Abstract
Maybe one good thing will come from the Chinese espionage flap–the weapons labs' security deficiencies may be improved.
The report of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China–customarily called the Cox report after Chairman Christopher Cox–created a major stir before and after its May 25 release. (See, for instance, “A Very Convenient Scandal” in the May/June Bulletin and “Call China's Hand” in the July/August issue.)
While informed observers may see the conclusions offered in the Cox report for what they are–productive criticisms at best, political maneuverings at worst–much of the public may not have the political or historical context with which to consider the relevance or accuracy of such important-sounding judgments.
Nor will the general public necessarily hear important criticisms of the report. For example, following the release of the report, Washington Cong. Norman Dicks, the committee's ranking Democrat, explained that “the conclusions of the report have been written in a worst-case fashion.” The objective, he explained, was to provoke changes at Energy Department weapons laboratories.
While presenting a worst-case scenario may facilitate change, the approach comes with some risk. In addition to distorting the historical record, it may create exaggerated or premature fears about the consequences of China's acquisition of nuclear weapons information. It is important to evaluate what we know about past events and to acknowledge the uncertainties in estimating the impact on Chinese nuclear capabilities as well as the strategic consequences for the United States and its allies.
The espionage issue
For more than a decade, the state of security at U.S. nuclear labs has been the target of criticism–from a multitude of General Accounting Office reports, some Energy Department officials, and the occasional congressional hearing. China's strategy for improving its nuclear arsenal has been well understood for even longer.
For example, a 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency brief noted that increased Chinese access to U.S. technology, combined with China's covert acquisition efforts, would by the 1990s show up as “qualitative improvements” in warhead reliability, size, and multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) capability. Of concern was both “overt contact with U.S. scientists and technology, and the covert acquisition of U.S. technology.”
The brief also projected, however, that Chinese nuclear forces would remain small when compared to those of the Soviet Union and that China would not attempt to match the superpowers in overall nuclear capability. It noted that China would continue to seek Western technology, primarily to support its underground nuclear test program.
Security deficiencies at the labs do exist, as confirmed in last June's report by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which noted a variety of defects, including inefficient security clearance programs, loosely controlled programs for foreign scientists, inadequate control of classified documents, poor counterintelligence programs, and deficient computer security methods.
But while inadequate security invites espionage, it does not, by itself, establish the frequency or seriousness of espionage activity. Of course, China's extensive use of its intelligence services, students abroad, and travelers to collect technical information–both classified and unclassified–is hardly surprising. But the question remains as to how much information China has obtained–and how much of that was obtained through espionage.
The Cox report states that the “U.S. Intelligence Community reported in 1996 that China stole neutron bomb technology from a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory.” It goes on to assert that China stole classified information concerning seven warheads, including the W88, which is deployed on the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. In addition, the report also notes that during the mid-1990s the United States discovered that China had acquired U.S. technical information concerning insensitive high explosives, a component of some thermonuclear weapons, and raises the possibility that China also acquired classified U.S. nuclear weapons computer codes from one or more of the weapons laboratories.
There are three basic sources for the committee's conclusions. Analysis of Chinese nuclear tests conducted between 1990 and 1995 led to the conclusion by some Energy Department analysts (a conclusion questioned by some CIA analysts) that China had stolen W88 technology. Energy's analysis indicated a dramatic shift to a warhead design similar to the W88, one that allowed production of smaller warheads without sacrificing explosive power (New York Times, March 6, 1999). And in 1996, a source inside China's intelligence service reported that officials were boasting that they had just stolen U.S. secrets that would allow them to improve Beijing's neutron bomb (New York Times, April 8, 1999).
The most extensive data on Chinese acquisition of U.S. nuclear secrets is derived from a 1988 Chinese document provided to the CIA in 1995 by a walk-in. The document describes the weight, dimensions, explosive yield, and other significant details of six U.S. nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles that carry them, along with hand-drawn sketches of the reentry vehicles.
Conclusively establishing the extent of espionage and those responsible has proven difficult. The FBI investigation that focused on China's acquisition of data about the W70 warhead (carried by the retired Lance short-range ballistic missile) resulted in the resignation of one scientist from Lawrence Livermore. The investigation concerning disclosure of W88 technology–information that, according to the PFIAB, has been accessible to a number of government and military organizations since 1983–has produced a suspect, Wen Ho Lee, but a suspect who may never be charged because of insufficient evidence.
