest that corruption is actually down; inflation has fallen by two percentage points since the October coup; and the Pakistani rupee is holding steady—all signs that the military is getting a grip on the economy, however tentative.
While leaders at the November Commonwealth Summit in Durban, South Africa, were vociferous in demanding an early restoration of democracy in Pakistan, Pakistanis in general are neither agitated nor concerned about living under military rule. There is not even a whisper about the need for a “timetable” to restore democracy.
Javed Jabbar, a former Pakistani information minister and now general secretary of the Millat Party, said in an interview with the Hindustan Times, a Delhi newspaper, “There are many hazards to a rigid timeframe. The moment the system learns that the tenure of a particular government is going to end on date X, it becomes a lame duck administration.”
Even the Pakistani intelligentsia isn't too bothered yet, because key aspects of a democratic society—like a free press and independent judiciary— have not been curbed. “These may act as deterrents against one man or a group of men deciding to arbitrarily extend their tenure,” says Jabbar. “Democratic institutions will retain enough vitality even under military rule to check the regime from degenerating into blatant authoritarianism.”
Professor Ibadullah Rashdi of the University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan, told me by telephone, “Democracy has failed to strike roots in Pakistan because the will of the people has never been articulated through it. Our so-called democracy has been the captive of landlords and business groups. In the garb of democracy, we had a mafia-like rule which occasionally degenerated into urban riots.”
In contrast, the army has made even a midnight drive down Karachi's infamous Port Road safe. “There have been no riots in the city. The army has brought peace. At least we can work,” a Karachi taxi driver told Dinesh Shar-ma, an Indian who frequently visits Pakistan on business.
The paucity of support for deposed premier Nawaz Sharif can be gauged from the near-total lack of public sympathy for him. His ongoing trial in Karachi, on charges of conspiracy to murder, hardly attracts a crowd. Fowziah Khalili, a social worker with UNICEF told me, “People seem to think that Sharif deserved what he got, even though they know that his removal was illegal and unconstitutional.”
Musharraf is said to be aware that popular support for him is based on anger and disappointment with corrupt politicians. He is trying to convert some of that disappointment into gains for himself. By initiating legal action against relatives of Sharif, Benazir Bhutto, and scores of other well-connected families, he is sending the right message down the line. He is cultivating the image of a liberal and constantly feeding the press with stories of “cleansing the system.”
The general is here to stay for the long haul. Indications are that he is planning a referendum early this year to accord legitimacy to his rule.
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee might not like to think so, but the army is the most stabilizing institution in Pakistan. Pakistan's civilian leadership has always been subordinate to the military, which sets its own agenda and carries it out, regardless of what the politicians think.
Rather than treat General Musharraf as an untouchable, goes the argument, India should start a dialogue with the Pakistani government, meeting him and his ministers in multinational forums like the Commonwealth and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The Lahore process should be revived, if possible.
If India softens its anti-Musharraf approach, the general might respond positively—and the results on the ground could be substantial in terms of a reduction in cross-border tensions.
If a cross-border dialogue is not resumed soon, the year 2000 could be a sorry one indeed for South Asia. For starters, many Indians predict increased terrorism and acts of war against India in Kashmir. When summer comes to the high country, shelling and firefights and infiltration are often not far behind. Musharraf already distrusts India. By fueling that distrust, New Delhi will only invite him to another fight.
And it could be a big fight. In recent months, Pakistan has taken delivery of French Mirage fighters and Augosta submarines, and tanks from Ukraine. Meanwhile, India continues a massive conventional arms buildup.
Even if India engages Musharraf in dialogue, there would be no guarantee that he would rein in the Islamic militants. But it would be a starting point. Prime Minister Vajpayee must be apprehensive about talking peace with Pakistan again, having figuratively burnt his fingers after shaking hands with Nawaz Sharif. But isolating Musharraf is not likely to decrease his animosity toward New Delhi.
Regardless of who is at the helm, general or prime minister, Pakistan has a place in the international community. A nation with 130 million people and a small nuclear arsenal cannot be isolated just because of a military coup— particularly if that coup has popular support, which seems to be the case.