And although Peter Lee, a former employee of Lawrence Livermore contractor TRW, confessed to providing Chinese scientists with oral information on submarine detection technology and techniques for creating miniature nuclear fusion explosions, the FBI is not sure it has gotten the whole story from Lee.
The inability to link much of China's knowledge of U.S. nuclear weapons design with specific acts of espionage is due in part to the lack of any data concerning Chinese acquisition of sensitive documents. In many Cold War espionage cases, those charged with spying on behalf of the Soviet Union would, after their initial confession, provide details on what particular documents they delivered, permitting U.S. analysts to judge the extent of the compromise.
Instead, apart from Peter Lee, the United States has as evidence its analysis of China's nuclear tests, two suspects (the scientist who worked at Livermore and Wen Ho Lee) who admit no wrongdoing, and a Chinese document summarizing some of China's knowledge concerning U.S. nuclear warheads. To muddy the waters further, the Chinese document was provided by a source that the U.S. intelligence community has concluded was under Chinese control.
Thus, the brief damage assessment released by the Director of Central Intelligence a month before the Cox report noted that “we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were acquired.” With respect to the issue of espionage, the assessment observed that Chinese advances have resulted from “information derived from espionage, contact with U.S. and other countries' scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified U.S. weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development. The relative contribution of each cannot be determined (emphasis added).”
Impact
The uncertain role that espionage has played in Chinese acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapons technology makes it difficult to determine how security practices at U.S. nuclear labs contributed to China's ability to acquire such information, although this is no excuse for delaying aggressive action to correct the deficiencies. The ultimate repercussions of China's acquisition of information about U.S. nuclear weapons technology will depend, in part, on the extent to which such information results in China increasing the size and quality of its arsenal. Some reports suggest that the road-mobile DF-31 ICBM, which was apparently tested in August, will incorporate W88 technology. But unless China expands its arsenal and adopts a more aggressive nuclear posture, the fact that its missiles have better warheads will make little difference in the overall nuclear balance.
One way that W88 technology could lead to a more impressive Chinese nuclear arsenal is if China were to develop an arsenal of missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVS)–including those carried on submarines. The Cox committee, while noting reports that China has undertaken efforts related to multiple warhead technology, also states that it “has no information on whether China currently intends to develop and deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle systems.” Likewise, the intelligence community assessment noted that China has had the capability to deploy land-based MIRVed missiles for a number of years. Whether China's acquisition of W88 information stimulates deployment of land or sea-based MIRVed missiles remains to be seen.
China also faces hurdles in employing the information it acquired–particularly if it did not obtain blueprints or other documents related to nuclear weapons design. As reported in the May 11 Los Angeles Times, one U.S. official said regarding the walk-in document, “knowing the dimension and size doesn't tell you how to build a nuclear weapon.” And in the May 30 Washington Post, two former lab directors questioned how useful the information discussed in the Cox report would be in helping China develop a more sophisticated arsenal. In addition, a significant expansion of China's nuclear arsenal would not come cheap–and its leaders may not be willing to pay that heavy price, since there would be no hope of obtaining a nuclear advantage over the United States.
Further, the ultimate impact is not simply a function of technical improvements in the Chinese nuclear arsenal. For example, would China be more willing to take action against Taiwan simply as a result of improving its nuclear arsenal? Or would other factors, such as a lack of U.S. resolve in its overall relationship with China (as exhibited by recent administrations) or a dramatic improvement in China's conventional capabilities, particularly its ability to launch an amphibious invasion, have more influence?
Nonetheless, it seems clear that no good will come out of China's acquisition of sensitive information on U.S. nuclear weapons–except that it might stimulate security improvements at Energy Department labs. However, the question remains open as to the extent of the damage that will result. A full assessment will have to wait until it is possible to more precisely assess the breadth and depth of China's espionage activities, evaluate their impact on China's arsenal and strategic doctrine, and measure the effect on China's relations with the United States and the rest of Asia.